Duffy standard in Texas

2000The Duffy standard asks "first whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance; and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assistance." See Craig v. State , 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim.

2000The Duffy standard asks "first whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance; and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assistance." See Craig v. State , 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim.

2011On remand, the Craig Court reviewed counsel’s effectiveness only at the punishment stage, not the guilt-innocence stage, and considered the effect of his performance by applying the then-accepted Duffy standard, not the Strickland standard. 8 Craig, 847 S.W.2d at 435 -36 (citing Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 , 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)) (explaining that the Duffy test for effectiveness of counsel in the punishment phase of a non-capital offense was, first, whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance, and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assist

2011On remand, the Craig Court reviewed counsel’s effectiveness only at the punishment stage, not the guilt-innocence stage, and considered the effect of his performance by applying the then-accepted Duffy standard, not the Strickland standard. 8 Craig, 847 S.W.2d at 435 -36 (citing Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 , 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)) (explaining that the Duffy test for effectiveness of counsel in the punishment phase of a non-capital offense was, first, whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance, and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assist

2009Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

2009Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

2000In Hernandez , the court expressly overruled the application of the Duffy standard of review to these complaints and determined that the proper test to be applied is the now familiar two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2000In Hernandez , the court expressly overruled the application of the Duffy standard of review to these complaints and determined that the proper test to be applied is the now familiar two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2009DISSENTING OPINION In Hernandez, the majority overruled the “reasonably effective assistance of counsel” standard from Ex Parte Duffy in favor of Strickland’s requirement that a defendant show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient performance.1 What’s more, the majority in Hernandez gave no reason for abandoning the Duffy standard, only stating: “[W]e perceive no valid reason why Strickland cannot apply, or why a different 1 See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim.

2009DISSENTING OPINION In Hernandez, the majority overruled the “reasonably effective assistance of counsel” standard from Ex Parte Duffy in favor of Strickland’s requirement that a defendant show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient performance.1 What’s more, the majority in Hernandez gave no reason for abandoning the Duffy standard, only stating: “[W]e perceive no valid reason why Strickland cannot apply, or why a different 1 See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim.

1993Reviewing the entire record, see Walker , 777 S.W.2d at 431 , and keeping in mind the totality of the representation, we conclude that appellant has failed to meet his burden under the Duffy standard to show that he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel.

1993Reviewing the entire record, see Walker , 777 S.W.2d at 431 , and keeping in mind the totality of the representation, we conclude that appellant has failed to meet his burden under the Duffy standard to show that he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel.

2011On remand, the Craig Court reviewed counsel’s effectiveness only at the punishment stage, not the guilt-innocence stage, and considered the effect of his performance by applying the then-accepted Duffy standard, not the Strickland standard. 8 Craig, 847 S.W.2d at 435 -36 (citing Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 , 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)) (explaining that the Duffy test for effectiveness of counsel in the punishment phase of a non-capital offense was, first, whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance, and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assist

2011On remand, the Craig Court reviewed counsel’s effectiveness only at the punishment stage, not the guilt-innocence stage, and considered the effect of his performance by applying the then-accepted Duffy standard, not the Strickland standard. 8 Craig, 847 S.W.2d at 435 -36 (citing Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 , 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)) (explaining that the Duffy test for effectiveness of counsel in the punishment phase of a non-capital offense was, first, whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance, and second, whether counsel reasonably rendered effective assist

1999Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) Although it could be argued that Welch is controlling, there is considerable difference from the failure to afford to the defendant in a criminal trial the full range of punishment, i.e. probation, as opposed to instructing- a jury that they- should not consider evidence in determining the full range of punishment.

1999Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) Although it could be argued that Welch is controlling, there is considerable difference from the failure to afford to the defendant in a criminal trial the full range of punishment, i.e. probation, as opposed to instructing- a jury that they- should not consider evidence in determining the full range of punishment.

1998Ware v. State, 875 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, pet. ref'd).

1995See Ware v. State, 875 S.W.2d 432, 437 (Tex.App. — Waco 1994, pet. ref'd) (applying Duffy standard and reversing; stating in dictum that Strickland would not require reversal).

1997See Ex parte Langley, 833 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

1997See Ex parte Langley, 833 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

1995See also Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Ex parte Walker, 111 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). 10 Whether the Strickland or the Duffy standard has been met is to be judged by the “totality of the representation” rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel, and the tests or standards are to be applied at the time of the trial, not through hindsight.

1992Ex parte Walker, 111 S.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1995Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Cruz, 739 S.W.2d at 58 ; Wilkerson, 726 S.W.2d at 548 .

1993Ex parte Welborn , 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim.

1995See also Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Ex parte Walker, 111 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). 10 Whether the Strickland or the Duffy standard has been met is to be judged by the “totality of the representation” rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel, and the tests or standards are to be applied at the time of the trial, not through hindsight.

1994Walker, 794 S.W.2d at 36-38 .

2022App. 1989) (applying then-accepted Duffy standard of review, which did not require proof of prejudice, court found defense counsel ineffective because she introduced otherwise inadmissible evidence of extraneous offenses); 6 Stone v. State, 17 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, pet. ref’d) (defense counsel ineffective because he elicited testimony from defendant regarding prior murder conviction that would otherwise have been inadmissible); Cooper v. State, 769 S.W.2d 301 , 304–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d) (defense counsel ineffective because he que

2014App. 1999), the court held the Strickland standard, not the Duffy standard (which contained no prejudice component), applies in noncapital sentencing proceedings. 3 exclusive factors for evaluating whether the probative value of Rule 609 evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect: (1) the impeachment value of the prior offense; (2) the temporal proximity of the past crime relative to the charged offense and the witness’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the offense being prosecuted; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the importance of the c

2014App. 1999), the court held the Strickland standard, not the Duffy standard (which contained no prejudice component), applies in noncapital sentencing proceedings. 3 exclusive factors for evaluating whether the probative value of Rule 609 evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect: (1) the impeachment value of the prior offense; (2) the temporal proximity of the past crime relative to the charged offense and the witness’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the offense being prosecuted; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the importance of the c

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

2002See Medrano v. State, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Meyers, J., not participating); Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Hernandez, 988 S.W.2d at 772 ; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [11] When the Court in Hernandez overruled the Duffy standard of "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" and replaced it with the two-prong Strickland test, it predicated its decision on the notion that the Duffy standard was inconsistent with federal constitutional law and, therefore, the Court had "no choice" but to overrule Duffy .

1998See Hernandez v. State , 943 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. granted Sept. 17, 1997); Oliva v. State , 942 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. granted August 27, 1997).

1998See Hernandez v. State , 943 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. granted Sept. 17, 1997); Oliva v. State , 942 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. granted August 27, 1997).

1998Valencia v. State, 946 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

1998Valencia v. State, 946 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

1996Stone v. State, 751 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).

1996Stone v. State, 751 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).

1993See Ewing , 570 S.W.2d at 945 .

1993See Ewing , 570 S.W.2d at 945 .

1993See Alfano v. State , 780 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.).

1993See Alfano v. State , 780 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.).