6 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1880–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Clubgreen2 sentences2012League Baseball Club, 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945) (“[I]f there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose.” (citations omitted)); Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n, 332 S.C. 54, 64-65 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1998) (explaining that knowledge of facts or circumstances putting a party on notice to inquire constitutes constructive, not implied actual notice). 2012League Baseball Club, 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945) (“[I]f there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose.” (citations omitted)); Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n, 332 S.C. 54, 64-65 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1998) (explaining that knowledge of facts or circumstances putting a party on notice to inquire constitutes constructive, not implied actual notice). | 3 | 4 |
Black v. Childsgreen2 sentences2009To the contrary, a resolution of this question includes consideration of “circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry.” Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321-22 (1880) (quoted in Spence, 368 S.C. at 120 , 628 S.E.2d at 876 ). 1996See Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321 (1880) ("[i]f there are circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted would certainly disclose; but constructive notice goes no further."); McGee v. French, 49 S.C. 454 , 27 S.E. 487 (1897) (holding where facts were sufficient to be put on inquiry, then it was equivalent to notice); Huestess v. South Atl. | 2 | 2 |
Patellis v. Tannergreen2 sentences1996That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.'" Id. at 185 , 427 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944)). 1996That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.'" Id. at 185 , 427 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944)). | 2 | 2 |
Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Commissiongreen2 sentences2012League Baseball Club, 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945) (“[I]f there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose.” (citations omitted)); Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n, 332 S.C. 54, 64-65 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1998) (explaining that knowledge of facts or circumstances putting a party on notice to inquire constitutes constructive, not implied actual notice). 2012League Baseball Club, 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945) (“[I]f there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose.” (citations omitted)); Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n, 332 S.C. 54, 64-65 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1998) (explaining that knowledge of facts or circumstances putting a party on notice to inquire constitutes constructive, not implied actual notice). | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson County Bank v. Ericksongreen2 sentences1996"Actual notice is synonymous with knowledge." Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 Minn. 354 , 247 N.W. 245, 247 (1933). 1996"Actual notice is synonymous with knowledge." Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 Minn. 354 , 247 N.W. 245, 247 (1933). | 1 | 1 |
Dicks & Gillam, Inc. v. Clelandgreen2 sentences1996Amplifying the use of "notice" as it relates to parties inter sese is City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, et al., 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945): "Furthermore, if there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose." A commonsensical statement in regard to "notice" is contained in Hannah v. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 42 , 430 S.E.2d 539 (Ct.App.1993): Stated differently, "[n]o one needs notice of what he already knows. 1996Amplifying the use of "notice" as it relates to parties inter sese is City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, et al., 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945): "Furthermore, if there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose." A commonsensical statement in regard to "notice" is contained in Hannah v. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 42 , 430 S.E.2d 539 (Ct.App.1993): Stated differently, "[n]o one needs notice of what he already knows. | 1 | 1 |
Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakisgreen2 sentences1993That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice." Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944); see Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakis, 199 Va. 142 , 98 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1957) (means of knowledge coupled with duty of using means is equivalent to knowledge itself); 58 Am.Jur.2d Notice § 14 (1989). 1993That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice." Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944); see Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakis, 199 Va. 142 , 98 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1957) (means of knowledge coupled with duty of using means is equivalent to knowledge itself); 58 Am.Jur.2d Notice § 14 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lambert v. California
green
2 sentences2012In Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225 , 78 S.Ct. 240 , 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), the United States Supreme Court applied a similar analysis to notice of criminal prohibitions, though without using the terminology of actual and constructive notice. 2012In Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225 , 78 S.Ct. 240 , 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), the United States Supreme Court applied a similar analysis to notice of criminal prohibitions, though without using the terminology of actual and constructive notice. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Spence v. Spence Ex Rel. Spence
green
2 sentences2009To the contrary, a resolution of this question includes consideration of “circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry.” Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321-22 (1880) (quoted in Spence, 368 S.C. at 120 , 628 S.E.2d at 876 ). 2009To the contrary, a resolution of this question includes consideration of “circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry.” Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321-22 (1880) (quoted in Spence, 368 S.C. at 120 , 628 S.E.2d at 876 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hannah v. United Refrigerated Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Amplifying the use of "notice" as it relates to parties inter sese is City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, et al., 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945): "Furthermore, if there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose." A commonsensical statement in regard to "notice" is contained in Hannah v. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 42 , 430 S.E.2d 539 (Ct.App.1993): Stated differently, "[n]o one needs notice of what he already knows. 1996Amplifying the use of "notice" as it relates to parties inter sese is City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, et al., 205 S.C. 495, 509 , 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945): "Furthermore, if there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose." A commonsensical statement in regard to "notice" is contained in Hannah v. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 42 , 430 S.E.2d 539 (Ct.App.1993): Stated differently, "[n]o one needs notice of what he already knows. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Fuller-Ahrens Partnership v. S.C. Deparment of Highways & Public Transportation
green
2 sentences1996That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.'" Id. at 185 , 427 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944)). 1996That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.'" Id. at 185 , 427 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471 , 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
McGee v. French
neutral
2 sentences1996See Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321 (1880) ("[i]f there are circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted would certainly disclose; but constructive notice goes no further."); McGee v. French, 49 S.C. 454 , 27 S.E. 487 (1897) (holding where facts were sufficient to be put on inquiry, then it was equivalent to notice); Huestess v. South Atl. 1996See Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 312, 321 (1880) ("[i]f there are circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted would certainly disclose; but constructive notice goes no further."); McGee v. French, 49 S.C. 454 , 27 S.E. 487 (1897) (holding where facts were sufficient to be put on inquiry, then it was equivalent to notice); Huestess v. South Atl. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Birdsall v. . Russell
green
1 sentence1880It stands upon the principle that the party is bound to the' exercise of due diligence, and is assumed to have the knowledge to which that diligence would lead him; but he is not held to have notice of matter which lies beyond the range of that inquiry and which that diligence might not disclose. “ There must appear to be, in the nature of the case, such a connection between the facts disclosed and the further facts to be discovered, that the former could justly be viewed as furnishing a clue to the latter.” Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220 ; Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326 ; Le | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Cambridge Valley Bank v. . Delano
green
1 sentence1880It stands upon the principle that the party is bound to the' exercise of due diligence, and is assumed to have the knowledge to which that diligence would lead him; but he is not held to have notice of matter which lies beyond the range of that inquiry and which that diligence might not disclose. “ There must appear to be, in the nature of the case, such a connection between the facts disclosed and the further facts to be discovered, that the former could justly be viewed as furnishing a clue to the latter.” Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220 ; Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326 ; Le | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.