licensee violation in Pennsylvania

2018Renfroe v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing , 179 A.3d 644 , 650 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that where the licensee testified that he could not take a blood test because he feared needles, the factual record did not support his claim on appeal that he was "forced to choose between asserting his Fourth Amendment right and maintaining his operating privilege"); Quigley v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing , 965 A.2d 349 , 354 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (where the licensee claimed that the warnings were ambiguous, we noted that the licensee never told the officer that she thought

2018Licensee never claimed that she was confused when Sergeant sought a second breath test.6 Quigley, 965 A.2d at 354 .

1992Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Althouse, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 141, 503 A.2d 90 (1986).

1988Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Althouse, 94 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 141 , 503 A.2d 90 (1986).

2023McKenna v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 72 A.3d 294 , 298 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 7 Licensee asserts that DOT did not make the request until two hours after the scheduled start time, and Licensee had retained private counsel and incurred additional expenses as a result of the continuance being granted.

2022“The question of whether a licensee refuses to submit to a chemical test is a legal one, based on the facts found by the trial court.” Factor, 199 A.3d at 496 .

2021In holding the test results were admissible, the trial court stated that “[t]he evidence was admitted specifically for the purpose of establishing that [Licensee] was driving in an intoxicated state and not to show any culpability for [DUI].” (Trial ct. op. at 7.) Lastly, the trial court addressed Licensee’s claim that the license suspension was “illegal as an unconstitutional civil penalty imposed on an individual’s exercise of the Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent to a warrantless search.” (Trial ct. op., at 7.) Relying on Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Licensing,

2021In holding the test results were admissible, the trial court stated that “[t]he evidence was admitted specifically for the purpose of establishing that [Licensee] was driving in an intoxicated state and not to show any culpability for [DUI].” (Trial ct. op. at 7.) Lastly, the trial court addressed Licensee’s claim that the license suspension was “illegal as an unconstitutional civil penalty imposed on an individual’s exercise of the Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent to a warrantless search.” (Trial ct. op., at 7.) Relying on Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Licensing,

2021Equities, 95 A.3d 13 at 930 .

2020Hyer v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 957 A.2d 807 , 810 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 8 When Trooper Fry read the DL-26[] [F]orm to [Licensee] inside the patrol car, Trooper Magarelli was standing right at the door outside the patrol vehicle, and, therefore, he was able to hear Trooper Fry when he was reading the form to [Licensee].

2018There is substantial evidence in the record, particularly Mr. Klem’s own admission during the plea colloquy, that he imported large amounts 47 P.S. § 4-464. 18 “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a conclusion.” First Ward Republican Club of Phila. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 11 A.3d 38 , 43 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 17 of cocaine from Philadelphia and then used the property to store and distribute that cocaine.

2018Renfroe v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing , 179 A.3d 644 , 650 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that where the licensee testified that he could not take a blood test because he feared needles, the factual record did not support his claim on appeal that he was "forced to choose between asserting his Fourth Amendment right and maintaining his operating privilege"); Quigley v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing , 965 A.2d 349 , 354 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (where the licensee claimed that the warnings were ambiguous, we noted that the licensee never told the officer that she thought

2018The delay at issue in Chappell was two months long, during which time the licensee was already serving a separate license suspension. 430 A.2d at 378 .

2018Id., Item #18.

2017Id.

2017Specifically, PennDOT asserts that Gingrich is inapplicable because the two-year, seven-month delay here does not amount to an “extraordinarily extended period of time.” (PennDOT Br. at 19.) Generally, for a licensee to challenge a license suspension based on delay, the licensee must, prove that: “ ‘(1) an unreasonable delay chargeable to PennDOT led the licensee to believe that [his] operating privileges would not be impaired; and (2) prejudice would result by having the operating privileges suspended after such delay.’ ” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Gombocz, 589 Pa. 404 ,

2016As a result of the amended Form DL-21, the Secretary changed the effective date of her suspension to June 14, 2012, but denied Licensee’s exception that she is allowed to concurrently serve the suspension and revocation terms as being “without merit.” Licensee then filed this petition for review.6 6 “In a case involving administrative credit toward a driver’s license suspension, this Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law has been committed or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial

2016Martinovic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30 , 34 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). 5 This Court has held that “[a] party’s statements in its brief . . . are treated as a judicial admission.” Bartholomew v. State Ethics Commission, 795 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (citation omitted).

2016As a result of the amended Form DL-21, the Secretary changed the effective date of her suspension to June 14, 2012, but denied Licensee’s exception that she is allowed to concurrently serve the suspension and revocation terms as being “without merit.” Licensee then filed this petition for review.6 6 “In a case involving administrative credit toward a driver’s license suspension, this Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law has been committed or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial

2013To that end, as we explained in Stair v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 911 A.2d 1014 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006): [R]egardless of whether a plea agreement existed in the underlying criminal proceedings, it has no effect on [Penn-DOT’s] duty under the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code to impose the instant license suspension and ignition interlock requirement.

2013The BLCE argued: “Thus, [the licensee] has not been prejudiced here by his alleged failure to have received the notice of violation letter, which serves the limited purpose of providing a licensee with warning that his activities have been under investigation and that his license may be in danger.” Can, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1164 .

2012The present case is distinguishable from Byler for three reasons: (1) whereas Byler had a fifty-eight year driving record with no moving violations or alcohol-related accidents, Licensee’s brief driving record contains two recent accidents, one being the July 25, 2010 fatal accident, (Department’s Ex. 1, R.R. at 54a), and the other being a 2007 accident resulting in injury, (Department’s Ex. 1, R.R. at 53a), a 2009 charge for underage DUI, and multiple speeding violations in low speed areas; (2) whereas the licensee in Byler testified about his “lifestyle and the frequency and amount of his dr

2012The present case is distinguishable from Byler for three reasons: (1) whereas Byler had a fifty-eight year driving record with no moving violations or alcohol-related accidents, Licensee's brief driving record contains two recent accidents, one being the July 25, 2010 fatal accident, (Department's Ex. 1, R.R. at 54a), and the other being a 2007 accident resulting in injury, (Department's Ex. 1, R.R. at 53a), a 2009 charge for underage DUI, and multiple speeding violations in low speed areas; (2) whereas the licensee in Byler testified about his "lifestyle and the frequency and amount of his dr