6 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 2003–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Investigation of the Death of Millergreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Miller, 357 N.C. at 330 (“Significantly, our General Assembly has not seen fit to enact . . . statutory provisions for the attorney-client privilege, and we must look solely to the common law for its proper application.”). by inducing them to sign licensing agreements that disclaimed a franchise relationship with WW when WW and Beth Vannoy knew WW’s disclaimer was false. 42 As a result, Plaintiffs argue that the crime-fraud exception should be applied to effect a waiver of privilege concerning all of WW’s communications regarding franchise law matters prior to 1 November 2011. 43 34 2021Given the importance of the attorney-client privilege to North Carolina’s jurisprudence and the resulting scrutiny that should be applied to any exceptions, Miller, 357 N.C. at 331 , parties advancing the crime-fraud exception must prove the prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Zolingreen2 sentences2022In that regard, “the crime-fraud exception applies only when the client has engaged the services of a lawyer ‘in furtherance of future illegal conduct.’ ” Ford I, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 89 , at *21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989)). 31. 2021Furthermore, the crime-fraud exception applies only when the client has engaged the services of a lawyer “in furtherance of future illegal conduct.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130 , 151–52 (D. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2019The crime-fraud exception exists to recognize that “the attorney- client privilege cannot serve as a shield for fraud or as a tool to aid in the commission of future criminal activities; if a communication is not ‘made in the course of seeking or giving legal advice for a proper purpose,’ it is not protected.” Id. (quoting State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 611 , 430 S.E.2d 188, 204 (1993)); see State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 498 , 42 S.E.2d 686 , 702–03 (1947) (“[T]he communication must have been made in the course of seeking legal advice for a proper purpose; hence, no privilege exists wher 2019The crime-fraud exception exists to recognize that “the attorney- client privilege cannot serve as a shield for fraud or as a tool to aid in the commission of future criminal activities; if a communication is not ‘made in the course of seeking or giving legal advice for a proper purpose,’ it is not protected.” Id. (quoting State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 611 , 430 S.E.2d 188, 204 (1993)); see State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 498 , 42 S.E.2d 686 , 702–03 (1947) (“[T]he communication must have been made in the course of seeking legal advice for a proper purpose; hence, no privilege exists wher | 2 | 2 |
State v. . Davenportgreen2 sentences2019The crime-fraud exception exists to recognize that “the attorney- client privilege cannot serve as a shield for fraud or as a tool to aid in the commission of future criminal activities; if a communication is not ‘made in the course of seeking or giving legal advice for a proper purpose,’ it is not protected.” Id. (quoting State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 611 , 430 S.E.2d 188, 204 (1993)); see State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 498 , 42 S.E.2d 686 , 702–03 (1947) (“[T]he communication must have been made in the course of seeking legal advice for a proper purpose; hence, no privilege exists wher 2019The crime-fraud exception exists to recognize that “the attorney- client privilege cannot serve as a shield for fraud or as a tool to aid in the commission of future criminal activities; if a communication is not ‘made in the course of seeking or giving legal advice for a proper purpose,’ it is not protected.” Id. (quoting State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 611 , 430 S.E.2d 188, 204 (1993)); see State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 498 , 42 S.E.2d 686 , 702–03 (1947) (“[T]he communication must have been made in the course of seeking legal advice for a proper purpose; hence, no privilege exists wher | 2 | 2 |
In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigationgreen2 sentences2021Window World of Baton Rouge, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 54 at *45–46 (citing In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (“requiring a moving party to establish the existence of the crime- fraud exception by a preponderance of the evidence is consonant with the importance of the attorney-client privilege.”). 44. 2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co | 2 | 2 |
In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings 5 Empanelled January 28, 2004 United States of America v. Under Seal, and Under Seal, Intervenors-Appellantsgreen2 sentences2022“In applying the crime-fraud exception, ‘it is the client’s knowledge and intentions that are of paramount concern because the client is the holder of the privilege.’ ” Window World 2019, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 54 , at *47 (quoting United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5), 401 F.3d 247, 251 (2005)). 33. 2019In applying the crime-fraud exception, “it is the client’s knowledge and intentions that are of paramount concern because the client is the holder of the privilege.” Id. at 251 . | 1 | 2 |
Peterson v. Fairfax Hospital Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2022Sys., Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 535, 538 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (determining that any materials created after the alleged misconduct were not subject to the crime-fraud exception). 38. