unexcused violation in New York

2006We reject the further contention of defendants that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that, if it found that defendants violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law and that such violation was a proximate cause of the accident, then such a violation constitutes negligence. “[I]t is well settled that ‘a defendant’s unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se’ ” (Devoe v Kaplan, 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000], quoting Holleman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 [1999]; see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]), and it is equally well settled that negli

2004We cannot agree, however, inasmuch as only an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se (see Gadon v Oliva, 294 AD2d 397, 397-398 [2002]; Devoe v Kaplan, 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000]; Holleman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 [1999]).

2023A driver is negligent per se when he or she commits an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see Smith v State of New York , 121 AD3d 1358, 1359 [3d Dept 2014]; Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]).

2020Although "it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se" ( Devoe v Kaplan , 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]), liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident ( see Sheehan v City of New York , 40 NY2d 496, 501-503 [1976]; Wallace v Terrell , 295 AD2d 840, 841 [2002]).

2020Although "it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se" ( Devoe v Kaplan , 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]), liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident ( see Sheehan v City of New York , 40 NY2d 496, 501-503 [1976]; Wallace v Terrell , 295 AD2d 840, 841 [2002]).

2006We reject the further contention of defendants that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that, if it found that defendants violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law and that such violation was a proximate cause of the accident, then such a violation constitutes negligence. “[I]t is well settled that ‘a defendant’s unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se’ ” (Devoe v Kaplan, 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000], quoting Holleman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 [1999]; see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]), and it is equally well settled that negli

2011Although plaintiff is correct that an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, if proven, constitutes negligence per se (see Stalikas v United Materials, 306 AD2d 810, 811 , affd 100 NY2d 626 ), we cannot agree with plaintiff that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendants (see Greene v Frontier Cent.

2011Although plaintiff is correct that an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, if proven, constitutes negligence per se (see Stalikas v United Materials, 306 AD2d 810, 811 [2003], affd 100 NY2d 626 [2003]), we cannot agree with plaintiff that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendants (see Greene v Frontier Cent.

2021Auth. , 81 AD3d 1391, 1392 [4th Dept 2011]; see also Brown v State of New York [appeal No. 2], 144 AD3d 1535 , 1538 [4th Dept 2016], affd 31 NY3d 514 [2018]; Gardner v Chester , 151 AD3d 1894, 1896 [4th Dept 2017]; accord NY PJI 3d 2:26, Comment).

2016Auth., 81 AD3d 1391, 1392 [2011], citing Stalikas v United Materials, 306 AD2d 810, 811 [2003], affd 100 NY2d 626 [2003]).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

2025Other than her assertion that she was struck by a vehicle, plaintiff submitted nothing to establish that the driver of that vehicle did not exercise due care or committed an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( cf. Amerman v Reeves , 148 AD3d 1632, 1633 [4th Dept 2017]).

2021Consequently, even though defendants were negligent as a matter of law based on an unexcused violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a), on this record, a jury could find that decedent's actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Balliet v North Amityville Fire Dept. , 133 AD3d 559, 560 [2d Dept 2015]; Amorosi v Hubbard , 124 AD3d 1354, 1356 [4th Dept 2015]; Briccio v Disbrow , 212 AD2d 565, 566 [2d Dept 1995]; see generally Carnevale v Bommer , 175 AD3d 881 , 881-882 [4th Dept 2019]; Amerman v Reeves , 148 AD3d 1632, 1633-1634 [4th Dept 2017]).

2025"Although it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic [*2]Law constitutes negligence per se, liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident" ( Holownia v Caruso , 183 AD3d 1035, 1036 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 902 [2020]; see Ohl v Smith , 215 AD3d 1019, 1020 [3d Dept 2023])."Notably, even where a party is found to be negligent due to violation of a statute, proximate cause remains a question of fact to be decided by jury" ( Pasternak v County of Chenango , 226

2025"Although it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic [*2]Law constitutes negligence per se, liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident" ( Holownia v Caruso , 183 AD3d 1035, 1036 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 902 [2020]; see Ohl v Smith , 215 AD3d 1019 , 1020 [3d Dept 2023])."Notably, even where a party is found to be negligent due to violation of a statute, proximate cause remains a question of fact to be decided by jury" ( Pasternak v County of Chenango , 22

2020Although "it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se" ( Devoe v Kaplan , 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]), liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident ( see Sheehan v City of New York , 40 NY2d 496, 501-503 [1976]; Wallace v Terrell , 295 AD2d 840, 841 [2002]).

