incredible dubiosity rule in Indiana

2023Application of the incredible dubiosity rule requires that there be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015).

2020Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 ; cf. Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. 2002) (finding the incredible dubiosity rule inapplicable even when there was a single eyewitness).

2020“The incredible dubiosity rule provides that a court may impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge witness credibility only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 30-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied.

2019Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). “[W]hile incredible dubiosity provides a standard that is ‘not impossible’ to meet, it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). [14] In applying the Moore factors to this case, we conclude the

2025Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1288-89 (Ind. 2018). [21] Jones acknowledges that under the incredible dubiosity rule, “a court will impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994).

2019That is, we will only impinge on the trier of fact’s duty to judge witness credibility “where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1054 | November 20, 2019 Page 4 of 5 a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Id. at 755 (emphases in original) (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994)). [11] The incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable here for several reasons.

2018See Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2007). (holding that despite the inconsistencies from an eleven-year-old witness, the child’s clear and unequivocal testimony established the necessary elements and the incredible dubiosity rule did not apply). [17] Although Cox focuses on differences between M.N.’s statements to the Child Advocacy Center and her deposition, M.N.’s trial testimony was not internally inconsistent or inherently contradictory regarding the elements of the crime alleged.

2017Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1611-CR-2709 | May 18, 2017 Page 6 of 8 Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted) (emphases added). [12] Claudio’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced.

2016“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in trial testimony rather than Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1508-CR-1094 | March 7, 2016 Page 6 of 8 conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements made to the police before trial.” Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Reyburn v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

2015“The incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a witness contradicts himself in a single statement or while testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; see also Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in trial testimony rather than conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements made to the police before trial.”). [14] T.M. argues that we should apply the incredible dubiosity rule because C.C.’s testimony was equivocal a

2020Lastly, Tyler states that the other “evidence offered by the State did not overcome [Merriman’s] incredibly dubious testimony.” Id. [10] In applying the Moore factors, we conclude the incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable to the present case.

2020But making this showing is no easy task—while application of the incredible-dubiosity rule is “not impossible,” it is “a rare occasion.” Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001). [13] This case is not one of those rare occasions because Keenan has failed to show that the rule’s second and third conditions are satisfied: Cary’s trial testimony was not internally contradictory; and there was circumstantial evidence of Keenan’s guilt.

2023“Under the incredible dubiosity rule, a court will impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. 2002).

2020Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 ; cf. Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. 2002) (finding the incredible dubiosity rule inapplicable even when there was a single eyewitness).

2020See Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221-22 (Ind. 2015) (noting that although three witnesses testified, without the allegedly incredibly dubious testimony of one witness, the remaining witnesses’ testimony would have been an insufficient basis for the jury to find the defendant guilty; therefore, the first factor was satisfied). [11] As to the second factor, the incredible dubiosity rule applies only to conflicts in trial testimony.

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-97 | November 20, 2020 Page 6 of 12 [14] The incredible-dubiosity rule is only applicable when the sole witness’s trial testimony is “inconsistent within itself.” Smith, 34 N.E.3d at 1221 (citing Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 758–59).

2015“The incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a witness contradicts himself in a single statement or while testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; see also Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in trial testimony rather than conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements made to the police before trial.”). [14] T.M. argues that we should apply the incredible dubiosity rule because C.C.’s testimony was equivocal a

2014McKnelly’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced because the rule “applies only when a witness contradicts [herself] in a single statement or while testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

2020See Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind. 1998) (declining to apply the incredible dubiosity rule to defendant’s argument that the testimony of the State’s witnesses conflicted, because no witness contradicted himself). [13] Brown also argues that Ingram’s testimony regarding the extent of the damage conflicted with Fitzgerald’s testimony.

2020See Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind. 1998) (declining to apply the incredible dubiosity rule to defendant’s argument that the State’s witnesses conflicted with one another, but no one witness contradicted himself or herself).

2019“Application of [the incredible dubiosity rule] is very narrow and permitted only ‘where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.’” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1059 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2002)).

2017Dodd correctly notes that the incredible dubiosity rule allows us to impinge upon the fact finder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses “‘where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.’” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1059 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2002)).

2015Finally, as Moore concedes, there is circumstantial evidence in this case. ■ In a case where there is circumstantial evidence of an individual’s guilt, “reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced.” Majors v. State, 748 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 2001) (citing White v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Ind.1999)).

2014The incredible dubiosity doctrine applies when “the sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” White v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1079-80 (Ind. 1999).

2020Majors v. State, 748 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 2001). [14] Because the second and third prongs of the incredible dubiosity test are not met by the circumstances of this case, Tyler has failed to establish that the limited Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-483 | September 8, 2020 Page 8 of 9 exception of the incredible dubiosity rule applies and therefore we will not judge Merriman’s credibility for ourselves. [15] Even under the traditional sufficiency standard there was sufficient evidence to uphold Tyler’s conviction.

