5 California opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.green2 sentences2024(See, e.g., Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 760 ; Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 901 [observing that Supreme Court decisions have accommodated the Colgate doctrine].) The Colgate doctrine was first recognized by California courts in 1979. 2024(See, e.g., Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 760 ; Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 901 [observing that Supreme Court decisions have accommodated the Colgate doctrine].) The Colgate doctrine was first recognized by California courts in 1979. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2023But this too was insufficient to preserve an objection specific to the 20 samples. “[W]here the objection is lack of proper foundation, counsel must point out specifically in what respect the foundation 29 is deficient.” (People v. Moore (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 424, 434, fn. 8 .) Colgate’s objection did not specifically inform the trial court that it was raising an authenticity objection to the most recent 20 samples Dr. Longo tested, and, up to that point, it had not indicated that it was objecting to Dr. Longo’s reliance on those 20 samples. 2022But this too was insufficient to preserve an objection specific to the 20 samples. “[W]here the objection is lack of proper foundation, counsel must point out specifically in what respect the foundation 29 is deficient.” (People v. Moore (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 424, 434, fn. 8 .) Colgate’s objection did not specifically inform the trial court that it was raising an authenticity objection to the most recent 20 samples Dr. Longo tested, and, up to that point, it had not indicated that it was objecting to Dr. Longo’s reliance on those 20 samples. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stansburygreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve objection if it is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; states a specific legal ground for exclusion; and is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn.1 ; Evid. 2022(See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve objection if it is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; states a specific legal ground for exclusion; and is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn.1 ; Evid. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve objection if it is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; states a specific legal ground for exclusion; and is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn.1 ; Evid. 2022(See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve objection if it is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; states a specific legal ground for exclusion; and is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn.1 ; Evid. | 2 | 2 |
G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc.green2 sentences2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w 2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w | 1 | 2 |
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLPgreen2 sentences2024Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 U.S. 398, 407-408 (Verizon Communications).)5 This remains true whether the “unlawful” and “unfair” prongs are considered jointly or separately.6 5 In Verizon Communications, the United States Supreme Court explained why the Colgate doctrine protects unilateral conduct as procompetitive: “Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. 2024Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 U.S. 398, 407-408 (Verizon Communications).)5 This remains true whether the “unlawful” and “unfair” prongs are considered jointly or separately.6 5 In Verizon Communications, the United States Supreme Court explained why the Colgate doctrine protects unilateral conduct as procompetitive: “Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. | 1 | 1 |
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.green2 sentences2024(See, e.g., Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 760 ; Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 901 [observing that Supreme Court decisions have accommodated the Colgate doctrine].) The Colgate doctrine was first recognized by California courts in 1979. 2024(See, e.g., Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 760 ; Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 901 [observing that Supreme Court decisions have accommodated the Colgate doctrine].) The Colgate doctrine was first recognized by California courts in 1979. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.green2 sentences2024(United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1960) 362 U.S. 29, 49 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).) Rather than retreat from the doctrine over time, the high court continues to recognize its viability. 2024(United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1960) 362 U.S. 29, 49 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).) Rather than retreat from the doctrine over time, the high court continues to recognize its viability. | 1 | 1 |
R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.green2 sentences2024Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 419, 424-425, fn. 1 .) Although the Legislature has amended the Cartwright Act at least twice since 1979 (Stats. 1983, ch. 1069, § 1; Stats 1987, ch. 865, § 2), not to mention numerous times since 1919 ( Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 1162-1163), it has not undermined the applicability or effect of the Colgate doctrine. 2024Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 419, 424-425, fn. 1 .) Although the Legislature has amended the Cartwright Act at least twice since 1979 (Stats. 1983, ch. 1069, § 1; Stats 1987, ch. 865, § 2), not to mention numerous times since 1919 ( Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 1162-1163), it has not undermined the applicability or effect of the Colgate doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn.green2 sentences2024(Kolling, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 720 .) This premise, that “[a]bsent a legal provision to the contrary, a private party generally may choose to do or not do business with whomever it pleases” without violating antitrust laws (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 (Drum)), is known as the Colgate doctrine, arising from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion of the same name. 2024(Kolling, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 720 .) This premise, that “[a]bsent a legal provision to the contrary, a private party generally may choose to do or not do business with whomever it pleases” without violating antitrust laws (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 (Drum)), is known as the Colgate doctrine, arising from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion of the same name. | 1 | 1 |
