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8 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wenneker v. Fragergreen2 sentences2000Id. 1972There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Mr. Sayles had full authority to enter into the stipulation on behalf of appellants, Wenneker v. Frager, Mo.App., 448 S.W.2d 932, 937 [8], “ ‘An attorney in charge of a case has implied authority from his client to enter into any stipulation for the control of the progress of the action, even to the entering of judgment in favor of the opposite party.’ (Citing cases.)” Quoting Kahn v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., Mo.App., 156 S.W.2d 40 [8], the Wenneker opinion went on: “ ‘ * * * And the compromise of a pending suit by an att | 2 | 3 |
Stearns Bank N.A. v. Palmergreen2 sentences2019Further, even were we to find that the Appellants adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the attorney did not have actual authority to enter into the settlement, "where such apparent authority is present, '[t]he compromise of a pending suit will be binding upon his client, unless [the settlement] be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.'" Kenney, 277 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Stearns Bank N.A. v. Palmer, 182 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)). 2008Finally, where such apparent authority is present, “ ‘[t]he compromise of a pending suit will be binding upon his client, unless it be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.’ ” Steams Bank N.A. v. Palmer, 182 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.App. | 2 | 2 |
Promotional Consultants, Inc. v. Logsdongreen2 sentences2008E.D.2005) (quoting Promotional Consultants, Inc. v. Logsdon, 25 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo.App. 2005Only allegations of unfairness in the agreement to dismiss or fraud in its procurement would undermine the attorney’s apparent authority to enter the joint dismissal and relieve Palmer of the obligations thereunder: An attorney in charge of a case has implied authority from his client to enter into any stipulation for the control of the progress of the action, even to the entering of judgment in favor of the opposite party. ■ The compromise of a pending suit by an attorney having apparent authority will be binding upon his client, unless it be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry a | 2 | 2 |
Black v. Rogersgreen2 sentences1984Moreover, “the compromise of a pending suit by an attorney having apparent authority, will be binding upon his client, unless it be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.” Id.; Allen v. Fewel, 337 Mo. 955 , 87 S.W.2d 142, 145 (1935); Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 441, 448 (1882). 1972Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 441 .’ ” No fraud upon appellants is even slightly in the case. | 1 | 3 |
Samland v. J. White Transportation Co.green1 sentence2005E.D.2000) (attorney had implied authority to enter settlement requiring client to dismiss case with prejudice, and, without evidence that settlement was unfair or fraudulently obtained, it was binding on client); see also Samland, 675 S.W.2d at 96 (dismissal was authorized and binding on client absent showing by client that settlement was unfair or that attorney lacked authority to file stipulation of dismissal). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Fewelgreen2 sentences1984Moreover, “the compromise of a pending suit by an attorney having apparent authority, will be binding upon his client, unless it be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.” Id.; Allen v. Fewel, 337 Mo. 955 , 87 S.W.2d 142, 145 (1935); Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 441, 448 (1882). 1984Moreover, “the compromise of a pending suit by an attorney having apparent authority, will be binding upon his client, unless it be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.” Id.; Allen v. Fewel, 337 Mo. 955 , 87 S.W.2d 142, 145 (1935); Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 441, 448 (1882). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kenney v. Vansittert
green
1 sentence2019Further, even were we to find that the Appellants adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the attorney did not have actual authority to enter into the settlement, "where such apparent authority is present, '[t]he compromise of a pending suit will be binding upon his client, unless [the settlement] be so unfair as to put the other party upon inquiry as to the authority, or imply fraud.'" Kenney, 277 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Stearns Bank N.A. v. Palmer, 182 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.