staff analysis in Florida

2017The staff analysis merely notes, “The term is undefined in the bill or in chapter 447 and that its interpretation is left to practice.” Id. (citing Fla. S. Comm. on Govt.

2017The staff analysis merely notes, “The term is undefined in the bill or in chapter 447 and that its interpretation is left to practice.” Id. (citing Fla. S. Comm. on Govt.

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2006Ch. 59-205, § 606, at 718, Laws of Fla. [19] See White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) (using a staff analysis as an indication of legislative intent).

2001In Barns v. State, 768 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), to which the majority refers in its footnotes 1, 7, and 8, the district court stated in its footnote 2: The staff analysis of the bill references the conflict between Paul v. Jenne, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla.1999), and Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), suggesting that a primary motivation behind the statute was to legislatively overrule the result in Paul.

2000NOTES [1] The citations to Chapters 2000-178 and 2000-229 are referencing the page numbers in 5 West's Florida Session Law Service (2000). [2] The staff analysis of the bill references the conflict between Paul v. Jenne, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla.1999), and Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), suggesting that a primary motivation behind the statute was to legislatively overrule the result in Paul.

2001In Barns v. State, 768 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), to which the majority refers in its footnotes 1, 7, and 8, the district court stated in its footnote 2: The staff analysis of the bill references the conflict between Paul v. Jenne, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla.1999), and Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), suggesting that a primary motivation behind the statute was to legislatively overrule the result in Paul.

2000NOTES [1] The citations to Chapters 2000-178 and 2000-229 are referencing the page numbers in 5 West's Florida Session Law Service (2000). [2] The staff analysis of the bill references the conflict between Paul v. Jenne, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla.1999), and Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), suggesting that a primary motivation behind the statute was to legislatively overrule the result in Paul.

2022The staff analysis for the amendment recognized that “drones possess capabilities which could be used by private individuals . . . to breach reasonable expectations of privacy, including the voyeuristic actions of spying on and recording private acts.” Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS/SB 766 (2015), Post- Meeting Staff Analysis 3 (March 26, 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/766/Analyses/2015s0766. 3 ju.PDF. “[D]rones can be equipped with a wide array of sensory equipment, including high-magnification lenses, infrared, ultraviolet and see-through imaging devices, acoustical eavesd

2022The staff analysis for the amendment recognized that “drones possess capabilities which could be used by private individuals . . . to breach reasonable expectations of privacy, including the voyeuristic actions of spying on and recording private acts.” Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS/SB 766 (2015), Post- Meeting Staff Analysis 3 (March 26, 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/766/Analyses/2015s0766. 3 ju.PDF. “[D]rones can be equipped with a wide array of sensory equipment, including high-magnification lenses, infrared, ultraviolet and see-through imaging devices, acoustical eavesd

2017A Senate staff analysis of the 2011 amendments supports the view that this change was due to a terminology preference, not a shift in meaning: the only comment about the change in terminology in the staff analysis is that “[t]he bill . . . change[d] the term ‘negligence cases’ to ‘negligence action’ ” and “revis[ed] the definition [of that term] slightly.” Fla. S. Comm. on Com. & Tourism, CS/SB 142 (2011) Staff Analysis 8 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/142/Analyses/2011s0142.cm.PDF. - 41 - Finally, it is also worth considering the other reason why the trial

2017Further, the bill incorporated the recommendations of several groups, including the Guardianship Task Force. 6 Id.

2013As the second district acknowledged in Sousa I, the legislative staff analysis “appears to contrast with the wording of the statute.” 868 So.2d at 540 .

2013A shroud of uncertainty has been placed over the use of staff analyses by statements made by the Florida Supreme Court indicating that “ ‘[t]his Court is not unified in its view of the use of legislative staff analyses to determine legislative intent,’ ” Kasischke, 991 So.2d at 810 (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781 , 789 n. 4 (Fla.2007)), and that “even if staff analyses may sometimes help in determining legislative intent, and even if we could expect defendants to review them to determine what conduct was permitted, the Staff Analysis here fails to clarify the Legislature’s intent.”

2013Id. at 653-54 (quoting Fla. S. Comm. on Crim.

2012Id. (quoting Fla. H.R.

2011The staff analysis further explained the intended effect of this 1999 amendment: The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny Berger v. ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2011The staff analysis further explained the intended effect of this 1999 amendment: The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny Berger v. ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2011The staff analysis further explained the intended effect of this 1999 amendment: The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny Berger v. ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2011The staff analysis further explained the intended effect of this 1999 amendment: The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny Berger v. ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2011The staff analysis further explained the intended effect of this 1999 amendment: The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny Berger v. ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2011We quoted the specific staff analysis to support this conclusion: In 1981, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal held in Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), that an individual is not totally disqualified for benefits when he/ she works a full-time and part-time job simultaneously, qualifies for partial unemployment benefits based on being laid off by the full-time employer, then subsequently quits the part-time job.

2011We quoted the specific staff analysis to support this conclusion: In 1981, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal held in Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), that an individual is not totally disqualified for benefits when he/ she works a full-time and part-time job simultaneously, qualifies for partial unemployment benefits based on being laid off by the full-time employer, then subsequently quits the part-time job.

2011Lab., Inc., 45 So.3d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), we found this statutory language unclear and looked to the legislative history, including the staff analysis, to determine the Legislature’s intent. 1 We noted in Rumayor that the committee report and staff analysis reveal the 1999 amendment was intended to address the problem of “a claimant who is laid off of a full-time job, and upon being awarded unemployment benefits, quits a part-time job.” Id. at 985 .

2011Lab., Inc., 45 So.3d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), we found this statutory language unclear and looked to the legislative history, including the staff analysis, to determine the Legislature’s intent. 1 We noted in Rumayor that the committee report and staff analysis reveal the 1999 amendment was intended to address the problem of “a claimant who is laid off of a full-time job, and upon being awarded unemployment benefits, quits a part-time job.” Id. at 985 .

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 , 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ("[W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.'" (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 , 115 S.Ct. 2021 , 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from

2008Kasischke, 946 So.2d at 1159 .