Zhang v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024(Cf. Zhang, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 384 [UCL action may lie if defendant’s alleged conduct independently violates “obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law” even if “safe harbor” also applies].) To find otherwise would permit plaintiffs to use the UCL to “assault” the “ ‘absolute bar to relief’ ” established by the Colgate doctrine. 2024(Cf. Zhang, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 384 [UCL action may lie if defendant’s alleged conduct independently violates “obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law” even if “safe harbor” also applies].) To find otherwise would permit plaintiffs to use the UCL to “assault” the “ ‘absolute bar to relief’ ” established by the Colgate doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
State of California Ex Rel. Van De Kamp v. Texacogreen2 sentences2024Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1161 (Texaco), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570 .) Although other states’ antitrust acts in existence at the time of its adoption had broader application, the California Legislature chose to model the Cartwright Act after a “more 15 narrowly worded” Texas act that defined a “trust” as a “ ‘combination of capital, skills or acts . . .’ for various improper purposes.” (Texaco at pp. 1154-1155, italics omitted.) As we have mentioned, the Colgate doctri 2024Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1161 (Texaco), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570 .) Although other states’ antitrust acts in existence at the time of its adoption had broader application, the California Legislature chose to model the Cartwright Act after a “more 15 narrowly worded” Texas act that defined a “trust” as a “ ‘combination of capital, skills or acts . . .’ for various improper purposes.” (Texaco at pp. 1154-1155, italics omitted.) As we have mentioned, the Colgate doctri | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Colgate & Co.
green
2 sentences2024Applying the Colgate doctrine, U. S. v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U.S. 300 (Colgate) and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363 (Chavez), the trial court determined that Plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law. 2024Applying the Colgate doctrine, U. S. v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U.S. 300 (Colgate) and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363 (Chavez), the trial court determined that Plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law. | 3 | 2001–2024 |
Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co.
green
2 sentences2024(Kolling, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 720 .) This premise, that “[a]bsent a legal provision to the contrary, a private party generally may choose to do or not do business with whomever it pleases” without violating antitrust laws (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 (Drum)), is known as the Colgate doctrine, arising from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion of the same name. 2024(Kolling, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 720 .) This premise, that “[a]bsent a legal provision to the contrary, a private party generally may choose to do or not do business with whomever it pleases” without violating antitrust laws (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 (Drum)), is known as the Colgate doctrine, arising from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion of the same name. | 2 | 2001–2024 |
Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences2024According to Plaintiffs, the implication from Chavez that a “safe harbor” can be found outside of explicit statutory language immunizing specific conduct cannot be reconciled with Cel-Tech, particularly with the court’s declaration that the “Legislature’s mere failure to prohibit an activity does not prevent a court from finding it unfair.” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) Stated differently in the context of this case, Plaintiffs theorize that because the Legislature has not enacted a statute or provision condoning conduct embraced by the Colgate doctrine as lawful, Cel-Tech establis 2024According to Plaintiffs, the implication from Chavez that a “safe harbor” can be found outside of explicit statutory language immunizing specific conduct cannot be reconciled with Cel-Tech, particularly with the court’s declaration that the “Legislature’s mere failure to prohibit an activity does not prevent a court from finding it unfair.” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) Stated differently in the context of this case, Plaintiffs theorize that because the Legislature has not enacted a statute or provision condoning conduct embraced by the Colgate doctrine as lawful, Cel-Tech establis | 2 | 2001–2024 |
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Rutherford endorsed the refined standard of proof for causation announced therein because of the 18 Some courts have commented, without deciding, that Rutherford’s refined standard for proving causation “would appear appropriate for toxic torts beyond asbestos.” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 700 ; see also Major v. R.J. 2022Rutherford endorsed the refined standard of proof for causation announced therein because of the 18 Some courts have commented, without deciding, that Rutherford’s refined standard for proving causation “would appear appropriate for toxic torts beyond asbestos.” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 700 ; see also Major v. R.J. | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Lyons v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
green
2 sentences2023In response to Colgate’s motion to exclude Dr. Longo’s opinion, plaintiff pointed to Lyons, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 463 , and argued 34 that Dr. Longo had relied on his own testing and historical documents, and he could render an opinion without testing the bottles Schmitz used. 2023In response to Colgate’s motion to exclude Dr. Longo’s opinion, plaintiff pointed to Lyons, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 463 , and argued 34 that Dr. Longo had relied on his own testing and historical documents, and he could render an opinion without testing the bottles Schmitz used. | 2 | 2022–2023 |
