preenforcement challenge in Washington

2026A preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review if “‘the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531, 534 , 354 P.3d 832 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)).

2026A preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review “‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531, 534 , 354 P.3d 832 (2015) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786-91 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)).

2025In determining whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we determine whether “‘the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 786 (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)).

2015The community custody condition is ripe for review To determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we must find that '"the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final."' State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 6 As part of the ripeness analysis we also consider '"the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' !d. (internal qu

2009Restraint of Cashaw, 123 Wn.2d 138, 148 , 866 P.2d 8 (1994). ¶37 Shortly after oral argument in this case, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008), holding a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition prohibiting the possession of pornographic material ripe for review. 5 Our Supreme Court found Bahl’s preenforcement challenge ripe because a prohibition on possessing pornography implicates First Amendment rights and, thus, dealt with a purely legal issue that courts could solve on the present record without the need for additiona

2009Restraint of Cashaw, 123 Wn.2d 138, 148 , 866 P.2d 8 (1994). ¶37 Shortly after oral argument in this case, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008), holding a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition prohibiting the possession of pornographic material ripe for review. 5 Our Supreme Court found Bahl’s preenforcement challenge ripe because a prohibition on possessing pornography implicates First Amendment rights and, thus, dealt with a purely legal issue that courts could solve on the present record without the need for additiona

2008He contends that if he resumes a sales position after he is released from custody, there is no way for him to preevaluate potential clients because “anybody behind a door, on a telephone line, or waiting in line for a milkshake” could have a disability or illness, whether visible or not, and anyone who answers a door to a stranger could be considered “vulnerable.” In Bahl, we acknowledged that we have “not yet agreed it is appropriate to evaluate conditions of sentence for vagueness in a preenforcement challenge” and declined to review a vagueness challenge to a sentencing condition that prohi

2008He contends that if he resumes a sales position after he is released from custody, there is no way for him to preevaluate potential clients because "anybody behind a door, on a telephone line, or waiting in line for a milkshake" could have a disability or illness, whether visible or not, and anyone who answers a door to a stranger could be considered "vulnerable." [18] In Bahl, we acknowledged that we have "not yet agreed it is appropriate to evaluate conditions of sentence for vagueness in a preenforcement challenge" and declined to review a vagueness challenge to a sentencing condition that

2025App. 949, 953 , 10 P.3d 1101 (2000))).

2025Thus, the preenforcement challenge was not ripe for review “because it rest[ed] on the factually unsupported assumption that BA and UA testing will be ‘conducted in an unreasonable manner’ or ‘used impermissibly as part of “a fishing expedition to discover evidence of other crimes.” ’ ” Id. at 17 (quoting State v. Olsen, 189 Wn.2d 118 , 134, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017) (quoting State v. Combs, 102 Wn.

2019When reviewing whether a no-contact order with a defendant’s own children is appropriate, we conduct a fact-based inquiry, weighing the State’s compelling interest in preventing harm to children against the defendant’s fundamental right to raise their children without State interference. ~ State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn.

2015The Court of Appeals has noted that the personal computer is a “ ‘modern day repository of a man’s records, reflections, and conversations.’ ” Nordlund, 113 Wn.

2010We recognized such a claim is ripe for review on direct appeal “ ‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’ ” Id. at 751 (quoting First United Methodist Church v. Hr’g Exam’r, 129 Wn.2d 238, 255-56 , 916 P.2d 374 (1996)).

2010We recognized such a claim is ripe for review on direct appeal “ ‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’ ” Id. at 751 (quoting First United Methodist Church v. Hr’g Exam’r, 129 Wn.2d 238, 255-56 , 916 P.2d 374 (1996)).

2008He contends that if he resumes a sales position after he is released from custody, there is no way for him to preevaluate potential clients because "anybody behind a door, on a telephone line, or waiting in line for a milkshake" could have a disability or illness, whether visible or not, and anyone who answers a door to a stranger could be considered "vulnerable." [18] In Bahl, we acknowledged that we have "not yet agreed it is appropriate to evaluate conditions of sentence for vagueness in a preenforcement challenge" and declined to review a vagueness challenge to a sentencing condition that

2008The defendant had not yet been accused of violating the conditions and failed to explain why his vagueness challenge required "evaluation of the conditions in a factual vacuum." Id. at 719, 159 P.3d 416 .

2007Loy, 237 F.3d at 260-61 . ¶17 The court thus concluded it was appropriate to reach the merits of the offender’s preenforcement challenge and proceeded to determine that the “unusually broad” prohibition against possessing pornography was unconstitutional as it could subject the offender to prosecution, for example, for the possession of any art form that employs nudity.

2007“That said, there is no question that the District Court could, perfectly consonant with the constitution, restrict Loy’s access to sexually oriented materials, so long as that restriction was set forth with sufficient clarity and with a nexus to the goals of supervised release.” Loy, 237 F.3d at 267 . ¶18 While we have followed Loy in concluding that a prohibition against possessing “pornography” is too vague as applied to possession of the photographs in Sansone, we have not yet agreed it is appropriate to evaluate conditions of sentence for vagueness in a preenforcement challenge.

1990Gardner, 387 U.S. at 138-39 .

1990Gardner, 387 U.S. at 138-39 .