45 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Purzycki v. Town of Fairfieldgreen2 sentences2014I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s position that our earlier cases addressing the liability of school officials, namely Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994), and Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), should be dismissed when analyzing the meaning of the ‘‘apparentness’’ prong of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception because ‘‘they involved school principals or superinten- dents who had a special duty of care regarding children in their respective school districts.’’ See footnote 25 of the majority opinion. 2014I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s position that our earlier cases addressing the liability of school officials, namely Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994), and Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), should be dismissed when analyzing the meaning of the ‘‘apparentness’’ prong of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception because ‘‘they involved school principals or superinten- dents who had a special duty of care regarding children in their respective school districts.’’ See footnote 25 of the majority opinion. | 6 | 9 |
Burns v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2021Our recent decision in Martinez aptly summarizes the line of decisions in the wake of Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 649 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 , 101 A.3d 249 (2014), which apply the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discre- tionary act immunity in the public school context, and we need not repeat that detailed analysis here. 2021Our recent decision in Martinez aptly summarizes the line of decisions in the wake of Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 649 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 , 101 A.3d 249 (2014), which apply the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discre- tionary act immunity in the public school context, and we need not repeat that detailed analysis here. | 5 | 13 |
Shore v. Town of Stoningtongreen2 sentences2017See Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 153-54, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (although legally intoxicated driver was not arrested by police officer, plaintiff lacked cause of action in negligence against officer and town for failure to enforce motor vehicle laws governing reckless driving and driving while under influence because there was no identifiable person likely subject to imminent harm). 2017See Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 153-54, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (although legally intoxicated driver was not arrested by police officer, plaintiff lacked cause of action in negligence against officer and town for failure to enforce motor vehicle laws governing reckless driving and driving while under influence because there was no identifiable person likely subject to imminent harm). | 3 | 6 |
Sestito v. City of Grotongreen2 sentences2014The plaintiff’s reliance is misguided, as the present case is distinguishable in that Petras, unlike the police officer in Soderlund, was not compelled by any authority to act. 7 Our Supreme Court determined in Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332 , 984 A.2d 684 (2009), that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies in actions brought pursuant to § 52-557n. 8 The plaintiff argues that Sestito v. Groton, supra, 178 Conn. 520 is analo- gous to the present case. 2003The identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity was recognized in Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979). | 3 | 5 |
Grady v. Town of Somersgreen2 sentences2022The plaintiff claims that he falls within the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity.14 The identifiable person-imminent harm ‘‘exception applies when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 350 , 984 A.2d 684 (2009). 2022The plaintiff claims that he falls within the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity.14 The identifiable person-imminent harm ‘‘exception applies when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 350 , 984 A.2d 684 (2009). | 2 | 4 |
Cotto v. BD. OF EDUC. OF CITY OF NEW HAVENgreen2 sentences2011By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.... [T]he failure to estabhsh any one of the three prongs precludes the application of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 859-60 , 977 A.2d 738 ; see Cotto v. Board of Edmation, supra, 294 Conn, at 273, 984 A.2d 58 . 2011By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.... [T]he failure to estabhsh any one of the three prongs precludes the application of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 859-60 , 977 A.2d 738 ; see Cotto v. Board of Edmation, supra, 294 Conn, at 273, 984 A.2d 58 . | 2 | 3 |
Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C.green2 sentences2016See Hurley v. Heart Physi- cians, P.C., 278 Conn. 305 , 323–24, 898 A.2d 777 (2006) (‘‘we conclude that whether [the] actions [of the defen- dant’s agent] were in derogation of the warnings in the technical manual was an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment’’). 2016See Hurley v. Heart Physi- cians, P.C., 278 Conn. 305 , 323–24, 898 A.2d 777 (2006) (‘‘we conclude that whether [the] actions [of the defen- dant’s agent] were in derogation of the warnings in the technical manual was an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment’’). | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2007However, our Supreme Court has approved of the defendant attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint through a motion to strike “[w]here it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the municipality was engaging in a governmental function while performing the acts and omissions complained of by the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 321 , 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); see also Doe v. Board of Education, 76 Conn. App. 296 , 299 n.6, 819 A.2d 289 (2003). 9 At oral argument, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should have concluded that t 2007However, our Supreme Court has approved of the defendant attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint through a motion to strike “[w]here it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the municipality was engaging in a governmental function while performing the acts and omissions complained of by the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 321 , 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); see also Doe v. Board of Education, 76 Conn. App. 296 , 299 n.6, 819 A.2d 289 (2003). 9 At oral argument, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should have concluded that t | 1 | 3 |
Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLCgreen2 sentences2022Our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim in the present appeal focuses on the imminence and apparentness prongs of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception.15 For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was subject to imminent harm, ‘‘[i]mminent does not simply mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in the not too distant future.’’ Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 314 , 999 A.2d 700 (2010); see also Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012). 2022Our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim in the present appeal focuses on the imminence and apparentness prongs of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception.15 For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was subject to imminent harm, ‘‘[i]mminent does not simply mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in the not too distant future.’’ Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 314 , 999 A.2d 700 (2010); see also Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