T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
green
2 sentences2024Although we recognize that the “decisions of . . . the lower federal courts may be instructive to the extent we find their analysis persuasive, they are neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175 .) The Ninth Circuit and the district court mentioned Chavez only in passing, and neither court engaged a rigorous analysis of the Colgate doctrine and its effect on UCL claims. 2024Although we recognize that the “decisions of . . . the lower federal courts may be instructive to the extent we find their analysis persuasive, they are neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175 .) The Ninth Circuit and the district court mentioned Chavez only in passing, and neither court engaged a rigorous analysis of the Colgate doctrine and its effect on UCL claims. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
The Jeanery, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, and Rock Bottom Jean Co., Inc., an Oregon Corporation v. James Jeans, Inc., a Washington Corporation
green
2 sentences2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w 2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People's Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless
green
2 sentences2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w 2024(Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 .) In Colgate, “the Supreme Court recognized that, subject to antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, there is a ‘long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” (People’s Choice Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 656, 663 , fn. omitted; accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752, 761 (Monsanto) [“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, w | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp.
green
2 sentences2024Applying the Colgate doctrine, U. S. v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U.S. 300 (Colgate) and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363 (Chavez), the trial court determined that Plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law. 2024Applying the Colgate doctrine, U. S. v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U.S. 300 (Colgate) and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363 (Chavez), the trial court determined that Plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1161 (Texaco), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570 .) Although other states’ antitrust acts in existence at the time of its adoption had broader application, the California Legislature chose to model the Cartwright Act after a “more 15 narrowly worded” Texas act that defined a “trust” as a “ ‘combination of capital, skills or acts . . .’ for various improper purposes.” (Texaco at pp. 1154-1155, italics omitted.) As we have mentioned, the Colgate doctri 2024Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1161 (Texaco), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570 .) Although other states’ antitrust acts in existence at the time of its adoption had broader application, the California Legislature chose to model the Cartwright Act after a “more 15 narrowly worded” Texas act that defined a “trust” as a “ ‘combination of capital, skills or acts . . .’ for various improper purposes.” (Texaco at pp. 1154-1155, italics omitted.) As we have mentioned, the Colgate doctri | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2024Because both antitrust laws and the UCL are designed to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 320 ; Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 ), logic dictates that there can be no harm to consumers under the UCL based on the same unilateral practices that have been historically accepted as procompetitive and categorically shielded from antitrust liability by the Colgate doctrine. 2024Because both antitrust laws and the UCL are designed to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 320 ; Chavez, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 ), logic dictates that there can be no harm to consumers under the UCL based on the same unilateral practices that have been historically accepted as procompetitive and categorically shielded from antitrust liability by the Colgate doctrine. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson
green
2 sentences2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P 2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bert G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co.
green
2 sentences2001Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1042-1043 , 219 Cal.Rptr. 203 ; G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 256, 267-268 , 195 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Rolling v. Dow Jones & Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 709, 720-721 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 797 ; R.E. 2001Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1042-1043 , 219 Cal.Rptr. 203 ; G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 256, 267-268 , 195 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Rolling v. Dow Jones & Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 709, 720-721 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 797 ; R.E. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cianci v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P 2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P | 1 | 2001–2001 |
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P 2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
green
2 sentences2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P 2001The purpose of federal and state antitrust laws is to protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. ( NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 106-107 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 , 82 L.Ed.2d 70 ; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 918-919 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 575 , 710 P.2d 375 .) Antitrust laws are designed to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning conduct that unreasonably impairs competition and harms consumers. ( Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 723 , 108 S.Ct. 1515 ; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. P | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.