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Moazzenigreen2 sentences2022Significantly for present purposes, North Carolina courts apply the crime-fraud exception only where “the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Ford I, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 89 , at *20 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 352 F. App’x 805, 810 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that documents that “were in furtherance of the alleged scheme” bore “the requisite close relationship”); United States v. Moazzeni, 906 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D. 2022Significantly for present purposes, North Carolina courts apply the crime-fraud exception only where “the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Ford I, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 89 , at *20 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 352 F. App’x 805, 810 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that documents that “were in furtherance of the alleged scheme” bore “the requisite close relationship”); United States v. Moazzeni, 906 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Under Sealgreen2 sentences2022Significantly for present purposes, North Carolina courts apply the crime-fraud exception only where “the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Ford I, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 89 , at *20 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 352 F. App’x 805, 810 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that documents that “were in furtherance of the alleged scheme” bore “the requisite close relationship”); United States v. Moazzeni, 906 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D. 2022Significantly for present purposes, North Carolina courts apply the crime-fraud exception only where “the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Ford I, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 89 , at *20 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 352 F. App’x 805, 810 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that documents that “were in furtherance of the alleged scheme” bore “the requisite close relationship”); United States v. Moazzeni, 906 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
In re Grand Jury Subpoenagreen2 sentences2021Furthermore, the crime-fraud exception applies only when the client has engaged the services of a lawyer “in furtherance of future illegal conduct.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130 , 151–52 (D. 2021Furthermore, the crime-fraud exception applies only when the client has engaged the services of a lawyer “in furtherance of future illegal conduct.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130 , 151–52 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Swidler & Berlin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Although “the attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications” and “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice[,]” Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 340 , 737 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2013) (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)), there exists a crime-fraud exception to the privilege, which 23 The Special Master was not asked to consider, and thus did not consider, the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. 2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co | 1 | 1 |
Susan Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.green2 sentences2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co 2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sealed Grand Jury Subpoenasgreen2 sentences2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co 2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Austergreen2 sentences2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co 2019While the attorney-client privilege generally functions identically in both civil and criminal proceedings, see Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09, several courts have recognized that the crime-fraud exception may apply differently in the grand jury context, see In re Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1094–95 (“[I]n a civil case the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should be preponderance of the evidence.”); Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81 , 97 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We co | 1 | 1 |
The Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc.green1 sentence2019“While [a prima facie] showing may justify a finding in favor of the offering party, it does not necessarily compel such a finding.” Duplan Corp., 540 F.2d at 1220 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGradygreen2 sentences2019State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 892 , 787 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2016); see Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1095–96 (concluding “preliminary questions concerning the existence or non-existence of the attorney-client privilege—including whether the crime-fraud exception terminate[s] the privilege—must be established under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104(a).” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 2019State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 892 , 787 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2016); see Napster Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d at 1095–96 (concluding “preliminary questions concerning the existence or non-existence of the attorney-client privilege—including whether the crime-fraud exception terminate[s] the privilege—must be established under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104(a).” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Dickson v. Rucho, 366 NC 332green2 sentences2019Although “the attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications” and “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice[,]” Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 340 , 737 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2013) (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)), there exists a crime-fraud exception to the privilege, which 23 The Special Master was not asked to consider, and thus did not consider, the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. 2019Although “the attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications” and “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice[,]” Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 340 , 737 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2013) (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)), there exists a crime-fraud exception to the privilege, which 23 The Special Master was not asked to consider, and thus did not consider, the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2014Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 , 105 L.Ed. 2d 469 (in camera review to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applies); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974) (in camera review to determine whether communications are subject to the executive privilege). 2014Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 , 105 L.Ed. 2d 469 (in camera review to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applies); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974) (in camera review to determine whether communications are subject to the executive privilege). | 2 | 2003–2014 |
United States v. Gorski
green
1 sentence2021The district court agreed that the exception applied because there was a reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client communications “were intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity.” Id. at 461 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.