overcoming presumption in California

2013Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end." (Id. at pp. 532-533, fn. omitted.) It stated: "[W]e think there is no good reason to draw a line between laws that lower the burden of proof and laws that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden; the two types of laws are indistinguishable in all meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 541.) 27 The Carmell court distinguished Thompson v. Missouri, supra, 171 U.S. 380 and Hopt v. Territory of Utah (1884)

2004Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end. . . . [T]he government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction." ( Carmell, supra, 529 U.S. 513, 532-533 , 120 S.Ct. 1620 , 146 L.Ed.2d 577 , fn. omitted.) Responding to an argument made by both the State and the dissenting justices, the Carmell majority declined to view the statute as merely a rule affecting the admissibility and competency of evidence under Hopt v. U

2004Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end. . . . [T]he government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction." ( Carmell, supra, 529 U.S. 513, 532-533 , 120 S.Ct. 1620 , 146 L.Ed.2d 577 , fn. omitted.) Responding to an argument made by both the State and the dissenting justices, the Carmell majority declined to view the statute as merely a rule affecting the admissibility and competency of evidence under Hopt v. U

2004Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end. . . . [T]he government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction." ( Carmell, supra, 529 U.S. 513, 532-533 , 120 S.Ct. 1620 , 146 L.Ed.2d 577 , fn. omitted.) Responding to an argument made by both the State and the dissenting justices, the Carmell majority declined to view the statute as merely a rule affecting the admissibility and competency of evidence under Hopt v. U

2016The Bank’s loan officer testified the additional security on the Alta Loma property was taken only to comply with banking 6 Larry points out that In re Marriage of Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pages 1186-1187, expresses the standard for overcoming the presumption that loan proceeds are community property in stricter terms than were used in Gudelj v. Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at page 210 .

2016Whereas Gudelj stated the test was whether the evidence showed the lender “primarily” relied on separate property, Grinius expressed it as whether “the lender intended to rely solely upon a spouse’s separate property.” (In re Marriage of Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187 , italics added.) We are bound to apply the Supreme Court’s test. 8 regulations restricting banks to a loan of up to 60 percent of the appraised value of property given as security.” (Ibid., italics added.) And the court noted that “[t]he proceeds of the loan so made on the personal credit of either spouse are regarded

2016The Bank’s loan officer testified the additional security on the Alta Loma property was taken only to comply with banking 6 Larry points out that In re Marriage of Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pages 1186-1187, expresses the standard for overcoming the presumption that loan proceeds are community property in stricter terms than were used in Gudelj v. Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at page 210 .

2013Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end." (Id. at pp. 532-533, fn. omitted.) It stated: "[W]e think there is no good reason to draw a line between laws that lower the burden of proof and laws that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden; the two types of laws are indistinguishable in all meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 541.) 27 The Carmell court distinguished Thompson v. Missouri, supra, 171 U.S. 380 and Hopt v. Territory of Utah (1884)

2013Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end." (Id. at pp. 532-533, fn. omitted.) It stated: "[W]e think there is no good reason to draw a line between laws that lower the burden of proof and laws that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden; the two types of laws are indistinguishable in all meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 541.) 27 The Carmell court distinguished Thompson v. Missouri, supra, 171 U.S. 380 and Hopt v. Territory of Utah (1884)