predeprivation hearing in Oregon

6 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
Tilbury v. Multnomah Countygreen ortc · 1994 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016In Tilbury v. Multnomah County, 13 OTR 157, 161 (1994), this court again addressed the requirement of due process, noting that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard and his due process rights were therefore not violated.	1	1
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 US 1, 18 , 111 S Ct 2105 , 115 L Ed 2d 1, 18 (1991) (without some showing of exigent circumstances, state’s failure to provide for preattachment hearing violated Due Process Clause); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 542 , 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 , 84 L Ed 2d 494, 503 (1985) (some kind of hearing required before employee was discharged). 1998Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 US 1, 18 , 111 S Ct 2105 , 115 L Ed 2d 1, 18 (1991) (without some showing of exigent circumstances, state’s failure to provide for preattachment hearing violated Due Process Clause); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 542 , 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 , 84 L Ed 2d 494, 503 (1985) (some kind of hearing required before employee was discharged).	1	1
Connecticut v. Doehrgreen scotus · 1991 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 US 1, 18 , 111 S Ct 2105 , 115 L Ed 2d 1, 18 (1991) (without some showing of exigent circumstances, state’s failure to provide for preattachment hearing violated Due Process Clause); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 542 , 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 , 84 L Ed 2d 494, 503 (1985) (some kind of hearing required before employee was discharged). 1998Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 US 1, 18 , 111 S Ct 2105 , 115 L Ed 2d 1, 18 (1991) (without some showing of exigent circumstances, state’s failure to provide for preattachment hearing violated Due Process Clause); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 542 , 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 , 84 L Ed 2d 494, 503 (1985) (some kind of hearing required before employee was discharged).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

Case	Cited	Years
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 2016The procedural safeguards may consist of a predeprivation hearing or clear and certain, backward-looking, postdeprivation relief. 496 US at 37 . 1994The procedural safeguards may consist of a predeprivation hearing or clear and certain, backward-looking, postdeprivation relief. 496 US at 37 .	2	1994–2016
Ester v. City of Monmouth green ortc · 1994 1 sentence 1995While the state may choose to provide either a predeprivation hearing, or clear and certain postdeprivation relief, it may not condition the remedy on group action.” Ester, 13 OTR at 107 .	1	1995–1995
Grannis v. Ordean green scotus · 1914 2 sentences 1994The fundamental requirement of predeprivation due process is that the person being deprived of property must be given “the opportunity to be heard.” 8 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US 385, 394 , 34 S Ct 779 , 58 L Ed 1363 (1914). 1994The fundamental requirement of predeprivation due process is that the person being deprived of property must be given “the opportunity to be heard.” 8 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US 385, 394 , 34 S Ct 779 , 58 L Ed 1363 (1914).	1	1994–1994
State v. Jones green orctapp · 1985 1 sentence 1986State v. Jones, supra, 76 Or App at 162 .	1	1986–1986
Dixon v. Love green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 1985The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.” After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105 , 97 S Ct 1723 , 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1 , 99 S Ct 2612 , 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), 5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons. 1985The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.” After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105 , 97 S Ct 1723 , 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1 , 99 S Ct 2612 , 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), 5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons.	1	1985–1985
United States v. Chadwick red scotus · 1977 1 sentence 1985The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.” After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105 , 97 S Ct 1723 , 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1 , 99 S Ct 2612 , 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), 5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons.	1	1985–1985
MacKey v. Montrym green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1985The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.” After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105 , 97 S Ct 1723 , 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1 , 99 S Ct 2612 , 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), 5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons. 1985The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.” After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105 , 97 S Ct 1723 , 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1 , 99 S Ct 2612 , 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), 5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons.	1	1985–1985

Where else courts name it

CA 18 (1984–2024) IL 12 (1984–2020) MI 9 (1990–2017) WA 9 (1985–2021) IA 9 (1993–2019) NY 7 (1991–2011) OH 7 (1987–2023) VT 6 (2004–2015) OR 6 (1985–2016) AL 5 (1991–2024) FL 5 (1992–2017) CT 5 (1992–2022) NC 4 (1994–2013) NJ 4 (1986–2022) MA 4 (1985–2021) WI 4 (1986–2001) PA 3 (2011–2019) GA 3 (1993–2004) DC 3 (1994–2018) NM 2 (2009–2009) NE 2 (1994–2017) MS 2 (1997–1999) CO 2 (1982–1991) KS 2 (2006–2020) AZ 2 (1991–1994) KY 2 (1993–1994) RI 2 (1994–2004) VA 2 (1995–1998) IN 2 (1990–1995) LA 2 (1993–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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