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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Deukmejian v. Browngreen2 sentences2015Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 154-155 (Brown) [citing section 11040 as an exception to sections 12511 and 12512].) This flexibility has been the rule since our state’s infancy. 2015Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 154-155 (Brown) [citing section 11040 as an exception to sections 12511 and 12512].) This flexibility has been the rule since our state’s infancy. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kunkingreen2 sentences2011In People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 ], our Supreme Court expanded on the flexibility of the rule: “We now conclude that an intent to take the property for so extended a period as to deprive the owner of a major portion of its value or enjoyment satisfies the common law, and therefore California, intent requirement.” (Id. at p. 55.) “The case generally cited (see, e.g., People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ]) as establishing California’s intent-to-deprive-permanently requirement itself implies that the requirement is 2011In People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 ], our Supreme Court expanded on the flexibility of the rule: “We now conclude that an intent to take the property for so extended a period as to deprive the owner of a major portion of its value or enjoyment satisfies the common law, and therefore California, intent requirement.” (Id. at p. 55.) “The case generally cited (see, e.g., People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ]) as establishing California’s intent-to-deprive-permanently requirement itself implies that the requirement is | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Avery
green
2 sentences2011In People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 ], our Supreme Court expanded on the flexibility of the rule: “We now conclude that an intent to take the property for so extended a period as to deprive the owner of a major portion of its value or enjoyment satisfies the common law, and therefore California, intent requirement.” (Id. at p. 55.) “The case generally cited (see, e.g., People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ]) as establishing California’s intent-to-deprive-permanently requirement itself implies that the requirement is 2011In People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 ], our Supreme Court expanded on the flexibility of the rule: “We now conclude that an intent to take the property for so extended a period as to deprive the owner of a major portion of its value or enjoyment satisfies the common law, and therefore California, intent requirement.” (Id. at p. 55.) “The case generally cited (see, e.g., People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ]) as establishing California’s intent-to-deprive-permanently requirement itself implies that the requirement is | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Stangvik v. Shiley Inc.
green
1 sentence2011Otherwise, the flexibility of the doctrine would be threatened, and its application would be based on identification of a single factor rather than the balancing of several.” (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753 .) n The Court Properly Found Mexico Provides a Suitable Alternative Forum A Preliminarily, we dispose of plaintiffs’ contention reversal is required because the court’s order does not sufficiently explain its reasoning on the issue of suitability. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2011In People v. Brown [(1894)] 105 Cal. 66 [ 38 P. 518 ], the defendant defended against a charge of stealing a bicycle by testifying that he intended to return it. 2011In People v. Brown [(1894)] 105 Cal. 66 [ 38 P. 518 ], the defendant defended against a charge of stealing a bicycle by testifying that he intended to return it. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
green
1 sentence1991Otherwise, the flexibility of the doctrine would be threatened, and its application would be based on identification of a single factor rather than the balancing of several. ( Piper, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 249-250 [70 L.Ed.2d at pp. 431-432].) 4 The high court recognized that there is “ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum” (id. at p. 255 [ 70 L.Ed.2d at p. 435 ]), but held that a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference than the choice of a resident. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.