45 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State in Interest of MVgreen2 sentences2024In particular, adjudication orders and termination orders are considered final orders that are appealable as of right, while “shelter orders” are “not considered final.” Id. ¶ 20; see also In re S.A.K., 2003 UT App 87 , ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 1037 (“An adjudication order is one such judgment that we have found to be final for purposes of appeal.”); In re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that, because a shelter hearing only creates temporary orders, “a shelter hearing order . . . is not final and appealable as a matter of right”). ¶53 Because shelter orders are not co 2024In particular, adjudication orders and termination orders are considered final orders that are appealable as of right, while “shelter orders” are “not considered final.” Id. ¶ 20; see also In re S.A.K., 2003 UT App 87 , ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 1037 (“An adjudication order is one such judgment that we have found to be final for purposes of appeal.”); In re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that, because a shelter hearing only creates temporary orders, “a shelter hearing order . . . is not final and appealable as a matter of right”). ¶53 Because shelter orders are not co | 9 | 9 |
M.F. v. J.F.green2 sentences2017See generally M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶ 6 , 312 P.3d 946 (“Our case law is clear that where a court’s oral ruling differs from a final written order, the latter controls.”). 2017See generally M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶ 6 , 312 P.3d 946 (“Our case law is clear that where a court’s oral ruling differs from a final written order, the latter controls.”). | 3 | 3 |
M.F. v. J.F.green2 sentences2017See generally M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶ 6 , 312 P.3d 946 (“Our case law is clear that where a court’s oral ruling differs from a final written order, the latter controls.”). 2017See generally M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶ 6 , 312 P.3d 946 (“Our case law is clear that where a court’s oral ruling differs from a final written order, the latter controls.”). | 3 | 3 |
In re Z.C.W...green2 sentences2024See In re Z.C.W., 20230102-CA 20230103-CA 32 2024 UT App 47 In re K.J. 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 . 7 Moreover, we offer no specific instruction to the juvenile court as to whether, and to what extent, it must hold an evidentiary hearing on remand; we conclude only that the court must properly complete the required statutory analysis and that it “must—in some manner—consider and appropriately deal with proffered new evidence.” See id. ¶ 15. 2024See In re Z.C.W., 20230102-CA 20230103-CA 32 2024 UT App 47 In re K.J. 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 . 7 Moreover, we offer no specific instruction to the juvenile court as to whether, and to what extent, it must hold an evidentiary hearing on remand; we conclude only that the court must properly complete the required statutory analysis and that it “must—in some manner—consider and appropriately deal with proffered new evidence.” See id. ¶ 15. | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Sakgreen2 sentences2024In particular, adjudication orders and termination orders are considered final orders that are appealable as of right, while “shelter orders” are “not considered final.” Id. ¶ 20; see also In re S.A.K., 2003 UT App 87 , ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 1037 (“An adjudication order is one such judgment that we have found to be final for purposes of appeal.”); In re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that, because a shelter hearing only creates temporary orders, “a shelter hearing order . . . is not final and appealable as a matter of right”). ¶53 Because shelter orders are not co 2024In particular, adjudication orders and termination orders are considered final orders that are appealable as of right, while “shelter orders” are “not considered final.” Id. ¶ 20; see also In re S.A.K., 2003 UT App 87 , ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 1037 (“An adjudication order is one such judgment that we have found to be final for purposes of appeal.”); In re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that, because a shelter hearing only creates temporary orders, “a shelter hearing order . . . is not final and appealable as a matter of right”). ¶53 Because shelter orders are not co | 2 | 2 |
In re K.J...green2 sentences2024But more substantively, the GAL’s argument fails on its face; even if we assume, for purposes of the discussion, that the juvenile court’s comment was actually a reference to a federal statutory exception to the reasonable-efforts requirements, resort to the federal statute is unhelpful here because, at the time of the shelter hearing, no “court of competent jurisdiction” had made any determination that Parents had done anything wrong. 20230102-CA 20230103-CA 27 2024 UT App 47 In re K.J. 2024But more substantively, the GAL’s argument fails on its face; even if we assume, for purposes of the discussion, that the juvenile court’s comment was actually a reference to a federal statutory exception to the reasonable-efforts requirements, resort to the federal statute is unhelpful here because, at the time of the shelter hearing, no “court of competent jurisdiction” had made any determination that Parents had done anything wrong. 20230102-CA 20230103-CA 27 2024 UT App 47 In re K.J. | 2 | 2 |
