plaintiffs first claim in Connecticut

2002"Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum." Drumm v. Brown , 245 Conn. 657 , 676 , 716 A.2d 50 (1998).

2002"Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum." Drumm v. Brown , 245 Conn. 657 , 676 , 716 A.2d 50 (1998).

2019I WHETHER § 51-183B DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Relying primarily on Foote v. Commissioner of Correction , 125 Conn. App. 296 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010), and **698 Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc. , 215 Conn. 688 , 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), the plaintiffs first claim that the trial court lost personal jurisdiction over this case because it failed to issue its decision within 120 days after oral argument and posttrial briefing as required by § 51-183b.

2019I WHETHER § 51-183B DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Relying primarily on Foote v. Commissioner of Correction , 125 Conn. App. 296 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010), and **698 Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc. , 215 Conn. 688 , 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), the plaintiffs first claim that the trial court lost personal jurisdiction over this case because it failed to issue its decision within 120 days after oral argument and posttrial briefing as required by § 51-183b.

2019I WHETHER § 51-183B DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Relying primarily on Foote v. Commissioner of Correction , 125 Conn. App. 296 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010), and **698 Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc. , 215 Conn. 688 , 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), the plaintiffs first claim that the trial court lost personal jurisdiction over this case because it failed to issue its decision within 120 days after oral argument and posttrial briefing as required by § 51-183b.

2019I WHETHER § 51-183B DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Relying primarily on Foote v. Commissioner of Correction , 125 Conn. App. 296 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010), and **698 Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc. , 215 Conn. 688 , 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), the plaintiffs first claim that the trial court lost personal jurisdiction over this case because it failed to issue its decision within 120 days after oral argument and posttrial briefing as required by § 51-183b.

2012Citing Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 386 , 494 A.2d 1216 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 58 (1985), the plaintiff argues that the court was required to award it interest on the damages because the payment of interest was contractually *286 agreed upon in the lease agreement. 6 The plaintiff claims that the court, although explaining why it declined to award interest on the plaintiffs expenditures to repair and replace the electrical system, failed to explain why interest had not been awarded on the recovered amounts for unpaid rent, real estate taxes and liab

2012Citing Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 386 , 494 A.2d 1216 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 58 (1985), the plaintiff argues that the court was required to award it interest on the damages because the payment of interest was contractually *286 agreed upon in the lease agreement. 6 The plaintiff claims that the court, although explaining why it declined to award interest on the plaintiffs expenditures to repair and replace the electrical system, failed to explain why interest had not been awarded on the recovered amounts for unpaid rent, real estate taxes and liab

2012Although related to the plaintiffs first claim because it is similarly “broad and flexible” and, like that claim, is based on “the principle that it is contrary to equity and good conscience for a defendant to retain a benefit that has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff’; Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409 , 766 A.2d 416 (2001); a claim of unjust enrichment has different requirements.

2012Although related to the plaintiffs first claim because it is similarly “broad and flexible” and, like that claim, is based on “the principle that it is contrary to equity and good conscience for a defendant to retain a benefit that has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff’; Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409 , 766 A.2d 416 (2001); a claim of unjust enrichment has different requirements.

2012Citing Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 386 , 494 A.2d 1216 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 58 (1985), the plaintiff argues that the court was required to award it interest on the damages because the payment of interest was contractually *286 agreed upon in the lease agreement. 6 The plaintiff claims that the court, although explaining why it declined to award interest on the plaintiffs expenditures to repair and replace the electrical system, failed to explain why interest had not been awarded on the recovered amounts for unpaid rent, real estate taxes and liab

2012Citing Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 386 , 494 A.2d 1216 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 58 (1985), the plaintiff argues that the court was required to award it interest on the damages because the payment of interest was contractually *286 agreed upon in the lease agreement. 6 The plaintiff claims that the court, although explaining why it declined to award interest on the plaintiffs expenditures to repair and replace the electrical system, failed to explain why interest had not been awarded on the recovered amounts for unpaid rent, real estate taxes and liab

2010Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the court should not have strictly construed the time limitation and instead should have applied the principle recognized in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn. 409, 418-19 , 538 A.2d 219 (1988), that strict compliance with *595 contract notice terms may be excused in order to avoid a forfeiture, as long as there is no prejudice to the insurer.

2010Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the court should not have strictly construed the time limitation and instead should have applied the principle recognized in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn. 409, 418-19 , 538 A.2d 219 (1988), that strict compliance with *595 contract notice terms may be excused in order to avoid a forfeiture, as long as there is no prejudice to the insurer.

2010Specifically, the plaintiff contends that our decision in DeMaria v. DeMaria, 247 Conn. 715 , *351 724 A.2d 1088 (1999), is controlling and requires the trial court to consider the mandates and limitations of § 46b-86 (b) in terminating or modifying alimony, even when the language of the judgment of dissolution employs only the term “cohabitation,” without reference to any statute.

2010Specifically, the plaintiff contends that our decision in DeMaria v. DeMaria, 247 Conn. 715 , *351 724 A.2d 1088 (1999), is controlling and requires the trial court to consider the mandates and limitations of § 46b-86 (b) in terminating or modifying alimony, even when the language of the judgment of dissolution employs only the term “cohabitation,” without reference to any statute.

2010In support of this claim, the plaintiffs identified several minor details that the court inaccurately described or misinterpreted. 2 Nevertheless, only when inaccuracies, reviewed in relation to the record as a whole, “undermine appellate confidence in the court’s fact finding process [is] a new hearing . . . required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiNapoli v. Doudera, 28 Conn. App. 108, 112 , 609 A.2d 1061 (1992).

