5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2021DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez)) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a 2021Accordingly, we will omit the traditional statement of facts. 2 to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez).) Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on a | 2 | 2 |
In Re Johnsongreen2 sentences2013We also part company with In re Johnson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 290 , to the extent it suggests that subdivision (c)(15)(C) somehow “expands” the definition of what constitutes “obscene material” for purposes of prison administration. ( 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [tit. 15, § 3006, subd. (c)(15)(A) is “refined” by subd. (c)(15)(C), and together they represent an “expanded definition of obscenity”].) As we see it, subdivision (c)(15)(C) is the beginning point of the analysis, not the end. 2013We also part company with In re Johnson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 290 , to the extent it suggests that subdivision (c)(15)(C) somehow “expands” the definition of what constitutes “obscene material” for purposes of prison administration. ( 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [tit. 15, § 3006, subd. (c)(15)(A) is “refined” by subd. (c)(15)(C), and together they represent an “expanded definition of obscenity”].) As we see it, subdivision (c)(15)(C) is the beginning point of the analysis, not the end. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adoption of Allison C.
green
1 sentence2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Amy A. v. Quentin A.
green
1 sentence2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Heslen
green
1 sentence2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Horr v. Cattalini
green
1 sentence2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Jacklyn F.
green
1 sentence2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Department of Adoptions v. Daniel G.
green
2 sentences2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. 2010In father’s view, the “circumstances under which the children came to be in [mother’s] sole legal and physical custody should have been the beginning point of the analysis.” To support his position, father relies on Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 , Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 63 , Jacklyn F., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 747 , In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 201 ], and In re Cattalini (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662 [ 165 P.2d 250 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
White v. Davis
green
2 sentences1978As we recently observed in a similar context, however, "the identification of [such a] legitimate interest is just the beginning point of analysis ..., not, as defendant suggests, the conclusion." ( White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757, 766 .) "In this realm, as in all others, the permissible limits of governmental action are circumscribed by the federal Bill of Rights and the comparable protections of our state Constitution." ( Id. ) As we have seen, the source of the constitutional protection of associational privacy is the recognition that, as a practical matter, compelled disclosure will o 1978As we recently observed in a similar context, however, “the identification of [such a] legitimate interest is just the beginning point of analysis . . ., not, as defendant suggests, the conclusion.” (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757, 766 .) “In this realm, as in all others, the permissible limits of governmental action are circumscribed by the federal Bill of Rights and the comparable protections of our state Constitution.” (Id.) As we have seen, the source of the constitutional protection of associational privacy is the recognition that, as a practical matter, compelled disclosure will of | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.