Sampson v. Richinsgreen2 sentences2006Despite argument from counsel for each of the parties relying on portions of the transcript below to either support or refute the existence of the stipulation, we cannot resolve that issue. ¶14 Stepfather failed to supply this court with transcripts of the seven days of testimony from the shelter hearing. "`Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the [decision] was supported by admissible and competent evidence.'" Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 2006Despite argument from counsel for each of the parties relying on portions of the transeript below to either support or refute the existence of the stipulation, we cannot resolve that issue. 114 Stepfather failed to supply this court with transeripts of the seven days of testimony from the shelter hearing. " 'Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the [decision] was supported by admissible and competent evidence."" Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quoting Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Vuicichgreen2 sentences2006Despite argument from counsel for each of the parties relying on portions of the transcript below to either support or refute the existence of the stipulation, we cannot resolve that issue. ¶14 Stepfather failed to supply this court with transcripts of the seven days of testimony from the shelter hearing. "`Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the [decision] was supported by admissible and competent evidence.'" Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 2006Despite argument from counsel for each of the parties relying on portions of the transeript below to either support or refute the existence of the stipulation, we cannot resolve that issue. 114 Stepfather failed to supply this court with transeripts of the seven days of testimony from the shelter hearing. " 'Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the [decision] was supported by admissible and competent evidence."" Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quoting Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, | 2 | 2 |
L.S.C. v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at ¶ 16 , 991 P.2d 70 . 2003See A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at ¶ 16 , 991 P.2d 70 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Adoption of ABgreen2 sentences2003See A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at ¶ 16 , 991 P.2d 70 . 2003See A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at ¶ 16 , 991 P.2d 70 . | 2 | 2 |
In RE SC AND TC v. Andersongreen2 sentences2001She cites In re S.C., 1999 UT App 251 , 987 P.2d 611 , in which this court stated: "[W]e conclude the sixty-day limitation imposed by section 78-3a-308(2) is mandatory and that the trial court must hold the adjudication hearing on the State's abuse and neglect petition within sixty days of the shelter hearing." Id. at ¶ 15. ¶ 35 The Guardian ad Litem contends section 78-3a-308(2) is mandatory, but not jurisdictional, because any delay by the trial court could result in dismissal of DCFS petitions. 2001She cites In re S.C., 1999 UT App 251 , 987 P.2d 611 , in which this court stated: "[W]e conclude the sixty-day limitation imposed by section 78-3a-308(2) is mandatory and that the trial court must hold the adjudication hearing on the State's abuse and neglect petition within sixty days of the shelter hearing." Id. at ¶ 15. ¶ 35 The Guardian ad Litem contends section 78-3a-308(2) is mandatory, but not jurisdictional, because any delay by the trial court could result in dismissal of DCFS petitions. | 1 | 3 |
In re B.D.green2 sentences2024ANALYSIS ¶22 We begin our analysis by addressing the arguments raised by the State and the GAL that Father’s appellate claims are barred as a result of his actions at the shelter hearing and the adjudication 20230620-CA 10 2024 UT App 104 In re B.D. hearing. 2024See Utah Code § 80-3-203(2) (requiring in certain situations the scheduling of an “expedited hearing,” held after the filing of “an abuse, neglect, or dependency petition,” to consider 20230620-CA 12 2024 UT App 104 In re B.D. “whether a child should be placed in temporary custody”); see id. § 80-3-301(1) (requiring a juvenile court to “hold a shelter hearing to determine the temporary custody of a child” if certain conditions are met, including in cases where the child has already been “remov[ed] . . . from the child’s home by” DCFS); see also In re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1050 (Utah 1997) (stat | 1 | 1 |
| A.E. v. Christeangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Education of the Granite School District v. Salt Lake Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Wpogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peeblesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salt Lake County v. Tax Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Division of Securities of the Department of Commercegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Utah Technical Collegegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kitzmiller
green
2 sentences2024“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the [party] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Kitzmiller, 2021 UT App 87, ¶ 14 , 493 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified). ¶33 Finally, Parents challenge the juvenile court’s earlier order following the shelter hearing, asserting that the court failed to engage in the proper statutory analysis before issuing its order finding that removal was necessary. 2024“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the [party] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Kitzmiller, 2021 UT App 87, ¶ 14 , 493 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified). ¶33 Finally, Parents challenge the juvenile court’s earlier order following the shelter hearing, asserting that the court failed to engage in the proper statutory analysis before issuing its order finding that removal was necessary. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In re K.J.
