16 California opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Carringtongreen1 sentence2024(People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 163 [“The showing required in order to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a prima facie case.”].) Significantly, while an arrestee has no opportunity to challenge an arrest before it happens, a licensee can challenge an APS accusation before the suspension takes effect. “ ‘ “A driver’s license cannot be suspended without due process of law.” ’ ” (California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department 14 of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 , 529 (DUI Lawyers); see also Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (20 | 1 | 1 |
Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2009Code, § 664) supplies sufficient indicia of the trustworthiness of blood-alcohol test results to justify reliance upon such results to support a license suspension, subject to a showing by the licensee that the test was not performed in compliance with statutory requirements.” (Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.) “[Wjhere it is established that the matters reported are the direct observations and within the personal knowledge of the reporting officer, a sworn 367 report[ 10 ] introduced at a [DMV administrative per se hearing] is presumed trustworthy, based upon the officer’s duty unde 2009“Indeed, he made no effort to contest it.” (Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.) The court held “[u]nder these circumstances, the hearing officer properly relied upon the statutory presumption that the test was properly administered by a trained officer, using properly functioning equipment. *1004 Based upon the presumption, the hearing officer could properly and reasonably conclude that the test results were reliable.” {Ibid.) This case is distinguishable from Davenport in several respects. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Boardgreen1 sentence2006Control v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (ALQ Corp.) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 720, 726-727 [173 Cal-Rptr. 582].) Like many state administrative agencies, 2 the Department exercises its adjudicatory power through a two-stage process. | 1 | 1 |
Reilly v. Strohgreen2 sentences2004(See Reilly v. Stroll (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 47, 53 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 250 ].) Also, we use the term “licensee” to include the licensee’s agent employee, such as a bartender or a liquor store clerk. 5 The Board had found that the licensee had no defense as to all three minors. 2004(See Reilly v. Stroll (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 47, 53 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 250 ].) Also, we use the term “licensee” to include the licensee’s agent employee, such as a bartender or a liquor store clerk. 5 The Board had found that the licensee had no defense as to all three minors. | 1 | 1 |
August v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1992(Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 ; August v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 52, 65 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 172 ].) An “official duty” is imposed upon law enforcement agencies and their officers and employees under section 436.52 of the Health and Safety Code and regulations promulgated thereunder to perform blood-alcohol analyses by methods devised to assure reliability. 4 Section 436.52 provides: “The testing of breath samples by or for law enforcement agencies for purposes of *142 determining the concentration of ethyl alcohol in the blood of p 1992(Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 ; August v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 52, 65 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 172 ].) An “official duty” is imposed upon law enforcement agencies and their officers and employees under section 436.52 of the Health and Safety Code and regulations promulgated thereunder to perform blood-alcohol analyses by methods devised to assure reliability. 4 Section 436.52 provides: “The testing of breath samples by or for law enforcement agencies for purposes of *142 determining the concentration of ethyl alcohol in the blood of p | 1 | 1 |
Beaudreau v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) The United States Supreme Court “consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 ].) Justice Tobriner, however, once stated: “Due process cann 1983“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) The United States Supreme Court “consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 ].) Justice Tobriner, however, once stated: “Due process cann | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences1983“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) The United States Supreme Court “consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 ].) Justice Tobriner, however, once stated: “Due process cann 1983“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) The United States Supreme Court “consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 ].) Justice Tobriner, however, once stated: “Due process cann | 1 | 1 |
The Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of Cal.green2 sentences1967(See, e.g., Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of Cal. (1929) 98 Cal.App. 769, 778-779 [ 277 P. 887 ].) This rule has no application if the agreement sets forth the particular circumstances under which termination must occur. 1967(See, e.g., Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of Cal. (1929) 98 Cal.App. 769, 778-779 [ 277 P. 887 ].) This rule has no application if the agreement sets forth the particular circumstances under which termination must occur. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alexander D. v. State Board of Dental Examiners