2020Majors v. State, 748 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 2001). [14] Because the second and third prongs of the incredible dubiosity test are not met by the circumstances of this case, Tyler has failed to establish that the limited Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-483 | September 8, 2020 Page 8 of 9 exception of the incredible dubiosity rule applies and therefore we will not judge Merriman’s credibility for ourselves. [15] Even under the traditional sufficiency standard there was sufficient evidence to uphold Tyler’s conviction.

2019Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

2019Whatley v. State , 908 N.E.2d 276 , 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied .

2019“Application of [the incredible dubiosity rule] is very narrow and permitted only ‘where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.’” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1059 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2002)).

2018See also Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2002) (explaining that the incredible dubiosity rule applies only “where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt”).

2020The incredible dubiosity rule “allows an appellate court to impinge upon the fact-finder’s assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial was so ‘unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.’” Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015)).

2019The incredible dubiosity rule “allows an appellate court to impinge upon the fact-finder’s assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial was so ‘unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.’” Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015)).

2016Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2014Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2020“The incredible dubiosity rule provides that a court may impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge witness credibility only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 30-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied.

2017Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 30-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2018“Incredibly dubious or inherently improbable testimony is that which runs counter to human experience, and which no reasonable person could believe.” Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

2018“Incredibly dubious or inherently improbable testimony is that which runs counter to human experience, and which no reasonable person could believe.” Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

2017See Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 487 (Ind. 2001) (holding that inconsistencies in the testimony of two or more witnesses go to the weight of the evidence and credibility of the testimony of each individual witness, and such inconsistencies do not make the evidence “incredible” as a matter of law), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1105 , 122 S. Ct. 905 (2002); White v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the incredible dubiosity rule was inapplicable and that by claiming contradictory testimony, instead of inherent Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A0

2014See Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463 . 12 The incredible dubiosity rule is not applicable here because C.S.’s trial testimony was unequivocal and not coerced.

2016“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in trial testimony rather than Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1508-CR-1094 | March 7, 2016 Page 6 of 8 conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements made to the police before trial.” Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Reyburn v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

2014“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in trial testimony rather than conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements made to the police before trial.” Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Reyburn v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

2015Any inconsistencies between the testimonies of the officer and T.R. about any particular factual matter do not meet the standard for declaring a witness’ testimony “incredibly dubious.” See Altes v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1116, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “limited to cases where the sole witness’ testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it”), trans. denied.

2014See Altes v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1116, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “limited to cases where the sole witness’ testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it”), trans. denied.

2020See Toles Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-909 | November 30, 2020 Page 21 of 24 v. State, 151 N.E.3d 805 , 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (treating defendant’s sufficiency argument as an incredible-dubiosity argument). [36] Under the incredible-dubiosity doctrine, we can impinge upon a factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when “the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2020There is only one exception to this rule: the incredible-dubiosity doctrine, under which we can impinge upon a factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when “the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2017See Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to those situations where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt).

2017See Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to those situations where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt).

2017Leyva v. State, 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2017Leyva v. State, 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2018Although Willoughby was the sole eyewitness to testify, nothing about Willoughby’s testimony was inherently dubious or wholly incredible. 3 From the time she reported the crime through the trial, 4 Willoughby consistently stated the same facts: 1) she 3 Newkirk cites Gaddis v. State, 251 N.E.2d 658 (Ind. 1969), to support his claim Willoughby’s testimony was incredibly dubious.

2016“Application of this rule is limited to cases…where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994) (citing Gaddis v. State, 253 Ind. 73 , 251 N.E.2d 658 (1969)).

2019See Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. 2002) (recognizing that inconsistencies between a police statement and trial testimony does not equate to uncorroborated “testimony inherently contradictory as a result of coercion”).

2004However, under the incredible dubiosity rule, a reviewing court may impinge upon the fact-finder's responsibility to judge witness credibility when "a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence." Id. (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 228 (Ind.1994)).

2018Id. [14] To convict Eakright of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, the State was required to prove that he, “a person at least eighteen (18) years of age,” did “perform[ ] or submit[ ] to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5)” with A.M., who was “a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age.” See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9 (a). [15] Under the incredible dubiosity rule, we may “impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witness only when it has confronted ‘inherently improbable testim

2016See Rodgers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ind. 1981).

2020See Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1988 | February 19, 2020 Page 4 of 6 (declining to reverse conviction because victim’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence and was not incredibly dubious). [9] Furthermore, Conn’s argument that Jones’s guilty plea to a charge of false informing from 2012 renders her testimony incredibly dubious in the present case is not well taken.

2017It is well-settled that “discrepancies between a witness’s trial testimony and earlier statements made to police and in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017 Page 5 of 7 depositions do not render such testimony ‘incredibly dubious.’” Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [12] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here because Burley’s testimony was supported by circumstantial evidence and his testimony at trial was not inherently contradictory, equivocal or the result of coercion.