| Lane v. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colon v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2001"The identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies not only to identifiable individuals but also to narrowly defined classes of foreseeable victims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000) (holding that a public school student was identifiable and within the foreseeable class of victims in an accident that occurred in a school building); see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). 2001"The identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies not only to identifiable individuals but also to narrowly defined classes of foreseeable victims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000) (holding that a public school student was identifiable and within the foreseeable class of victims in an accident that occurred in a school building); see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). | 7 | 2001–2009 |
Evon v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2007The identifiable person-imminent harm exception “to the general rule of governmental immunity for employees engaged in discretionary activities has received very limited recognition in this state.” (Emphasis added.) Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 507 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). 2007The identifiable person-imminent harm exception “to the general rule of governmental immunity for employees engaged in discretionary activities has received very limited recognition in this state.” (Emphasis added.) Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 507 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). | 6 | 2000–2007 |
Doe v. Petersen
green
2 sentences2021II IDENTIFIABLE PERSON-IMMINENT HARM EXCEPTION TO DISCRETIONARY ACT IMMUNITY John Doe II and John Doe III next claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the identifiable person- imminent harm exception to discretionary act immu- nity, as explicated in Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 , 312–23, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), and Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 , 616–21, 903 A.2d 191 (2006), does not apply in this case. 2021II IDENTIFIABLE PERSON-IMMINENT HARM EXCEPTION TO DISCRETIONARY ACT IMMUNITY John Doe II and John Doe III next claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the identifiable person- imminent harm exception to discretionary act immu- nity, as explicated in Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 , 312–23, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), and Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 , 616–21, 903 A.2d 191 (2006), does not apply in this case. | 5 | 2009–2021 |
Colon v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2001"The identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies not only to identifiable individuals but also to narrowly defined classes of foreseeable victims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000) (holding that a public school student was identifiable and within the foreseeable class of victims in an accident that occurred in a school building); see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). | 5 | 2001–2009 |
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Tarro
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2001"The identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies not only to identifiable individuals but also to narrowly defined classes of foreseeable victims." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000) (holding that a public school student was identifiable and within the foreseeable class of victims in an accident that occurred in a school building); see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994). | 5 | 2001–2009 |
Martinez v. City of New Haven
green
2 sentences2021All three must be proven in order for the exception to apply. . . . [T]he ultimate determi- nation of whether [governmental] immunity applies is ordinarily a question of law for the court . . . [unless] there are unresolved factual issues . . . properly left to the jury.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. New Haven, 328 Conn. 1, 8 , 176 A.3d 531 (2018). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] stated pre- viously that this exception to the general rule of govern- mental immunity for employees engaged in discretion- ary activities has received very limited recognition in this 2021All three must be proven in order for the exception to apply. . . . [T]he ultimate determi- nation of whether [governmental] immunity applies is ordinarily a question of law for the court . . . [unless] there are unresolved factual issues . . . properly left to the jury.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. New Haven, 328 Conn. 1, 8 , 176 A.3d 531 (2018). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] stated pre- viously that this exception to the general rule of govern- mental immunity for employees engaged in discretion- ary activities has received very limited recognition in this | 4 | 2018–2021 |
Strycharz v. Cady
green
2 sentences2018Moreover, the question of whether the defendants could have prevented the plaintiff from leaving school property, while relevant to whether the defendants had breached a ministerial duty, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether it was apparent to them that students were, in fact, leaving school property, which is what the plaintiff must demonstrate to establish ... the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 590 , 148 A.3d 1011 . 2018Moreover, the question of whether the defendants could have prevented the plaintiff from leaving school property, while relevant to whether the defendants had breached a ministerial duty, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether it was apparent to them that students were, in fact, leaving school property, which is what the plaintiff must demonstrate to establish ... the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 590 , 148 A.3d 1011 . | 4 | 2018–2020 |
Bonington v. Town of Westport
green
2 sentences2022Our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim in the present appeal focuses on the imminence and apparentness prongs of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception.15 For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was subject to imminent harm, ‘‘[i]mminent does not simply mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in the not too distant future.’’ Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 314 , 999 A.2d 700 (2010); see also Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012). 2022Our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim in the present appeal focuses on the imminence and apparentness prongs of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception.15 For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was subject to imminent harm, ‘‘[i]mminent does not simply mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in the not too distant future.’’ Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 314 , 999 A.2d 700 (2010); see also Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012). | 2 | 2017–2022 |
St. Pierre v. Town of Plainfield
green
2 sentences2019Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 434 , 165 A.3d 148 (2017) (noting that three exceptions to discretionary act immunity are recognized, but only identifiable person-imminent harm exception was relevant). 12 We recognize that the trial court provided substantial analysis in regard to whether the identifiable person-imminent harm exception was applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims. 2019Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 434 , 165 A.3d 148 (2017) (noting that three exceptions to discretionary act immunity are recognized, but only identifiable person-imminent harm exception was relevant). 12 We recognize that the trial court provided substantial analysis in regard to whether the identifiable person-imminent harm exception was applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
