delay in asserting claim in Georgia

1959Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 733 ( 156 S. E. 603 ), “In determining whether there has been laches, various things' aré to be considered, notably the duration 'of the delay in asserting the claim, and the sufficiency of the 'excuse offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay .thé evidence 'of the matters in dispute has been lost or become ■obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the ■property1 in suit during the delay) whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity, to have acted sooner, and whether the party charged with, laches acted at the first pos

1959Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 733 ( 156 S. E. 603 ), “In determining whether there has been laches, various things' aré to be considered, notably the duration 'of the delay in asserting the claim, and the sufficiency of the 'excuse offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay .thé evidence 'of the matters in dispute has been lost or become ■obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the ■property1 in suit during the delay) whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity, to have acted sooner, and whether the party charged with, laches acted at the first pos

1999To constitute the defense of laches the delay must have been such as practically to preclude the court from arriving at a safe conclusion as to the truth of the matters in controversy, and thus make the doing of equity either doubtful or impossible, due to loss or obscuration of evidence of the transaction in issue, or where the lapse of time has been sufficient to create or justify a presumption against the existence or validity of the plaintiff's right, or to justify a presumption that, if the plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has been abandoned or waived, or has been satisfied." [

1999To constitute the defense of laches the delay must have been such as practically to preclude the court from arriving at a safe conclusion as to the truth of the matters in controversy, and thus make the doing of equity either doubtful or impossible, due to loss or obscuration of evidence of the transaction in issue, or where the lapse of time has been sufficient to create or justify a presumption against the existence or validity of the plaintiff's right, or to justify a presumption that, if the plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has been abandoned or waived, or has been satisfied." [

1996See also Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 432 ( 34 SE2d 541 ) (1945).

1996See also Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 432 ( 34 SE2d 541 ) (1945).

1950“In determining whether there has been laches there are various things to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim and the sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation of the delay, whether plaintiff acquiesced in the assertion or operation of the corresponding adverse claim, the character of the evidence by which plaintiff’s right is sought to be established, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscured or the conditions have so changed as tó render the enforcement of the right inequitable, whether third pe

1950“In determining whether there has been laches there are various things to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim and the sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation of the delay, whether plaintiff acquiesced in the assertion or operation of the corresponding adverse claim, the character of the evidence by which plaintiff’s right is sought to be established, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscured or the conditions have so changed as tó render the enforcement of the right inequitable, whether third pe

2017Co. , 199 Ga. App. 343 , 344 (1), 404 S.E.2d 807 (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured's claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense).

2017Co. , 199 Ga. App. 343 , 344 (1), 404 S.E.2d 807 (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured's claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense).

2017Co., 199 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) ( 404 SE2d 807 ) (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured’s claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense). 28 Capital City Developers, LLC v. Bank of N. Ga., 316 Ga. App. 624, 628-29 (2) ( 730 SE2d 99 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 58 (4) ( 701 SE2d 165 ) (2010) (holding that “estoppel requires an act on the part of the one intended to influence the other, and detrimental reliance upon that ac

2017Co., 199 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) ( 404 SE2d 807 ) (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured’s claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense). 28 Capital City Developers, LLC v. Bank of N. Ga., 316 Ga. App. 624, 628-29 (2) ( 730 SE2d 99 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 58 (4) ( 701 SE2d 165 ) (2010) (holding that “estoppel requires an act on the part of the one intended to influence the other, and detrimental reliance upon that ac

2017Co., 199 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) ( 404 SE2d 807 ) (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured’s claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense). 28 Capital City Developers, LLC v. Bank of N. Ga., 316 Ga. App. 624, 628-29 (2) ( 730 SE2d 99 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 58 (4) ( 701 SE2d 165 ) (2010) (holding that “estoppel requires an act on the part of the one intended to influence the other, and detrimental reliance upon that ac

2017Co., 199 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) ( 404 SE2d 807 ) (1991) (noting that pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-40, evidence of a delay in asserting a defense pending a full and complete investigation of insured’s claim would not be material to the issue of whether insurer waived its defense). 28 Capital City Developers, LLC v. Bank of N. Ga., 316 Ga. App. 624, 628-29 (2) ( 730 SE2d 99 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 58 (4) ( 701 SE2d 165 ) (2010) (holding that “estoppel requires an act on the part of the one intended to influence the other, and detrimental reliance upon that ac

2011See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 875 ( 452 SE2d 756 ) (1995) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an out-of-time appeal if the failure of his initial appeal is the fault of appellate counsel). 2 In the event that a criminal defendant labels a pleading as a “motion in arrest of judgment” hut it is in substance some other type of motion, the appealability of the trial court’s ruling on the motion will turn on the substance of the motion.

2011See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 875 ( 452 SE2d 756 ) (1995) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an out-of-time appeal if the failure of his initial appeal is the fault of appellate counsel). 2 In the event that a criminal defendant labels a pleading as a “motion in arrest of judgment” hut it is in substance some other type of motion, the appealability of the trial court’s ruling on the motion will turn on the substance of the motion.

1982Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 733 (3) ( 156 SE 603 ); Flemister v. Billups, 202 Ga. 132, 133 (1) ( 42 SE2d 376 ).” Hodges v. Libbey, 224 Ga. 509, 510 ( 162 SE2d 716 ) (1968).

1982Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 733 (3) ( 156 SE 603 ); Flemister v. Billups, 202 Ga. 132, 133 (1) ( 42 SE2d 376 ).” Hodges v. Libbey, 224 Ga. 509, 510 ( 162 SE2d 716 ) (1968).

1959See Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 432 , Whitfield v. Whitfield, 204 Ga. 64 , and Cannon v. Fulton Nat.

1945As was well stated in Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 719 ( 156 S. E. 603 ): 'In determining whether there has been laches, various things are to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim, the sufficiency of the excuse, if any, offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the property in suit during the delay, whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity to act sooner, and whether he acted at t

1945As was well stated in Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717, 719 ( 156 S. E. 603 ): 'In determining whether there has been laches, various things are to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim, the sufficiency of the excuse, if any, offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the property in suit during the delay, whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity to act sooner, and whether he acted at t