2010In support of this claim, the plaintiffs identified several minor details that the court inaccurately described or misinterpreted. 2 Nevertheless, only when inaccuracies, reviewed in relation to the record as a whole, “undermine appellate confidence in the court’s fact finding process [is] a new hearing . . . required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiNapoli v. Doudera, 28 Conn. App. 108, 112 , 609 A.2d 1061 (1992).

2010A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809 , 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007). *75 The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly issued its decision on facts that were clearly erroneous.

2010A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809 , 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007). *75 The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly issued its decision on facts that were clearly erroneous.

2010A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809 , 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007). *75 The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly issued its decision on facts that were clearly erroneous.

2010A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809 , 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007). *75 The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly issued its decision on facts that were clearly erroneous.

2009Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363, 370 , 746 A.2d 753 (2000).

2009Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363, 370 , 746 A.2d 753 (2000).

2008Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 652 , 923 A.2d 709 (2007). 6 I The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly rejected two jurisdictional challenges made by them.

2008Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 652 , 923 A.2d 709 (2007). 6 I The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly rejected two jurisdictional challenges made by them.

2008As to the plaintiffs first claim that the second amended complaint states a colorable claim, our review of that complaint reveals that the trial court properly determined that there are no factual allegations of conduct causing unreasonable pollution or harm to the state’s natural resources, which is required to bring a cause of action pursuant to § 22a-16. 8 In light of the parties’ history with this court and the exhaustive discussion of our standing jurisprudence in Afees I, we see no reason to repeat that discussion in the present case. 9 *273 We have held that “ [a] complaint does not suf

2008As to the plaintiffs first claim that the second amended complaint states a colorable claim, our review of that complaint reveals that the trial court properly determined that there are no factual allegations of conduct causing unreasonable pollution or harm to the state’s natural resources, which is required to bring a cause of action pursuant to § 22a-16. 8 In light of the parties’ history with this court and the exhaustive discussion of our standing jurisprudence in Afees I, we see no reason to repeat that discussion in the present case. 9 *273 We have held that “ [a] complaint does not suf

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2007Fleming v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. App. 400, 404 , 886 A.2d 1220 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 922 , 895 A.2d 795 (2006). *611 “A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” Communiter Break Co. v. Scinto, 196 Conn. 390, 393 , 493 A.2d 182 (1985).

2006II The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly concluded that any implied easement over the second lawn parcel benefiting the defendants that may have been created by the Baker plan, either as interpreted by our decision in Fisk v. Ley, supra, 76 Conn. 295 , or on its face, had not been extinguished by the act.

2006This authority to find the facts entitles the commissioner to determine the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by lay and expert witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sprague v. Lindon Tree Service, Inc., 80 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 836 A.2d 1268 (2003).

2006This authority to find the facts entitles the commissioner to determine the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by lay and expert witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sprague v. Lindon Tree Service, Inc., 80 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 836 A.2d 1268 (2003).

2005It is well settled that “[w]e will overturn ... a finding of fact only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the whole record.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 705 , 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

2004As our Supreme Court explained in In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383 , 773 A.2d 347 (2001), “temporary custody orders are immediately appealable because an immediate appeal is the only reasonable method of ensuring that the important rights surrounding the parent-child relationship are adequately protected . . . and, further ... an immediate appeal is the only way to ensure the protection of the best interests of children.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 385 . “[I]n order to protect the parent’s interest in retaining custody of the child, an order of temporary custody

2004As our Supreme Court explained in In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383 , 773 A.2d 347 (2001), “temporary custody orders are immediately appealable because an immediate appeal is the only reasonable method of ensuring that the important rights surrounding the parent-child relationship are adequately protected . . . and, further ... an immediate appeal is the only way to ensure the protection of the best interests of children.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 385 . “[I]n order to protect the parent’s interest in retaining custody of the child, an order of temporary custody

2003Contrary to the plaintiffs first claim, case law has made clear that “[t]wo of the general classes of libel which, it is generally recognized, are actionable per se are (1) libels charging crimes and (2) libels which injure a man in his profession and calling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 492 , 523 A.2d 1356 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802 , 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).

2003Contrary to the plaintiffs first claim, case law has made clear that “[t]wo of the general classes of libel which, it is generally recognized, are actionable per se are (1) libels charging crimes and (2) libels which injure a man in his profession and calling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 492 , 523 A.2d 1356 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802 , 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).

2003The plaintiff argues that our ruling in Commissioner of Transportation v. Towpath Associates, 255 Conn. 529 , 767 A.2d 1169 (2001), makes consideration of the value created by a condemnation impermissible.

2003The plaintiff argues that our ruling in Commissioner of Transportation v. Towpath Associates, 255 Conn. 529 , 767 A.2d 1169 (2001), makes consideration of the value created by a condemnation impermissible.

2003We disagree. “[Professional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services. . . . [Malpractice presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . . [T]o prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (

2003We disagree. “[Professional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services. . . . [Malpractice presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . . [T]o prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (

2003Contrary to the plaintiffs first claim, case law has made clear that “[t]wo of the general classes of libel which, it is generally recognized, are actionable per se are (1) libels charging crimes and (2) libels which injure a man in his profession and calling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 492 , 523 A.2d 1356 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802 , 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).

2003Contrary to the plaintiffs first claim, case law has made clear that “[t]wo of the general classes of libel which, it is generally recognized, are actionable per se are (1) libels charging crimes and (2) libels which injure a man in his profession and calling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 492 , 523 A.2d 1356 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802 , 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).