6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
A,B,C,D,E,F,G, & H v. District Court of the Second Judicial Districtgreen2 sentences2018The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege "provides that communications between a client and his attorney will not be privileged if they are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime." Id. at 324. 2018But we have not yet specified the exact quantum of proof required to meet that burden. ¶26 Over forty years ago, in A v. District Court , this court established that a trial court may strip a document of its privilege and admit it into evidence when there is a "prima facie showing" that the crime-fraud exception applies to the document. 550 P.2d at 326 . | 2 | 3 |
Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley, P. C. v. MacFarlanegreen2 sentences1987An analogous example of conflicting social policies is the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, which provides that “communications between a client and his attorney are not privileged if they are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime.” Id. 1987An analogous example of conflicting social policies is the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, which provides that "communications between a client and his attorney are not privileged if they are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime." Id. | 2 | 3 |
In Re Richard Roe, Inc., and John Doe, Inc. United States of America v. Richard Roe, Inc., Richard Roe, John Doe, Inc., and John Doegreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , In re Richard Roe, Inc. , 68 F.3d 38 , 40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We have recently reiterated that a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof." (emphasis added)); In re Antitrust Grand Jury , 805 F.2d 155 , 165-66 (6th Cir. 1986) ("We are persuaded by the Second Circuit's [probable cause standard] and adopt it as our evidentiary standard of a prima facie showing."). ¶32 Of course, this probable cause requir 2018See, e.g. , In re Richard Roe, Inc. , 68 F.3d 38 , 40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We have recently reiterated that a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof." (emphasis added)); In re Antitrust Grand Jury , 805 F.2d 155 , 165-66 (6th Cir. 1986) ("We are persuaded by the Second Circuit's [probable cause standard] and adopt it as our evidentiary standard of a prima facie showing."). ¶32 Of course, this probable cause requir | 2 | 2 |
Caldwell v. DIST. CT. IN AND FOR CITY, ETC.green2 sentences2018Caldwell , 644 P.2d at 33 . ¶25 The party seeking to overcome the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing that the crime-fraud exception applies. 2018Therefore, we essentially created a two-step process for determining if the crime-fraud exception applies: *60 first, there must be some threshold showing before a trial court can order a document produced for in camera inspection; and second, a prima facie showing must be made before the court can ultimately conclude that the crime-fraud exception applies. ¶28 We elaborated on the first step in Caldwell v. District Court , explaining that before the trial court can order the production of documents for an in camera review, it should "require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Zolingreen2 sentences2018Therefore, we essentially created a two-step process for determining if the crime-fraud exception applies: *60 first, there must be some threshold showing before a trial court can order a document produced for in camera inspection; and second, a prima facie showing must be made before the court can ultimately conclude that the crime-fraud exception applies. ¶28 We elaborated on the first step in Caldwell v. District Court , explaining that before the trial court can order the production of documents for an in camera review, it should "require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a 2018Therefore, we essentially created a two-step process for determining if the crime-fraud exception applies: *60 first, there must be some threshold showing before a trial court can order a document produced for in camera inspection; and second, a prima facie showing must be made before the court can ultimately conclude that the crime-fraud exception applies. ¶28 We elaborated on the first step in Caldwell v. District Court , explaining that before the trial court can order the production of documents for an in camera review, it should "require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a | 1 | 2 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedingsgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 417 F.3d 18 , 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the "reasonable cause" standard, which requires a "reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to foster a crime or fraud" in order to overcome the privilege); United States v. Martin , 278 F.3d 988 , 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The [crime-fraud] exception applies only when there is 'reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.' " (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 87 F.3d 377 , 381 (9th Cir. 1996) )); | 1 | 1 |
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 Marc Rich & Co. A.G., Intervenor-Appellant v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983 , 731 F.2d 1032 , 1039 (2d Cir. 1984). 2018Id. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Antitrust Grand Jurygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , In re Richard Roe, Inc. , 68 F.3d 38 , 40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We have recently reiterated that a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof." (emphasis added)); In re Antitrust Grand Jury , 805 F.2d 155 , 165-66 (6th Cir. 1986) ("We are persuaded by the Second Circuit's [probable cause standard] and adopt it as our evidentiary standard of a prima facie showing."). ¶32 Of course, this probable cause requir 2018In re Antitrust Grand Jury , 805 F.2d at 168 (noting in camera review of documents "could have assisted the court in determining whether" probable cause existed to apply the crime-fraud exception). | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Grand Jury v.green1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 417 F.3d 18 , 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the "reasonable cause" standard, which requires a "reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to foster a crime or fraud" in order to overcome the privilege); United States v. Martin , 278 F.3d 988 , 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The [crime-fraud] exception applies only when there is 'reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.' " (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 87 F.3d 377 , 381 (9th Cir. 1996) )); | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2018There, the division noted that other jurisdictions have held that "the party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that the communication was in furtherance thereof." Id. at 200 (emphasis added). ¶31 This standard has been adopted by a handful of the federal circuit courts of appeals. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978. Appeal of Nathan Markowitzgreen2 sentences1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra 1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where "the underlying facts demonstrat | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Carl Walsh, a Witness Before the Special September 1978 Grand Jury. Appeal of United States of Americagreen2 sentences1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra 1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where "the underlying facts demonstrat | 1 | 1 |
