guideline requirement in California

1998The presumption may be rebutted when the parent being ordered to pay support has an “extraordinarily high income.” Estevez v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 423 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 470 ] holds that once the guideline presumption has been rebutted in this manner, an extraordinarily high earning parent who offers to pay any reasonable amount of court-ordered child support does not need to provide detailed financial discovery to the other parent.

1998The presumption may be rebutted when the parent being ordered to pay support has an “extraordinarily high income.” Estevez v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 423 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 470 ] holds that once the guideline presumption has been rebutted in this manner, an extraordinarily high earning parent who offers to pay any reasonable amount of court-ordered child support does not need to provide detailed financial discovery to the other parent.

1996Because the county must, under section 903, abide by and implement the substantive limitations charted in Jerald C., supra, 36 Cal.3d 1 , and Dell J., supra, 46 Cal.3d 1236—indeed section 903’s provision for use of the child support guideline stands constitutional precisely because of these requirements—we asked the county to explain how it does (and thus will in this case) accomplish and ensure compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate that it retain only the allowable elements and amount of support.

1996Because the county must, under section 903, abide by and implement the substantive limitations charted in Jerald C., supra, 36 Cal.3d 1 , and Dell J., supra, 46 Cal.3d 1236—indeed section 903’s provision for use of the child support guideline stands constitutional precisely because of these requirements—we asked the county to explain how it does (and thus will in this case) accomplish and ensure compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate that it retain only the allowable elements and amount of support.

1978The court ruled, “We conclude . . . that where . . . the plaintiff perceives by sight and hearing the physical injury to another in her presence caused by the defendant’s negligence, the guideline requirement of direct emotional impact from sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident is satisfied, although the plaintiff may not be aware of the precise nature of the negligence.” ( 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 577 .) There the foster mother witnessed the injuries to the infant held in her arms as he became spastic and convulsant and finally comatose from the administration of an overly concen

1978Finally, in Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ], where the husband sought recovery for the emotional trauma incident to his witnessing his wife’s death, the court approved Archibald v. Braverman, supra, as follows: “We confirm the propriety of the expression in Archibald, supra, that the Dillon requirement of‘sensory *565 and contemporaneous observance of the accident’ does not require a visual perception of the impact causing the death or injury.

1978Finally, in Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ], where the husband sought recovery for the emotional trauma incident to his witnessing his wife’s death, the court approved Archibald v. Braverman, supra, as follows: “We confirm the propriety of the expression in Archibald, supra, that the Dillon requirement of‘sensory *565 and contemporaneous observance of the accident’ does not require a visual perception of the impact causing the death or injury.

1973(People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 775 .) Thus, the guideline factors mentioned in Beagle are seen to be only specific examples or applications of the general considerations involved in the exercise of the court’s discretion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.