Swanson v. City of Groton
green
2 sentences2011By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.... [T]he failure to estabhsh any one of the three prongs precludes the application of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 859-60 , 977 A.2d 738 ; see Cotto v. Board of Edmation, supra, 294 Conn, at 273, 984 A.2d 58 . 2011By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.... [T]he failure to estabhsh any one of the three prongs precludes the application of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 859-60 , 977 A.2d 738 ; see Cotto v. Board of Edmation, supra, 294 Conn, at 273, 984 A.2d 58 . | 2 | 2010–2011 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2006Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn.App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. at 646 , 638 A.2d 1 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn.App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn.App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Gajewski v. Pavelo
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Animal Rights Front, Inc. v. Jacques
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2006Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn.App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. at 646 , 638 A.2d 1 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn.App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn.App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Gajewski v. Pavelo
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
DeConti v. McGlone
green
2 sentences2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). 2009Colon v. Board of Education, 60 Conn. App. 178, 184 , 758 A.2d 900 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908 , 763 A.2d 1034 (2000); see also Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 646 ; DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270, 273 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 36 Conn. App. 601, 620 , 652 A.2d 509 (1994), aff'd, 236 Conn. 27 , 670 A.2d 318 (1996). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2001See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield , 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994); Evon v. Andrews , 211 Conn. 501 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989); Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority , 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); 7 See also Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 758 A.2d 900 (2000); Bonamico v. Middletown , 49 Conn. App. 605 , 713 A.2d 1291 (1998). 2001See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield , 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994); Evon v. Andrews , 211 Conn. 501 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989); Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority , 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); 7 See also Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 758 A.2d 900 (2000); Bonamico v. Middletown , 49 Conn. App. 605 , 713 A.2d 1291 (1998). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Bonamico v. City of Middletown
neutral
2 sentences2001See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield , 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994); Evon v. Andrews , 211 Conn. 501 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989); Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority , 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); 7 See also Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 758 A.2d 900 (2000); Bonamico v. Middletown , 49 Conn. App. 605 , 713 A.2d 1291 (1998). 2001See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield , 244 Conn. 101 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998), Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994); Evon v. Andrews , 211 Conn. 501 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989); Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority , 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); 7 See also Colon v. City of New Haven , 60 Conn. App. 178 , 758 A.2d 900 (2000); Bonamico v. Middletown , 49 Conn. App. 605 , 713 A.2d 1291 (1998). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Bonamico v. City of Middletown
neutral
2 sentences2000On the other hand, the case of Bonamico v. Middletown , 47 Conn. App. 758 (1998), without discussion, affirms the granting of a motion to strike a complaint because "the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged facts necessary to bring this case within the ambit of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity". 2000Id., 762 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Borelli v. Renaldi
green
1 sentence2022Cit- ing Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 , 243 A.3d 1064 (2020), and Kusy v. Norwich, 192 Conn. App. 171 , 217 A.3d 31 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 931 , 218 A.3d 71 (2019), the court stated that, to determine whether the plaintiff had pleaded facts satisfying the identifiable victim element of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity, it had to consider whether the plaintiff was legally compelled to be present on the property when the pit bulls attacked her.3 The court determined that the plaintiff was not legally compelled to be on the property, notwithstanding h | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fenner v. Commissioner of Correction
neutral
1 sentence2022Nevertheless, this court is required to follow binding Supreme Court precedent unless and until our Supreme Court sees fit to alter it.’’ Buehler v. Newtown, supra, 206 Conn. App. 488 n.14 . 8 As an alternative ground for affirmance, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to allege that she was subject to imminent harm for purposes of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immu- nity. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kusy v. Norwich
green
1 sentence2022Cit- ing Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 , 243 A.3d 1064 (2020), and Kusy v. Norwich, 192 Conn. App. 171 , 217 A.3d 31 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 931 , 218 A.3d 71 (2019), the court stated that, to determine whether the plaintiff had pleaded facts satisfying the identifiable victim element of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity, it had to consider whether the plaintiff was legally compelled to be present on the property when the pit bulls attacked her.3 The court determined that the plaintiff was not legally compelled to be on the property, notwithstanding h | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Northrup v. Witkowski green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Fleming v. City of Bridgeport green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Violano v. Fernandez green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Durrant v. BOARD OF ED. OF CITY OF HARTFORD green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Baran neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Valenti v. Zoning Board green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Brown v. Town of Branford green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Peters v. Town of Greenwich, No. Cv 95-0147192 S (Jan. 2, 2001) green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Levinson v. Connecticut Board of Chiropractic Examiners green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Roman v. City of Stamford green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Roman v. City of Stamford green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.