green
2 sentences2018The juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over both petitions, and we agree with the juvenile 20170812-CA and 20170814-CA 13 2018 UT App 216 In re K.J. court that the State may elect to proceed with the more final petition first. 2018The juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over both petitions, and we agree with the juvenile 20170812-CA and 20170814-CA 13 2018 UT App 216 In re K.J. court that the State may elect to proceed with the more final petition first. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In re C.C. and K.H. (S.C. v. State)
green
2 sentences2013Accordingly, in order to ensure that courts properly 44 See id. § 78B-6-136.5(1) (stating that “a final decree of adop- tion may not be entered until . . . the child has lived in the home of the prospective adoptive parent for six months”). 45 See id. § 78B-6-132(1) (stating that “the court shall give spe- cial consideration to the relationship of the child with his foster parents, if the child has been in that home for a period of six months or longer”). 46 See id. § 78A-6-307(18)(a) (“Any preferential consideration that a relative . . . is initially granted . . . expires 120 days from the da 2013Accordingly, in order to ensure that courts properly analyze a child’s best interests when faced with multiple adoption 44 See id. § 78B-6-136.5(1) (stating that “a final decree of adop- tion may not be entered until . . . the child has lived in the home of the prospective adoptive parent for six months”). 45 See id. § 78B-6-132(1) (stating that “the court shall give spe- cial consideration to the relationship of the child with his foster parents, if the child has been in that home for a period of six months or longer”). 46 See id. § 78A-6-307(18)(a) (“Any preferential consideration that a rel | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Hardinger v. Kimberly
green
2 sentences2012Mother argues that the alleged procedural irregularities deprived the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for termination of her parental rights. ¶16 “‘[J]uvenile courts are creatures of statute . . . .’ Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is limited to that which the Legislature grants it . . . .” In re Adoption of B.B.G., 2007 UT App 149, ¶ 5 , 160 P.3d 9 (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.B., 2004 20100922‐CA 5 UT 39 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 252 ). 2012Mother argues that the alleged procedural irregularities deprived the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for termination of her parental rights. 116 " [JJuvenile courts are creatures of statute....' Accordingly, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited to that which the Legislature grants it...." In re Adoption of B.B.G., 2007 UT App 149, ¶ 5 , 160 P.3d 9 (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.B., 2004 UT 39 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 252 ). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Adoption of BBG
green
2 sentences2012Mother argues that the alleged procedural irregularities deprived the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for termination of her parental rights. ¶16 “‘[J]uvenile courts are creatures of statute . . . .’ Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is limited to that which the Legislature grants it . . . .” In re Adoption of B.B.G., 2007 UT App 149, ¶ 5 , 160 P.3d 9 (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.B., 2004 20100922‐CA 5 UT 39 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 252 ). 2012Mother argues that the alleged procedural irregularities deprived the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for termination of her parental rights. ¶16 “‘[J]uvenile courts are creatures of statute . . . .’ Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is limited to that which the Legislature grants it . . . .” In re Adoption of B.B.G., 2007 UT App 149, ¶ 5 , 160 P.3d 9 (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.B., 2004 20100922‐CA 5 UT 39 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 252 ). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State Ex Rel. Sa
green
