6 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Stategreen2 sentences2024In a footnote, the Court also cited approvingly Coleman v. State, which recognized that “any 3 Charles elsewhere asserts that “it is true that [the signal statute does not] require the driver’s action to be ‘unsafe’ to supply an officer with reasonable suspicion.” 11 construction limiting the signal requirement to unsafe lane changes renders the pertinent portion of section 545.104(a) a nullity.” 188 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d); see Krug v. State, 86 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. ref’d) (concluding that signal and safety statutes “are not mutually exclusi 2010See Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (Tex. Gov't Code § 311.021 requires courts to presume that "the entire statute is intended to be effective”; because only those lane changes that can be made safely are permitted, any construction limiting the signal requirement to unsafe lane changes would render the pertinent portion of Section 545.104(a) [statutory mandate to signal an intention to turn] a nullity.). | 4 | 4 |
Krug v. Stategreen1 sentence2024In a footnote, the Court also cited approvingly Coleman v. State, which recognized that “any 3 Charles elsewhere asserts that “it is true that [the signal statute does not] require the driver’s action to be ‘unsafe’ to supply an officer with reasonable suspicion.” 11 construction limiting the signal requirement to unsafe lane changes renders the pertinent portion of section 545.104(a) a nullity.” 188 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d); see Krug v. State, 86 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. ref’d) (concluding that signal and safety statutes “are not mutually exclusi | 1 | 1 |
Leming v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Leming, 493 S.W.3d at 554 . | 1 | 1 |
United States Ex Rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.green1 sentence2010Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 495 (D.C.Cir.2004), respectively). [51] See Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (Tex. Gov't Code § 311.021 requires courts to presume that "the entire statute is intended to be effective"; because only those lane changes that can be made safely are permitted, any construction limiting the signal requirement to unsafe lane changes would render the pertinent portion of Section 545.104(a) [statutory mandate to signal an intention to turn] a nullity.). [1] Tex. Dept. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Getts v. State
green
1 sentence2010Public Safety, TEXAS DRIVER'S HANDBOOK, Introduction. [2] 155 S.W.3d 153 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). [3] TEX. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Tijerina v. Nerio
neutral
1 sentence1974Tijerina v. Nerio, supra. The plaintiff alleged that defendant Martinez was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, injuries and death of the plaintiff’s husband in: (1) Failing to have a flagman at bridge so as to warn any on-coming traffic *814 that the bridge over Copano Creek would be entirely blocked at the time and place in question. (2) Failing to have a signal or warning device on the tractor and cultivator at the time and place in question. (3) Failing to yield the right of way. (4) Failing to keep a proper lookout for on-coming traffic. (5) Failing to | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.