In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term. Harvey W. Thompson, Secretary, Phillips Petroleum Company and Phillips Petroleum Company v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982See In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (1976). 1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra | 1 | 1 |
Speirs v. Bank of Nevadagreen2 sentences1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra 1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where "the underlying facts demonstrat | 1 | 1 |
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Evansgreen2 sentences1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra 1982Compare In Re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976) (no adversary hearing required on question of whether claim of privilege precludes grand jury examination of subpoenaed documents) with In Matter of Grand Jury Em-panelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney permitted to testify in camera on facts establishing privilege under judicially-created use immunity) and In Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 994 , 101 S.Ct. 531 , 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980) (court approved in camera proceeding where “the underlying facts demonstra | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunaway v. New York
green
2 sentences2018Further, because the probable cause standard is familiar, cf. People v. Hearty , 644 P.2d 302 , 309 (Colo. 1982) (referring to the "familiar threshold standard of probable cause" in the context of a seizure (quoting Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200 , 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) )), it should prove workable. ¶37 Thus, a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception and defeat the attorney-client privilege in Colorado must do so as follows. 2018Further, because the probable cause standard is familiar, cf. People v. Hearty , 644 P.2d 302 , 309 (Colo. 1982) (referring to the "familiar threshold standard of probable cause" in the context of a seizure (quoting Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200 , 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) )), it should prove workable. ¶37 Thus, a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception and defeat the attorney-client privilege in Colorado must do so as follows. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. Appeal of the Corporation
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 417 F.3d 18 , 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the "reasonable cause" standard, which requires a "reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to foster a crime or fraud" in order to overcome the privilege); United States v. Martin , 278 F.3d 988 , 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The [crime-fraud] exception applies only when there is 'reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.' " (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 87 F.3d 377 , 381 (9th Cir. 1996) )); | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Pr v. District Court for County of Denver
green
2 sentences2018Because this hearing is now a hearing under section 102(9), and because this hearing necessarily involves the disclosure of wiretap information to establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, the broad and undifferentiated disclosure mandate in section 102(9) applies. ¶65 The majority holds that the present hearing is a section 102(9) hearing by way of strained analogy to this court’s decision in P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346 (Colo. 5 1981), where this court held that a contempt proceeding for a recalcitrant grand jury witness was sufficiently d 2018Because this hearing is now a hearing under section 102(9), and because this hearing necessarily involves the disclosure of wiretap information to establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, the broad and undifferentiated disclosure mandate in section 102(9) applies. ¶65 The majority holds that the present hearing is a section 102(9) hearing by way of strained analogy to this court's decision in P.R. v. District Court , 637 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1981), where this court held that a contempt proceeding for a recalcitrant grand jury witness was sufficiently di | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Curtis R. Martin, Jr., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 417 F.3d 18 , 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the "reasonable cause" standard, which requires a "reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to foster a crime or fraud" in order to overcome the privilege); United States v. Martin , 278 F.3d 988 , 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The [crime-fraud] exception applies only when there is 'reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.' " (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 87 F.3d 377 , 381 (9th Cir. 1996) )); | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Hearty
green
1 sentence2018Further, because the probable cause standard is familiar, cf. People v. Hearty , 644 P.2d 302 , 309 (Colo. 1982) (referring to the "familiar threshold standard of probable cause" in the context of a seizure (quoting Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200 , 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) )), it should prove workable. ¶37 Thus, a party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception and defeat the attorney-client privilege in Colorado must do so as follows. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Pignatiello v. DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR SEC. JUD.
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, the subpoena covered communications that occurred even after police seizures had effectively shuttered the allegedly illegal activity, and thus after the crime or fraud upon which the court based its ruling. ¶41 In making this blanket ruling, the court relied on Pignatiello v. District Court , 659 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1983). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Board
green
1 sentence2009Board, 656 P.2d at 714 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Clark v. United States
green
2 sentences1982The criminal purpose exception to the privilege grows out of a competing value of our society which is manifested in the rule that ‘the public has the right to every man’s evidence, particularly in grand jury proceedings.’ ” ****** “We recognize that before the privilege can be ‘driven away’ there must be ‘something to give colour to the charge.’ The ‘prima facie evidence’ mentioned in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 (1932), is not tantamount to proof of a prima facie case. 1982The criminal purpose exception to the privilege grows out of a competing value of our society which is manifested in the rule that ‘the public has the right to every man’s evidence, particularly in grand jury proceedings.’ ” ****** “We recognize that before the privilege can be ‘driven away’ there must be ‘something to give colour to the charge.’ The ‘prima facie evidence’ mentioned in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 (1932), is not tantamount to proof of a prima facie case. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Webb v. State
green
1 sentence1982Caldwell v. District Court, Colo., 644 P.2d 26 (1982); A. v. District Court, supra ; Losavio v. District Court, supra . *1221 See also In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976); Webb v. State, 580 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.