2 sentences2007We agree that section 78-3a-312(8)(c) is mandatory, yet because it is not jurisdictional, the juvenile court did not lose its jurisdiction when the proceedings in this case were extended beyond the deadline. [3] ¶18 In In re S.A., 2001 UT App 308 , 37 P.3d 1172 , this court held that Utah Code section 78-3a-308(2), which requires an adjudication hearing to be held no later than sixty days from either the shelter hearing or the filing of the petition, is mandatory but not jurisdictional, and that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to hold the adjudication hearing after sixty days. 2007We agree that section 78-3a-312(8)(c) is mandatory, yet because it is not jurisdictional, the juvenile court did not lose its jurisdiction when the proceedings in this case were extended beyond the deadline. [3] ¶18 In In re S.A., 2001 UT App 308 , 37 P.3d 1172 , this court held that Utah Code section 78-3a-308(2), which requires an adjudication hearing to be held no later than sixty days from either the shelter hearing or the filing of the petition, is mandatory but not jurisdictional, and that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to hold the adjudication hearing after sixty days. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State Ex Rel. Jb
green
2 sentences2006"We review the juvenile court's judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under [r]ule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002 UT App 267,¶14 , 53 P.3d 958 . ¶12 Second, Stepfather contends that there was insufficient evidence to show by a clear and convincing standard that Stepfather had sexually abused O.D. 2006"We review the juvenile court's judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under [r]ule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002 UT App 267,¶14 , 53 P.3d 958 . ¶12 Second, Stepfather contends that there was insufficient evidence to show by a clear and convincing standard that Stepfather had sexually abused O.D. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State Ex Rel. Sa
green
2 sentences2006The juvenile court commented that Stepfather's counsel put on an "exhaustive defense" and that "well over half the evidence was elicited by [Stepfather's] attorney in this matter." Cf. In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,¶27 , 37 P.3d 1166 (remanding to juvenile court to conduct a new adjudication hearing because father had not participated in first adjudication hearing, resulting in denial of his due process rights); J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,¶27 , 33 P.3d 59 (holding that the juvenile court erred by applying an expungement order to DCFS when DCFS had not participated in the expungement procee 2006The juvenile court commented that Stepfather's counsel put on an "exhaustive defense" and that "well over half the evidence was elicited by [Stepfather's] attorney in this matter." Cf. In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,¶27 , 37 P.3d 1166 (remanding to juvenile court to conduct a new adjudication hearing because father had not participated in first adjudication hearing, resulting in denial of his due process rights); J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,¶27 , 33 P.3d 59 (holding that the juvenile court erred by applying an expungement order to DCFS when DCFS had not participated in the expungement procee | 2 | 2006–2006 |
J.J.W. v. State, Division of Child & Family Services
neutral
2 sentences2006The juvenile court commented that Stepfather's counsel put on an "exhaustive defense" and that "well over half the evidence was elicited by [Stepfather's] attorney in this matter." Cf. In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,¶27 , 37 P.3d 1166 (remanding to juvenile court to conduct a new adjudication hearing because father had not participated in first adjudication hearing, resulting in denial of his due process rights); J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,¶27 , 33 P.3d 59 (holding that the juvenile court erred by applying an expungement order to DCFS when DCFS had not participated in the expungement procee 2006The juvenile court commented that Stepfather's counsel put on an "exhaustive defense" and that "well over half the evidence was elicited by [Stepfather's] attorney in this matter." Cf. In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,¶27 , 37 P.3d 1166 (remanding to juvenile court to conduct a new adjudication hearing because father had not participated in first adjudication hearing, resulting in denial of his due process rights); J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,¶27 , 33 P.3d 59 (holding that the juvenile court erred by applying an expungement order to DCFS when DCFS had not participated in the expungement procee | 2 | 2006–2006 |
In re B.G.
