Cuyler standard in Texas

2015The ineffective assistance test adopted by the court of appeals in this case conflicts with and misstates the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) The court of appeals correctly cites to footnote 52 of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 759 (Tex. Crim.app. 2005) as establishing that “The Cuyler analysis has two elements: The applicant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel’s

2015The ineffective assistance test adopted by the court of appeals in this case conflicts with and misstates the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) The court of appeals correctly cites to footnote 52 of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 759 (Tex. Crim.app. 2005) as establishing that “The Cuyler analysis has two elements: The applicant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel’s

2013App. 2007) (holding that the Cuyler standard is the proper standard to analyze claims of ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest); Owens v. State, 357 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d).

2013App. 2007) (holding that the Cuyler standard is the proper standard to analyze claims of ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest); Owens v. State, 357 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d).

2026Id.

2026Id.

2013Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S. Ct. at 1719 . 5 Under the first prong of the Cuyler test, an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel is required ―‗to make a choice between advancing his client‘s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel‘s own) to the detriment of his client‘s interest.‘‖ Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis added) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim.

2013Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S. Ct. at 1719 . 5 Under the first prong of the Cuyler test, an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel is required ―‗to make a choice between advancing his client‘s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel‘s own) to the detriment of his client‘s interest.‘‖ Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis added) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim.

2013Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S. Ct. at 1719 . 5 Under the first prong of the Cuyler test, an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel is required ―‗to make a choice between advancing his client‘s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel‘s own) to the detriment of his client‘s interest.‘‖ Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis added) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim.

2013Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S. Ct. at 1719 . 5 Under the first prong of the Cuyler test, an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel is required ―‗to make a choice between advancing his client‘s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel‘s own) to the detriment of his client‘s interest.‘‖ Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis added) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim.

2013App. 1997)). ―[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues . . . .‖5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984).

2013App. 1997)). ―[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues . . . .‖5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984).

2015By choosing to do nothing, counsel lost the opportunity to learn what the father would say and attempt to secure a statement from the father in support of appellant. 15 The conflict of interest affected counsel’s actions — he failed to make inquiry and he failed to advocate on appellant’s behalf while interacting with the father.16 Cuyler Standard Satisfied The undisputed evidence shows the conflicts of interest colored counsel’s actions as well as his advice.17 Accordingly, the Cuyler standard is satisfied. 15 See Lopez, 358 S.W.3d at 694–95. 16 See Ex Parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.

2015By choosing to do nothing, counsel lost the opportunity to learn what the father would say and attempt to secure a statement from the father in support of appellant. 15 The conflict of interest affected counsel’s actions — he failed to make inquiry and he failed to advocate on appellant’s behalf while interacting with the father.16 Cuyler Standard Satisfied The undisputed evidence shows the conflicts of interest colored counsel’s actions as well as his advice.17 Accordingly, the Cuyler standard is satisfied. 15 See Lopez, 358 S.W.3d at 694–95. 16 See Ex Parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.

2015The ineffective assistance test adopted by the court of appeals in this case conflicts with and misstates the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) The court of appeals correctly cites to footnote 52 of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 759 (Tex. Crim.app. 2005) as establishing that “The Cuyler analysis has two elements: The applicant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel’s

2015The ineffective assistance test adopted by the court of appeals in this case conflicts with and misstates the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) The court of appeals correctly cites to footnote 52 of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 759 (Tex. Crim.app. 2005) as establishing that “The Cuyler analysis has two elements: The applicant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel’s

2002See Mickens, 535 U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1242-46 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ; see also Kegler v. State, 16 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet ref d) (finding Strickland to be appropriate standard of review because defendant could not show actual conflict from record).

2002See Mickens , 122 S. Ct. at 1242 B 46 ; Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 335 ; see also Kegler v. State , 16 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. App .

2002See Mickens, 535 U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1242-46 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ; see also Kegler v. State, 16 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet ref d) (finding Strickland to be appropriate standard of review because defendant could not show actual conflict from record).

2002See Mickens , 122 S. Ct. at 1242 B 46 ; Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 335 ; see also Kegler v. State , 16 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. App .

2002Monreal v. State, 923 S.W.2d 61,64 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996), aff'd, 947 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2002Monreal v. State, 923 S.W.2d 61,64 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996), aff'd, 947 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2015See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 349–50, 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 15 See Lopez v. State, 358 S.W.3d 691 , 694–95 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2011). 16 See Ex Parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (holding in habeas proceeding that an attorney’s “divided loyalties” adversely affected his representation when he advised a client not to testify while his duty to another client was to secure the testimony). 17 See id.; Ramirez, 13 S.W.3d at 486 ; Pina, 29 S.W.3d at 320 ; Maya, 932 S.W.2d at 635 .

2015See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 349–50, 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 15 See Lopez v. State, 358 S.W.3d 691 , 694–95 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2011). 16 See Ex Parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (holding in habeas proceeding that an attorney’s “divided loyalties” adversely affected his representation when he advised a client not to testify while his duty to another client was to secure the testimony). 17 See id.; Ramirez, 13 S.W.3d at 486 ; Pina, 29 S.W.3d at 320 ; Maya, 932 S.W.2d at 635 .

2013App. 2007) (holding that the Cuyler standard is the proper standard to analyze claims of ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest); Owens v. State, 357 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d).

2013App. 2007) (holding that the Cuyler standard is the proper standard to analyze claims of ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest); Owens v. State, 357 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d).

2000See Perillo, 79 F.3d at 447 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ).

2000See Perillo, 79 F.3d at 447 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ).

1997See Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700-701 (Tex. Crim.App.1991); see also footnote five, supra. [8] Appellant has not shown that his trial counsel misunderstood this rule of law. [1] This Court has recognized the Cuyler standard may be appropriate in a non-multiple representation case.

1997See Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700-701 (Tex. Crim.App.1991); see also footnote five, supra. [8] Appellant has not shown that his trial counsel misunderstood this rule of law. [1] This Court has recognized the Cuyler standard may be appropriate in a non-multiple representation case.

1997In Cantu v. State, 930 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), in considering the representation of an attorney who had been suspended from the practice of law, we stated: Of course, the particular circumstances surrounding an attorney's suspension or disbarment may give rise to an actual conflict of interest.

1997In Cantu v. State, 930 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), in considering the representation of an attorney who had been suspended from the practice of law, we stated: Of course, the particular circumstances surrounding an attorney's suspension or disbarment may give rise to an actual conflict of interest.