6 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barnett v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Evid. 609(b); see also Saldivar v. State , 980 S.W.2d 475, 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (convictions introduced at punishment phase are not subject to remoteness limitations contained in Rule 609(b)); Barnett v. State , 847 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no pet.) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Hernandez v. State , 976 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), pet. ref'd , 980 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Saldivar v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Evid. 609(b); see also Saldivar v. State , 980 S.W.2d 475, 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (convictions introduced at punishment phase are not subject to remoteness limitations contained in Rule 609(b)); Barnett v. State , 847 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no pet.) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Hernandez v. State , 976 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), pet. ref'd , 980 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Houston v. Morris
green
1 sentence2014Morris, 23 S.W.3d at 509-10 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bustillos v. State
green
1 sentence1982Bustillos, supra; Dillard, supra. Davis v. State, supra, at 150. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Milligan v. State
green
2 sentences1979While these convictions may have been inadmissible individually under the doctrine of remoteness, they were without question admissible collectively to show a lack of reformation. 3 Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 1979While these convictions may have been inadmissible individually under the doctrine of remoteness, they were without question admissible collectively to show a lack of reformation. [3] Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Watkins v. State
green
2 sentences1979While these convictions may have been inadmissible individually under the doctrine of remoteness, they were without question admissible collectively to show a lack of reformation. 3 Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 1979While these convictions may have been inadmissible individually under the doctrine of remoteness, they were without question admissible collectively to show a lack of reformation. [3] Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Landry v. Travelers Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1974The Supreme Court stated the rule in Landry v. Travelers Insurance Company, 458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1970) as follows: “The . . . conviction must not be too remote; that is, the conviction must have been ‘sufficiently recent in time to have some bearing on the present credibility of the witness.’ ***** ‘From a review of both civil and criminal cases it would appear that civil courts have generally held that such a matter depends upon circumstances presented and that the question should usually be left to the discretion of the trial judge. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Carr v. DeWitt
neutral
1 sentence1959In the case of Carr v. De Witt, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 388, 390 , the court stated: “Some authorities hold that ten or more years subsequent to a conviction is sufficient time to make the question too remote. 45 Tex.Jur. 111, 112, par. 250, and Linz v. Skinner, 11 Tex.Civ.App. 512 , 32 S.W. 915 .” In the case of Bernard’s, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Joseph Linz & Bro. v. Skinner
neutral
1 sentence1959In the case of Carr v. De Witt, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 388, 390 , the court stated: “Some authorities hold that ten or more years subsequent to a conviction is sufficient time to make the question too remote. 45 Tex.Jur. 111, 112, par. 250, and Linz v. Skinner, 11 Tex.Civ.App. 512 , 32 S.W. 915 .” In the case of Bernard’s, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Bernard's, Inc. v. Austin
neutral
2 sentences1959App. 512, 32 S.W. 915 ." In the case of Bernard's, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of evidence knows as the "doctrine of remoteness." We have not found, nor have we been cited to, any Texas case which holds that the date from which the computation is made should be that of the date of the commission of the offense rather than the date of the conviction or dat 1959In the case of Carr v. De Witt, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 388, 390 , the court stated: “Some authorities hold that ten or more years subsequent to a conviction is sufficient time to make the question too remote. 45 Tex.Jur. 111, 112, par. 250, and Linz v. Skinner, 11 Tex.Civ.App. 512 , 32 S.W. 915 .” In the case of Bernard’s, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Illies Hildebrand v. Frerichs
neutral
2 sentences1959App. 512, 32 S.W. 915 ." In the case of Bernard's, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of evidence knows as the "doctrine of remoteness." We have not found, nor have we been cited to, any Texas case which holds that the date from which the computation is made should be that of the date of the commission of the offense rather than the date of the conviction or dat 1959In the case of Carr v. De Witt, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 388, 390 , the court stated: “Some authorities hold that ten or more years subsequent to a conviction is sufficient time to make the question too remote. 45 Tex.Jur. 111, 112, par. 250, and Linz v. Skinner, 11 Tex.Civ.App. 512 , 32 S.W. 915 .” In the case of Bernard’s, Inc., v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 , writ refused, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the time of confinement in the penitentiary could be taken into account as a portion of the period of time required to create the presumption of reformation on which rests the rule of | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.