5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Arnold Sherlock and Ronald Charleygreen2 sentences2008The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U.S. v. *554 Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069, 1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases c 2006The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U. S. v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069,1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases cited | 3 | 3 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Robert W. Lloyd v. Leon J. Vincent, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility,respondent-Appellantgreen2 sentences2008Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272 , 1274—1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. . . . 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) 2006Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272, 1274-1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. [] 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) | 2 | 3 |
State v. Shawgreen2 sentences2008Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272 , 1274—1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. . . . 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) 2006Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272, 1274-1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. [] 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) | 2 | 2 |
People v. Woodwardgreen2 sentences2008Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272 , 1274—1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. . . . 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) 2006Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272, 1274-1275 [temporary exclusion of public did not ‘seriously deprive’ defendant of his public trial right]; State v. Shaw (Tenn.Crim.App. [] 1981) 619 S.W.2d 546, 548 [temporary closure of courtroom doors during closing arguments to avoid interruptions held not violative of public trial guarantee].)” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.) | 2 | 2 |
Brian W. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th 1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th | 1 | 1 |
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginiagreen2 sentences1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th 1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Douglas v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences2008The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U.S. v. *554 Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069, 1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases c 2006The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U. S. v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069,1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases cited | 3 | 1992–2008 |
Clark Davis v. Dan M. Reynolds, Warden and Robert H. Henry, Attorney General
green
2 sentences2008The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U.S. v. *554 Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069, 1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases c 2006The federal court, rejecting the defendant’s public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only ‘a short time,’ did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and ‘was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation.’ (Ibid.; see also U. S. v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 1069,1076-1077 [applying less exacting ‘substantial reason’ standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases cited | 3 | 1992–2008 |
Clyde Snyder v. Ira M. Coiner, Warden, West Virginia State Penitentiary
green
1 sentence1992The federal court, rejecting the defendant's public trial claim, observed that the closure of the courtroom lasted only "a short time," did not restrict the defendant, his family, witnesses, or even the previously admitted courtroom spectators, and "was entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation." ( Ibid. ; see also U.S. v. Sherlock (9th Cir.1989) 865 F.2d 1069, 1076-1077 [applying less exacting "substantial reason" standard for determining propriety of partial exclusion of public from courtroom]; Davis v. Reynolds (10th Cir.1989) 890 F.2d 1105, 1109-1110 , and cases cited | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rosato v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1980There are a number of instances where the courts have ... upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time." ( Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation's high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: "[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or th 1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Sirhan
green
2 sentences1980There are a number of instances where the courts have ... upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time." ( Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation's high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: "[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or th 1980There are a number of instances where the courts have. . . upheld the exclusion of the public for limited periods of time.” (Id., p. 439 [61 L.Ed.2d p. 659].) Recently (July 2, 1980) the nation’s high court reiterated the rule of the transcendent nature of the right of one criminally accused to a fair trial, in this manner: “[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or th | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo
green
2 sentences1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. 1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Walker v. City of San Gabriel
green
2 sentences1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. 1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners
green
2 sentences1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. 1945(Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858 [ 149 P.2d 397 ] ; Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879 *766 129 P.2d 349 , 142 A.L.R. 1383 ].) In the present proceeding, due process would not require a public hearing or trial unless the accused requested a hearing by filing an answer in which event the ordinance automatically provides for a “public hearing.” (§9.) The right to a public trial or hearing is a right which is personal to the accused. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.