green
2 sentences2017(See Alexander D., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 98 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 201 .) Fettgather requests we determine (1) what standard must be shown for an order under section 820 and (2) when a licensee may challenge that showing. 2017(See Alexander D., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 98 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 201 .) Fettgather requests we determine (1) what standard must be shown for an order under section 820 and (2) when a licensee may challenge that showing. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Luhdorff v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were 2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were | 2 | 2005–2005 |
FARRELL L. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were 2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1998XX, § 22; § 25658, subds. (a), (b).) In Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ], our Supreme Court upheld the use of underage decoys, finding that, in a criminal prosecution of a licensee based on a sale to a decoy, the licensee could not claim entrapment or otherwise object to the use of an underage decoy. 1998XX, § 22; § 25658, subds. (a), (b).) In Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ], our Supreme Court upheld the use of underage decoys, finding that, in a criminal prosecution of a licensee based on a sale to a decoy, the licensee could not claim entrapment or otherwise object to the use of an underage decoy. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
ROZE v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2021If the presumption is rebutted, “ ‘the burden shifts to the DMV to prove that the test was reliable despite the violation.’ ” (Roze v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1183 .) When a motorist’s license is suspended at a DMV hearing, the licensee can petition for writ review in the Superior Court. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were 2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence1992Code, § 664) supplies sufficient indicia of the trustworthiness of blood-alcohol test results to justify reliance upon such results to support a license suspension, subject to a showing by the licensee that the test was not performed in compliance with statutory requirements. ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 815 .) We agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Imachi court. 3 Evidence Code section 664 provides: “It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.” The presumption does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest (§ 664), but it does otherwise app | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence1992(Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 ; August v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 52, 65 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 172 ].) An “official duty” is imposed upon law enforcement agencies and their officers and employees under section 436.52 of the Health and Safety Code and regulations promulgated thereunder to perform blood-alcohol analyses by methods devised to assure reliability. 4 Section 436.52 provides: “The testing of breath samples by or for law enforcement agencies for purposes of *142 determining the concentration of ethyl alcohol in the blood of p | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
green
2 sentences1969(Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 420 P.2d 735 ]; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141 [ 346 P.2d 737 ].) In Wilke & Holzheiser we thoroughly reconsidered our initial holding to that effect so as "to foreclose any possibility that our silence might engender unwarranted speculation about the continued vitality of Allied Properties." (65 Cal. *1219 2d at p. 357.) After such re-examination of the issue, we reaffirmed our conviction "that the price maintenance provisions do no 1969(Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 420 P.2d 735 ]; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141 [ 346 P.2d 737 ].) In Wilke & Holzheiser we thoroughly reconsidered our initial holding to that effect so as "to foreclose any possibility that our silence might engender unwarranted speculation about the continued vitality of Allied Properties." (65 Cal. *1219 2d at p. 357.) After such re-examination of the issue, we reaffirmed our conviction "that the price maintenance provisions do no | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
green
2 sentences1969(Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 420 P.2d 735 ]; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141 [ 346 P.2d 737 ].) In Wilke & Holzheiser we thoroughly reconsidered our initial holding to that effect so as "to foreclose any possibility that our silence might engender unwarranted speculation about the continued vitality of Allied Properties." (65 Cal. *1219 2d at p. 357.) After such re-examination of the issue, we reaffirmed our conviction "that the price maintenance provisions do no 1969(Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 420 P.2d 735 ]; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141 [ 346 P.2d 737 ].) In Wilke & Holzheiser we thoroughly reconsidered our initial holding to that effect so as "to foreclose any possibility that our silence might engender unwarranted speculation about the continued vitality of Allied Properties." (65 Cal. *1219 2d at p. 357.) After such re-examination of the issue, we reaffirmed our conviction "that the price maintenance provisions do no | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Lee v. Southern Pacific Railroad
green
1 sentence1919Co., 116 Cal. 97 , [ 58 Am. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.