6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Angeline OSTAPOWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNSON BRONZE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences1999The flexibility of this standard was made explicit by the Hicks court which unequivocally stated that “if the EEOC’s investigation is unreasonably narrow or improperly conducted, the plaintiff should not be barred from his statutory right to a civil action.” Hicks, supra at 965 (3d Cir. 1978). 12 ¶ 20 Under this standard, when determining the appropriate scope of an agency investigation, the legal analysis turns on whether there is a close nexus between the facts supporting each claim, Hicks, supra at 966, or, as the Ostapowicz court wrote, whether additional charges made in the judicial compl 1999The flexibility of this standard was made explicit by the Hicks court which unequivocally stated that "if the EEOC's investigation is unreasonably narrow or improperly conducted, the plaintiff should not be barred from his statutory right to a civil action." Hicks, supra at 965 (3d Cir.1978). [12] ¶ 20 Under this standard, when determining the appropriate scope of an agency investigation, the legal analysis turns on whether there is a close nexus between the facts supporting each claim, Hicks, supra at 966, or, as the Ostapowicz court wrote, whether additional charges made in the judicial comp | 2 | 2 |
Harry Daniel HICKS, Appellant, v. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., Appelleegreen2 sentences1999The flexibility of this standard was made explicit by the Hicks court which unequivocally stated that “if the EEOC’s investigation is unreasonably narrow or improperly conducted, the plaintiff should not be barred from his statutory right to a civil action.” Hicks, supra at 965 (3d Cir. 1978). 12 ¶ 20 Under this standard, when determining the appropriate scope of an agency investigation, the legal analysis turns on whether there is a close nexus between the facts supporting each claim, Hicks, supra at 966, or, as the Ostapowicz court wrote, whether additional charges made in the judicial compl 1999The flexibility of this standard was made explicit by the Hicks court which unequivocally stated that “if the EEOC’s investigation is unreasonably narrow or improperly conducted, the plaintiff should not be barred from his statutory right to a civil action.” Hicks, supra at 965 (3d Cir. 1978). 12 ¶ 20 Under this standard, when determining the appropriate scope of an agency investigation, the legal analysis turns on whether there is a close nexus between the facts supporting each claim, Hicks, supra at 966, or, as the Ostapowicz court wrote, whether additional charges made in the judicial compl | 2 | 2 |
Montgomery County v. Iversongreen2 sentences2026Bagwell underscored the flexibility of the test, and the post-Pittsburgh Post-Gazette vitality of [Montgomery County v.] Iverson[, 50 A.3d 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)], noting that “although Iverson was decided prior to this Court’s clear recitation of the sufficiently specific test in Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the reasoning in Iverson highlights the flexible, case[-]by[- ]case, contextual application of the test.” Bagwell, 155 A.3d at 1144 -45 . . . . 2025Compare Carey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 61 A.3d 367, 372 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (upholding a request for “all records that were provided to the transferred inmates” because it sought “a discrete group of documents” limited by recipient), with Iverson, 50 A.3d at 284 (finding insufficient a request that “does not identify specific individuals, email addresses, or even departments, but requests any applicable emails sent from the County’s domain to four other domains”). | 1 | 2 |
City of Harrisburg v. J. Prince, Esq.green1 sentence2024City of Harrisburg v. Prince, 186 A.3d 544, 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 219 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carey v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2025Compare Carey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 61 A.3d 367, 372 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (upholding a request for “all records that were provided to the transferred inmates” because it sought “a discrete group of documents” limited by recipient), with Iverson, 50 A.3d at 284 (finding insufficient a request that “does not identify specific individuals, email addresses, or even departments, but requests any applicable emails sent from the County’s domain to four other domains”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kenneth C. Antol v. William J. Perry, Secretary Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency)
green
2 sentences1999Antol v. Perry, supra at 1296 . ¶ 21 Thus, contrary to Appellee’s assertion based on Antol v. Perry, supra, courts have not uniformly rejected attempts by plaintiffs to expand litigation to include types of discrimination not alleged in the administrative complaint. 1999Antol v. Perry, supra at 1296 . ¶ 21 Thus, contrary to Appellee’s assertion based on Antol v. Perry, supra, courts have not uniformly rejected attempts by plaintiffs to expand litigation to include types of discrimination not alleged in the administrative complaint. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia v. Bagwell
green
1 sentence2026Bagwell underscored the flexibility of the test, and the post-Pittsburgh Post-Gazette vitality of [Montgomery County v.] Iverson[, 50 A.3d 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)], noting that “although Iverson was decided prior to this Court’s clear recitation of the sufficiently specific test in Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the reasoning in Iverson highlights the flexible, case[-]by[- ]case, contextual application of the test.” Bagwell, 155 A.3d at 1144 -45 . . . . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind
green
2 sentences1986“The flexibility of the doctrine of equitable estoppel,” the Court opined, “does not allow it to be imposed where the essential elements of inducement and reliance are supported solely by speculation.” Id., 500 Pa. at 438 , 457 A.2d at 505 . 1986“The flexibility of the doctrine of equitable estoppel,” the Court opined, “does not allow it to be imposed where the essential elements of inducement and reliance are supported solely by speculation.” Id., 500 Pa. at 438 , 457 A.2d at 505 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.