2006We reject the further contention of defendants that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that, if it found that defendants violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law and that such violation was a proximate cause of the accident, then such a violation constitutes negligence. “[I]t is well settled that ‘a defendant’s unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se’ ” (Devoe v Kaplan, 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000], quoting Holleman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 [1999]; see Hellenbrecht v Radeker, 309 AD2d 834, 835 [2003]), and it is equally well settled that negli

2007(Gonzalez v Medina, 69 AD2d 14, 17 [1st Dept 1979], citing Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164, 168-170 [1920]; see also Tedia v Ellman, 280 NY 124, 133 [1939] [“The general duty is established by the statute, and deviation from it without good cause is a wrong” (emphasis added)].) In the widely-cited Martin case, which involved the absence of lights on a horse-drawn buggy, Judge Cardozo wrote: “the unexcused omission of the statutory signals ... is negligence in itself . . . to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another . . . is to fall short of the sta

1976The violation is " 'unexcused’ ” unless observance of a statute "would subject [one] to more imminent danger” (see Tedia v Ellman, 280 NY 124, 129, 131 ; see, also, New York Pattern Jury Instructions (PJI 2:27 and comment thereto), or unless the statute has been justifiably violated because of some emergency (see Miller v Hine, 281 App Div 387 ).

2007(Gonzalez v Medina, 69 AD2d 14, 17 [1st Dept 1979], citing Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164, 168-170 [1920]; see also Tedia v Ellman, 280 NY 124, 133 [1939] [“The general duty is established by the statute, and deviation from it without good cause is a wrong” (emphasis added)].) In the widely-cited Martin case, which involved the absence of lights on a horse-drawn buggy, Judge Cardozo wrote: “the unexcused omission of the statutory signals ... is negligence in itself . . . to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another . . . is to fall short of the sta

2007In opposition to plaintiffs posttrial motion, defendants correctly asserted that it is only an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law that compels a finding of negligence, and that such a violation “ ‘may be excused if [the driver] exercised reasonable care in an effort to comply’ ” with the statute (Arricale v Leo, 295 AD2d 920, 920 [2002], quoting Espinal v Sureau, 262 AD2d 523, 524 [1999]; see Sanly v Nowak, 28 AD3d 1113 [2006]; Schager v Lino Bordi, Inc., 2 AD3d 828 [2003]; see also Cook v Garrant, 27 AD3d 984, 986 [2006]; Simmons v Weegar, 292 AD2d 828 [2002]; PJI 2:84 [2007])

2007(Gonzalez v Medina, 69 AD2d 14, 17 [1st Dept 1979], citing Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164, 168-170 [1920]; see also Tedia v Ellman, 280 NY 124, 133 [1939] [“The general duty is established by the statute, and deviation from it without good cause is a wrong” (emphasis added)].) In the widely-cited Martin case, which involved the absence of lights on a horse-drawn buggy, Judge Cardozo wrote: “the unexcused omission of the statutory signals ... is negligence in itself . . . to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another . . . is to fall short of the sta

2007In opposition to plaintiffs posttrial motion, defendants correctly asserted that it is only an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law that compels a finding of negligence, and that such a violation “ ‘may be excused if [the driver] exercised reasonable care in an effort to comply’ ” with the statute (Arricale v Leo, 295 AD2d 920, 920 [2002], quoting Espinal v Sureau, 262 AD2d 523, 524 [1999]; see Sanly v Nowak, 28 AD3d 1113 [2006]; Schager v Lino Bordi, Inc., 2 AD3d 828 [2003]; see also Cook v Garrant, 27 AD3d 984, 986 [2006]; Simmons v Weegar, 292 AD2d 828 [2002]; PJI 2:84 [2007])

2023A driver is negligent per se when he or she commits an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see Smith v State of New York , 121 AD3d 1358, 1359 [3d Dept 2014]; Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]).

2020Although "it is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se" ( Devoe v Kaplan , 278 AD2d 734, 735 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]), liability does not result unless the violation was a proximate cause of the accident ( see Sheehan v City of New York , 40 NY2d 496, 501-503 [1976]; Wallace v Terrell , 295 AD2d 840, 841 [2002]).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

2024It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596 [2d Dept 1999]; s ee, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 [1920]; Cordero v City of New York, 112 AD2d 914 [2d Dept 1985]; Tomaselli v Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872 [2d Dept 1984]; Aranzullo v Seidell, 96 AD2d 1048 [2d Dept 1983]; also, PJI 2:26).

