5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Massey v. Charlotte Countygreen1 sentence2017Massey v. Charlotte Cty., 842 So. 2d 142, 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Procedural due process does not always require a predeprivation hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2000See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2000See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, Acting Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services
green
1 sentence2005The Supreme Court, noting that "Connecticut ... has decided that the registry requirement shall be based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness," reversed the circuit court "because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact [e.g., current dangerousness] that is not material to the State's statutory scheme." Doe, 538 U.S. at 4 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
green
2 sentences2005The federal circuit court held that Connecticut's Act "violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing to determine whether they are likely to be `currently dangerous.'" Id. at 4 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 , 46 (2d Cir.2001)). 2005The federal circuit court held that Connecticut's Act "violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing to determine whether they are likely to be `currently dangerous.'" Id. at 4 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 , 46 (2d Cir.2001)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
John Doe v. Dept. Of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2005The federal circuit court held that Connecticut's Act "violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing to determine whether they are likely to be `currently dangerous.'" Id. at 4 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 , 46 (2d Cir.2001)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 39 n. 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2251 n. 21 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 1997Id. at 39 n. 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2251 n. 21 (citations omitted; emphasis added). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992In Phillips , we summarized Mitchell and North Georgia as setting forth the following requirements: (1) the writ shall not issue without judicial authorization; (2) the writ may issue only upon the allegation of specific facts; (3) the party seeking to invoke a writ is required to post a bond to guarantee the tenant’s interests; (4) the tenant has the opportunity to obtain an immediate hearing to dissolve a writ; and (5) there is the opportunity for a prompt hearing on the merits, though not necessarily a predeprivation hearing. 344 So.2d at 571 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.