lis pendens doctrine in Kansas

1939The first paragraph of the syllabus reads: “Where the wife files a petition asking for a divorce and for alimony, in which she definitely describes certain real estate of the husband, and prays that it may be set apart and decreed to her as permanent alimony, the doctrine of lis pendens will apply; and anyone who purchases such property during the pendency of the action will be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered therein.” See, also, Kremer v. Schutz, 82 Kan. 175 , 107 Pac. 708 ; Graham v. Popple, 129 Kan. 735 , 284 Pac. 394 .

1939The first paragraph of the syllabus reads: “Where the wife files a petition asking for a divorce and for alimony, in which she definitely describes certain real estate of the husband, and prays that it may be set apart and decreed to her as permanent alimony, the doctrine of lis pendens will apply; and anyone who purchases such property during the pendency of the action will be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered therein.” See, also, Kremer v. Schutz, 82 Kan. 175 , 107 Pac. 708 ; Graham v. Popple, 129 Kan. 735 , 284 Pac. 394 .

2003One of the issues reviewed by the Kansas Supreme Court was whether the divorce petition had sufficiendy described the real estate to qualify the case for application of lis pendens: “Where the wife files a petition asking for a divorce and for alimony, in which she definitely describes certain real estate of the husband, and prays that it may be set apart and decreed to her as permanent alimony, the doctrine of lis pendens will apply; and anyone who purchases such property during the pendency of the action will be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered therein.” 43 Kan. 590 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2003The court observed a divorce petition containing only a general prayer for alimony and no specific mention of any real estate would be insufficient, 43 Kan. at 594 , and finally held the lis pendens doctrine also did not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97 .

1969In Travis v. Supply Co., 42 Kan. 625, 628 , 22 Pac. 991 , this court stated the three elements of a valid and effective lis pendens are: (1) The property must be of a character to be subject to the rule of lis pendens; (2) the court must acquire jurisdiction both of the person and the property; and (3) the property must be sufficiently described in the pleadings.

1939The first paragraph of the syllabus reads: “Where the wife files a petition asking for a divorce and for alimony, in which she definitely describes certain real estate of the husband, and prays that it may be set apart and decreed to her as permanent alimony, the doctrine of lis pendens will apply; and anyone who purchases such property during the pendency of the action will be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered therein.” See, also, Kremer v. Schutz, 82 Kan. 175 , 107 Pac. 708 ; Graham v. Popple, 129 Kan. 735 , 284 Pac. 394 .

1927The opinion-in the case of Smith v. Kimball, 36 Kan. 474 , 13 Pac. 801 , was written by a commissioner of the court, who was enamored of the common-law doctrine of lis pendens.

1898In Kincaid v. Frog, 49 Kan. 766 , 31 Pac. 704 , it was held that in attachment proceedings, where no service of summons is had within sixty days from the filing of the petition, the attachment falls and the land so attached may be conveyed free from any lien on account of such attachment.

1887Eq. 205; Bruse v. Nelson, 35 Iowa, 157 ; Stimpson v. Pease, 53 id. 572; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494 ; Shaver v. Williams, 87 Ill. 469 . 3 paramount tltle' The second mortgage was executed by the defendant in the ejectment suit while that suit was pending, and was also foreclosed against the mortgagor while that suit was pending; and therefore, under the doctrine of lis pendens, the parties taking that mortgage and afterward foreclosing it could, as against the other parties and their privies, procure no more or greater rights than their mortgagor, Mrs. Colcher, might in that ejectment action be a

1887Eq. 205; Bruse v. Nelson, 35 Iowa, 157 ; Stimpson v. Pease, 53 id. 572; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494 ; Shaver v. Williams, 87 Ill. 469 . 3 paramount tltle' The second mortgage was executed by the defendant in the ejectment suit while that suit was pending, and was also foreclosed against the mortgagor while that suit was pending; and therefore, under the doctrine of lis pendens, the parties taking that mortgage and afterward foreclosing it could, as against the other parties and their privies, procure no more or greater rights than their mortgagor, Mrs. Colcher, might in that ejectment action be a

1887Eq. 205; Bruse v. Nelson, 35 Iowa, 157 ; Stimpson v. Pease, 53 id. 572; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494 ; Shaver v. Williams, 87 Ill. 469 . 3 paramount tltle' The second mortgage was executed by the defendant in the ejectment suit while that suit was pending, and was also foreclosed against the mortgagor while that suit was pending; and therefore, under the doctrine of lis pendens, the parties taking that mortgage and afterward foreclosing it could, as against the other parties and their privies, procure no more or greater rights than their mortgagor, Mrs. Colcher, might in that ejectment action be a