lis pendens doctrine in Oklahoma

1977Flanagan v. Clark, 156 Okl. 230 , 11 P.2d 176 (1932).

1977Flanagan v. Clark, 156 Okl. 230 , 11 P.2d 176 (1932).

1953Thereupon, upon the attaching of the homestead characteristics to this property, the defendant in error acquired color of title and she thereby became at least an equitable owner of the property and she may bring suit to quiet title on the equitable interest owned by her, Bridwell v. Goeske, 200 Okla. 244 , 192 P. 2d 656 , and the claim of the homestead rights by her is not a reliance upon the weakness of her adversary’s title, but is merely a strengthening of the title acquired by her in the divorce decree dated March 19, 1947, and the same is true regarding her attempt to invoke the doctrine

1953Thereupon, upon the attaching of the homestead characteristics to this property, the defendant in error acquired color of title and she thereby became at least an equitable owner of the property and she may bring suit to quiet title on the equitable interest owned by her, Bridwell v. Goeske, 200 Okla. 244 , 192 P. 2d 656 , and the claim of the homestead rights by her is not a reliance upon the weakness of her adversary’s title, but is merely a strengthening of the title acquired by her in the divorce decree dated March 19, 1947, and the same is true regarding her attempt to invoke the doctrine

1925Stat. 1921, provides: “When the petition ñas been filed, the action is pending, so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency), and while pending, no interest can be acquired by third persons i'n the subject-matter thereof as against the plaintiff's title.” In McWhorter v. Brady et al., 41 Okla. 383 , 140 Pac. 782 , this court said: ‘ The doctrine of lis pendens, under the common law, was based upon the theory of public policy, while, under our statute, it appears to be treated as an element of the law of notice.” Notwithstanding the filing of the petition of plaintiff was at least

1925Stat. 1921, provides: “When the petition ñas been filed, the action is pending, so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency), and while pending, no interest can be acquired by third persons i'n the subject-matter thereof as against the plaintiff's title.” In McWhorter v. Brady et al., 41 Okla. 383 , 140 Pac. 782 , this court said: ‘ The doctrine of lis pendens, under the common law, was based upon the theory of public policy, while, under our statute, it appears to be treated as an element of the law of notice.” Notwithstanding the filing of the petition of plaintiff was at least

1924App.) 51 P. 812 , the Court of Appeals of Kansas, construing the statute of that state, which is substantially the same as ours, said: “That this applies equally to the defendant’s title, under a cross-petition, we do not think will be questioned.” Therein is quoted with approval the definition of the doctrine of lis pendens by Judge Storey, as follows: “A purchase made of the property actually in litigation, pendente lite, for a, valuable consideration, and without any express or implied notice in point of fact, affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had such notice, and he will ac

1922In his reply brief he says: "Where the record shows that a cause has been litigated upon the theory that a claim to land is in a certain party, such party has the right to appeal from the judgment rendered in- said cause, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence shows such title to have been conveyed by an unrecorded deed prior to the institution of the action." He cites in support of this proposition Doyle v. Hays Land & Investment Co. (Kan.) 102 Pac. 496 .

1916Rep. 158 , it is said: “Where the wife files a petition asking for a divorce and for alimony, in which she definitely describes certain real estate of the husband, and prays that it may be set apart and decreed to her as permanent alimony, the doctrine of lis pendens will apply.; and any one who purchases such property during the pendency of the action will be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered therein.” In Tolerton v. Willard, 30 Ohio St. 579 , it is said: “If a petition for divorce and alimony by the wife specifically describes certain real estate of the husband, charging T with equ

1916In Harshberger v. Harshberger, 26 Iowa, 503 , it is said: “The district court of the county where the plaintiff resides, having jurisdiction of the cause in an action for divorce and alimony, may rightfully declare and enforce a lien lor alimony granted in the. action against real estate of the defendant situated in another county.