1997A defendant’s unexcused violation of a statute constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence and it is for the jury to determine whether the violation was the proximate cause of the accident (see, Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164 ; Malloy v Trombley, 50 NY2d 46, 55 ; Frias v Fanning, 119 AD2d 796 ; McConnell v Nabozny, 110 AD2d 1060 ; Brogan v Zummo, 92 AD2d 533 ; McAllister v Adam Packing Corp., 66 AD2d 975 ; Ortiz v Kinoshita & Co., 30 AD2d 334 ).

1992Initially, we note that an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes some evidence of negligence (see, Ferrer v Harris, 55 NY2d 285, 293 , mod on other grounds 56 NY2d 737 ), and that plaintiff maintains that defendant violated two provisions of that law, namely, section 1201 (a), which forbids stopping or parking a vehicle on a public highway when it is practicable to do otherwise (see, Quiquin v Fitzgerald, 146 AD2d 894, 896-897 ), and section 1203 (a), which requires such a stopped vehicle to be placed as far to the right side of the roadway as possible (see, Brogan v Z

2003Although it is undisputed that plaintiff had the right of way, we conclude that the court erred in its implicit determination that the evidence established defendant’s unexcused violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a), failure to yield the right of way, and thus that defendant was negligent per se (cf. Weiser v Dalbo, 184 AD2d 935, 936 [1992], lv dismissed 80 NY2d 925 [1992]; see generally Holloman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 [1999]).

2000While it is well settled that “a defendant’s unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” (Holleman v Miner, 267 AD2d 867, 868-869 ) and, if proven, “[cannot] be disregarded by the jury” (Weiser v Dalbo, 184 AD2d 935, 936 , Iv dismissed 80 NY2d 925 ), great deference is accorded to a jury’s interpretation of the trial evidence (see, Raucci v City School Dist. of City of Mechanicville, 203 AD2d 714, 714-715 ; Durkin v Peluso, 184 AD2d 940, 940-941 ).

2024Lawrence Univ. , 13 AD3d 782, 783 [3d Dept 2004]).

2008Lawrence Univ., 13 AD3d at 783 ).

2011School Dist., 214 AD2d 947, 948 ), establishes that Cody violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. -2- 44 CA 10-01207 With respect to the alleged violation of section 1180, plaintiff presented no evidence that the bus driver was speeding.

2011School Dist., 214 AD2d 947, 948 [1995]), establishes that Cody violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

2007(Gonzalez v Medina, 69 AD2d 14, 17 [1st Dept 1979], citing Martin v Herzog, 228 NY 164, 168-170 [1920]; see also Tedia v Ellman, 280 NY 124, 133 [1939] [“The general duty is established by the statute, and deviation from it without good cause is a wrong” (emphasis added)].) In the widely-cited Martin case, which involved the absence of lights on a horse-drawn buggy, Judge Cardozo wrote: “the unexcused omission of the statutory signals ... is negligence in itself . . . to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another . . . is to fall short of the sta

1972It is, rather, an unexcused violation which constitutes negligence (Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 168 ; Miller v. Hine, 281 App. Div. 387, 391 ; Schaeffer v. Caldwell, 273 App. Div. 263, 268 ).

2024"It is well settled that a defendant's unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se" ( Kreis v Kiyonaga , 200 AD3d 1144, 1145 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Feeley v St.

2023A driver is negligent per se when he or she commits an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ( see Smith v State of New York , 121 AD3d 1358, 1359 [3d Dept 2014]; Baker v Joyal , 4 AD3d 596, 597 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]).

2022Although an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( see Habir v Wilczak , 191 AD3d 1320, 1321 [4th Dept 2021]; Heffernan v Logue , 40 AD2d 1071, 1071 [4th Dept 1972]), we conclude that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff violated those provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

2022Although an unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se ( see Habir v Wilczak , 191 AD3d 1320, 1321 [4th Dept 2021]; Heffernan v Logue , 40 AD2d 1071, 1071 [4th Dept 1972]), we conclude that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff violated those provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

2021Consequently, even though defendants were negligent as a matter of law based on an unexcused violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a), on this record, a jury could find that decedent's actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Balliet v North Amityville Fire Dept. , 133 AD3d 559, 560 [2d Dept 2015]; Amorosi v Hubbard , 124 AD3d 1354, 1356 [4th Dept 2015]; Briccio v Disbrow , 212 AD2d 565, 566 [2d Dept 1995]; see generally Carnevale v Bommer , 175 AD3d 881 , 881-882 [4th Dept 2019]; Amerman v Reeves , 148 AD3d 1632, 1633-1634 [4th Dept 2017]).