easement by estoppel doctrine in Texas

2025Id. “[E]stoppel ordinarily raises a fact issue that is inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment.” Tex. Utilities Fuel Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 11-98-00079-CV, 2000 WL 34234653 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 38 In Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979) the Texas Supreme Court explained that the “exact nature” of the doctrine of easement by estoppel “has not been clearly defined,” noting that: While it is frequently applied in a few definite categories of suits involving land, the authority for its application outside those c

2024CODE ANN. § 13.001. -8- 04-22-00270-CV by a person with authority to sell property, is not sworn, proved, or acknowledged, and is not filed with the Kinney County property records.” Boerschig, referencing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 693 13 and section 65.001 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, further argues that the statutory provisions that invalidate the Dooley easement “supersede the common law and equitable doctrines of easement by estoppel.” Rio Grande responds by arguing that “Texas law is clear that the doctrine of easement by estoppel is an exception to the statute of

2018Easement by Estoppel “The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations that have been acted upon by the owner of alleged dominant estate.” Ingham v. O’Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, review denied) (quoting Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)).

2014"The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations that have been acted upon by the holder of the alleged dominant estate." Ingham v. O'Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (quoting Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)).

2025Id. “[E]stoppel ordinarily raises a fact issue that is inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment.” Tex. Utilities Fuel Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 11-98-00079-CV, 2000 WL 34234653 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 38 In Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979) the Texas Supreme Court explained that the “exact nature” of the doctrine of easement by estoppel “has not been clearly defined,” noting that: While it is frequently applied in a few definite categories of suits involving land, the authority for its application outside those c

2025Easement by Estoppel The doctrine of easement by estoppel is an exception to the statute of frauds, Cleaver v. Cundiff, 203 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied), and, “[b]eing a creature of equity, it seeks to prevent injustice and to protect innocent parties from fraud.” Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979).

2023“The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations that have been acted upon by the holder of the alleged dominant estate.” Id. (quoting Ingham v. O’Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied)).

2018Easement by Estoppel “The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations that have been acted upon by the owner of alleged dominant estate.” Ingham v. O’Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, review denied) (quoting Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)).

2018See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (citing Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962)). 7 The doctrine of easement by estoppel is not applied as strictly as the doctrine of implied easement.

2008See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). 1 According to South Plains and Wisener’s theory, this is the missing element in Heinrich’s case.

2008A. Applicable Law "The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case." Stallman v. Newman , 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin , 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack , No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.). (4) The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for easement by estoppel in Harrison & Co. v. Boring , 44 Tex. 255 (Tex. 1

2008A. Applicable Law “The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case.” Stallman v. Newman, 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin, 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack, No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.).4 The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for 4 In reviewing secondary authority pertaining to easem ents by estoppel, we

2016See Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 452 ; see also Vinson, 80 S.W.3d at 229 .

2005See Vinson , 80 S.W.3d at 229 .

2025Id. “[E]stoppel ordinarily raises a fact issue that is inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment.” Tex. Utilities Fuel Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 11-98-00079-CV, 2000 WL 34234653 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 38 In Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979) the Texas Supreme Court explained that the “exact nature” of the doctrine of easement by estoppel “has not been clearly defined,” noting that: While it is frequently applied in a few definite categories of suits involving land, the authority for its application outside those c

2025See, e.g., Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325–26 (addressing easement by estoppel in case involving use of existing roadway across servient tract by owner of dominant tract); Wallace v. McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding easement by estoppel existed when landlocked tract had been accessed for more than seventy years using road across appellant’s property); Halsell v. Ferguson, 202 S.W. 317, 322 (Tex. 1918) (holding city and property owners, who had platted their land and faced lots upon certain streets and improved them, were estopped to change plat after othe

2011Machala, 56 S.W.3d at 756 ; Stallman, 9 S.W.3d at 247 ; Shipp v. Stoker, 923 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).

2011Machala, 56 S.W.3d at 756 ; Stallman, 9 S.W.3d at 247 ; 7 Shipp v. Stoker, 923 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied).

2025Easement by Estoppel The doctrine of easement by estoppel is an exception to the statute of frauds, Cleaver v. Cundiff, 203 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied), and, “[b]eing a creature of equity, it seeks to prevent injustice and to protect innocent parties from fraud.” Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979).

2023Cleaver v. Cundiff, 203 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2006, pet. denied).

2008A. Applicable Law "The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case." Stallman v. Newman , 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin , 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack , No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.). (4) The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for easement by estoppel in Harrison & Co. v. Boring , 44 Tex. 255 (Tex. 1

2008A. Applicable Law “The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case.” Stallman v. Newman, 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin, 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack, No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.).4 The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for 4 In reviewing secondary authority pertaining to easem ents by estoppel, we

2014Allen, 280 S.W.3d at 381 (citing Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962)).

2011The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by parol requires that equitable estoppel be strictly applied1; Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (citing Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1975, no writ)), and the estoppel ―should be certain, precise and clear.‖ Id. (citing McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). ―The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of

2008A. Applicable Law "The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case." Stallman v. Newman , 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin , 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack , No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.). (4) The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for easement by estoppel in Harrison & Co. v. Boring , 44 Tex. 255 (Tex. 1

2008A. Applicable Law “The doctrine of easement by estoppel has not been clearly defined and its application depends upon the unique facts of each case.” Stallman v. Newman, 9 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see Wilson v. McGuffin, 749 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); see also Ross v. Womack, No. 13-04-571-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10656 , at **17-18 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.).4 The Texas Supreme Court first enunciated the rationale for 4 In reviewing secondary authority pertaining to easem ents by estoppel, we

2025See, e.g., Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325–26 (addressing easement by estoppel in case involving use of existing roadway across servient tract by owner of dominant tract); Wallace v. McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding easement by estoppel existed when landlocked tract had been accessed for more than seventy years using road across appellant’s property); Halsell v. Ferguson, 202 S.W. 317, 322 (Tex. 1918) (holding city and property owners, who had platted their land and faced lots upon certain streets and improved them, were estopped to change plat after othe

2025See, e.g., Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325–26 (addressing easement by estoppel in case involving use of existing roadway across servient tract by owner of dominant tract); Wallace v. McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding easement by estoppel existed when landlocked tract had been accessed for more than seventy years using road across appellant’s property); Halsell v. Ferguson, 202 S.W. 317, 322 (Tex. 1918) (holding city and property owners, who had platted their land and faced lots upon certain streets and improved them, were estopped to change plat after othe

2011See Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 209 . 2 In North Clear Lake Development Corp. v. Blackstock, 450 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ.

2011The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by parol requires that equitable estoppel be strictly applied1; Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (citing Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1975, no writ)), and the estoppel ―should be certain, precise and clear.‖ Id. (citing McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). ―The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of

2011The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by parol requires that equitable estoppel be strictly applied1; Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (citing Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1975, no writ)), and the estoppel ―should be certain, precise and clear.‖ Id. (citing McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). ―The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of

2011The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by parol requires that equitable estoppel be strictly applied1; Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (citing Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1975, no writ)), and the estoppel ―should be certain, precise and clear.‖ Id. (citing McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). ―The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient estate may be estopped to deny the existence of

1996Payne v. Edmonson, 712 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).