delay in asserting defense in Pennsylvania

1978To the same effect is Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 119 , 220 A. 2d 639 (1966), holding: “Ordinarily, the passage of time in itself is insufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine, and it must further appear that injury or material prejudice has resulted to the defendant through the delay. [Citations omitted.] However, where the delay in asserting the claim involves a grossly unreasonable time, the necessity for specifics regarding prejudice or injury becomes less crucial.” The question of laches is factual and must be determined by an examination of the circumstances: Wilson v.

1978To the same effect is Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 119 , 220 A. 2d 639 (1966), holding: “Ordinarily, the passage of time in itself is insufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine, and it must further appear that injury or material prejudice has resulted to the defendant through the delay. [Citations omitted.] However, where the delay in asserting the claim involves a grossly unreasonable time, the necessity for specifics regarding prejudice or injury becomes less crucial.” The question of laches is factual and must be determined by an examination of the circumstances: Wilson v.

1945See also: Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa. 109 , 59 A. 689 ; United Nat.

1940A party is not entitled to have a decree pro confesso entered against him opened as a matter of course, but only “upon cause shown,” i. e., upon a showing that he is acting in good faith and that the delay in asserting the defense which he now seeks to assert, was not due to his own fault or wilful neglect: Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa. 109 ; Kurtz v. Farrell, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 355 .

1987Cf. Wilson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 99 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 508 , 513 A.2d 586 (1986) (vacating a grant of summary judgment where the agency foiled to raise the question of immunity and the trial court addressed this defense sua sponte.) In Hojfner, the Appellants asserted that the Commonwealths feilure to set forth the defense of immunity by way of preliminary objection or new matter constituted a waiver of the defense and that the delay in asserting this defense constituted laches.

1987Cf. Wilson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 99 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 508 , 513 A.2d 586 (1986) (vacating a grant of summary judgment where the agency foiled to raise the question of immunity and the trial court addressed this defense sua sponte.) In Hojfner, the Appellants asserted that the Commonwealths feilure to set forth the defense of immunity by way of preliminary objection or new matter constituted a waiver of the defense and that the delay in asserting this defense constituted laches.

1978To the same effect is Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 119 , 220 A. 2d 639 (1966), holding: “Ordinarily, the passage of time in itself is insufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine, and it must further appear that injury or material prejudice has resulted to the defendant through the delay. [Citations omitted.] However, where the delay in asserting the claim involves a grossly unreasonable time, the necessity for specifics regarding prejudice or injury becomes less crucial.” The question of laches is factual and must be determined by an examination of the circumstances: Wilson v.

1978To the same effect is Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 119 , 220 A. 2d 639 (1966), holding: “Ordinarily, the passage of time in itself is insufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine, and it must further appear that injury or material prejudice has resulted to the defendant through the delay. [Citations omitted.] However, where the delay in asserting the claim involves a grossly unreasonable time, the necessity for specifics regarding prejudice or injury becomes less crucial.” The question of laches is factual and must be determined by an examination of the circumstances: Wilson v.

1945Appellants must show that they were acting in good faith and that the delay in asserting the defense which they now seek to assert was not due to their own fault or wilful neglect: Mitchell v. Mitchell, 338 Pa. 152 , 12 A. 2d 16 .

1945Appellants must show that they were acting in good faith and that the delay in asserting the defense which they now seek to assert was not due to their own fault or wilful neglect: Mitchell v. Mitchell, 338 Pa. 152 , 12 A. 2d 16 .

1940A party is not entitled to have a decree pro confesso entered against him opened as a matter of course, but only “upon cause shown,” i. e., upon a showing that he is acting in good faith and that the delay in asserting the defense which he now seeks to assert, was not due to his own fault or wilful neglect: Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa. 109 ; Kurtz v. Farrell, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 355 .