neutral
1 sentence2026Therefore, we affirm. 2 Cite as: 2026 UT 2 Opinion of the Court BACKGROUND A. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ¶4 When DCFS takes a child into protective custody, the juvenile court must “hold a shelter hearing to determine the temporary custody of a child within 72 hours.” UTAH CODE § 80-3- 301(1). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Davis v. Sperry
green
2 sentences2025“A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others’ outstanding rights to the seller’s title.” Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ¶ 28 , 288 P.3d 26 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code § 57-3-103. 2025“A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others’ outstanding rights to the seller’s title.” Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ¶ 28 , 288 P.3d 26 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code § 57-3-103. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lavender v. FCOI Preserve
green
2 sentences2025The district court denied the rule 54(b) motion on several grounds, including that Lavender had identified no “clear error of law” and that any entity that acquired title through Fortress (which was, as the court had previously ruled, a bona fide purchaser for value) was likewise protected under what the court referred to as “the shelter rule.” 20230390-CA 9 2025 UT App 47 Lavender v. FCOI Preserve ¶23 As the case got closer to trial, Lavender filed various motions in limine. 2025We also note that, in addition to the two arguments we’ve identified, Lavender briefly asserts that the district court erred by “adopt[ing] the shelter rule sua sponte.” Lavender provides little support or analysis for this assertion, however, so we reject it on grounds of inadequate briefing. 20230390-CA 29 2025 UT App 47 Lavender v. FCOI Preserve (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove
green
1 sentence2025In support of its Utah common law argument, FCOI Preserve points to Utah Farm Production Credit Ass’n v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Moulding Investments v. Box Elder County
green
2 sentences2025This standard of review grants no deference to the decision of the district court.” Moulding Invs., LLC v. Box Elder County, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 21 , 545 P.3d 781 (quotation simplified). ¶38 Third, Lavender claims that the district court erred in ruling that FCOI Preserve qualified for protection as a bona fide purchaser under the shelter rule. 2025This standard of review grants no deference to the decision of the district court.” Moulding Invs., LLC v. Box Elder County, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 21 , 545 P.3d 781 (quotation simplified). ¶38 Third, Lavender claims that the district court erred in ruling that FCOI Preserve qualified for protection as a bona fide purchaser under the shelter rule. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
1 sentence2024The question of whether “intentional relinquishment” was demonstrated is a “legal question” that “is intensely fact dependent,” id., and “the legal conclusions underlying” a trial court’s waiver determination, even one made on summary judgment, “are reviewed with some measure of deference,” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶ 6 , 73 P.3d 320 . ¶35 But no party raised a waiver argument before the juvenile court at any point; that is, neither the State nor the GAL argued that the court should find Child dependent as to Father based on the actions (or inactions) Father to | 1 | 2024–2024 |
IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024The question of whether “intentional relinquishment” was demonstrated is a “legal question” that “is intensely fact dependent,” id., and “the legal conclusions underlying” a trial court’s waiver determination, even one made on summary judgment, “are reviewed with some measure of deference,” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶ 6 , 73 P.3d 320 . ¶35 But no party raised a waiver argument before the juvenile court at any point; that is, neither the State nor the GAL argued that the court should find Child dependent as to Father based on the actions (or inactions) Father to 2024The question of whether “intentional relinquishment” was demonstrated is a “legal question” that “is intensely fact dependent,” id., and “the legal conclusions underlying” a trial court’s waiver determination, even one made on summary judgment, “are reviewed with some measure of deference,” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶ 6 , 73 P.3d 320 . ¶35 But no party raised a waiver argument before the juvenile court at any point; that is, neither the State nor the GAL argued that the court should find Child dependent as to Father based on the actions (or inactions) Father to | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re J.M...
neutral
1 sentence2024At the shelter hearing, the court ordered the Children to remain in DCFS custody, appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the Children, and appointed Counsel to represent Mother. ¶6 In December 2021, Mother and Father attended mediation in which they agreed to respond to the allegations of the custody petition under rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure “by declining to admit or deny the allegations,” meaning the allegations would “be deemed true,” provided the State amended 20230310-CA 3 2024 UT App 147 In re J.M. those allegations. 2 Thereafter, the State filed an amended cus | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| In re K.K... green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re A.S.G.-R.
green
1 sentence2023Child has remained in Father’s care ever since. 20220645-CA 5 2023 UT App 126 In re A.S.G.-R. ¶14 Later, at a subsequent hearing, the court found, based on stipulation, that Child was dependent as to Father. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In re K.S. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| C.A. v. State (In Re State Ex Rel. J.A.) green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re C.S... neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re R.M. neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re L.A. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re Z.G. neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In re D.T. & H.T. (R.T. v. State) neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In re Z.Z...(K.Z. and V.Z. v. State) green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Interest of Bb green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State, in Interest of Pfb green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State Ex Rel. J.H. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State in Interest of EM green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State in Interest of Th v. Rh green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Boston & M.R.R. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.