purpose of this general rule in California

2016(Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341, fn. 6 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 726 ].) “It makes no difference that the issue was first raised on appeal by the court rather than the parties, as long as the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to address it.” (Ibid.) The attorney fee issue we are now considering falls within this exception.

2016(Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341, fn. 6 .) "It makes no difference that the issue was first raised on appeal by the court rather than the parties, as long as the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to address it"—which they have, in their supplemental briefs.

2016(See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 ].) However, ‘“[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ] (Woodward Park).) Thus, as an exception to this general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal where

2016(See Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1519 .) However, "[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court." (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 .) As an exception to the general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts are undisputed and could not have been altered by

2016(See Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1519 .) However, "[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court." (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 .) As an exception to the general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts are undisputed and could not have been altered by

2016(See Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1519 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 728 ].) However, “[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ].) *646 As an exception to the general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts

2016(See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 ].) However, ‘“[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ] (Woodward Park).) Thus, as an exception to this general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal where

2016(See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 ].) However, ‘“[i]t is important to remember . . . that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means short of an opposite outcome in the trial court.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 712 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ] (Woodward Park).) Thus, as an exception to this general rule, the appellate court has discretion to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal where

1995Plainly, "[i]n enacting section 664.6, had the Legislature intended `parties' to have a meaning other than this commonly understood meaning, it could and would have provided so in the statute." ( Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at p. 234, citing People v. Rodriguez (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 207, 213 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 563 ].) The majority purports to draw upon "the circumstances preceding and surrounding the enactment of section 664.6." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 584.) The only "circumstance" the majority cites, however, is the existence in 1981 of "conflicting views concerning the p

1995Plainly, "[i]n enacting section 664.6, had the Legislature intended `parties' to have a meaning other than this commonly understood meaning, it could and would have provided so in the statute." ( Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at p. 234, citing People v. Rodriguez (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 207, 213 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 563 ].) The majority purports to draw upon "the circumstances preceding and surrounding the enactment of section 664.6." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 584.) The only "circumstance" the majority cites, however, is the existence in 1981 of "conflicting views concerning the p

1995Plainly, "[i]n enacting section 664.6, had the Legislature intended `parties' to have a meaning other than this commonly understood meaning, it could and would have provided so in the statute." ( Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at p. 234, citing People v. Rodriguez (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 207, 213 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 563 ].) The majority purports to draw upon "the circumstances preceding and surrounding the enactment of section 664.6." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 584.) The only "circumstance" the majority cites, however, is the existence in 1981 of "conflicting views concerning the p

1995Instead, the majority purports to examine "the statutory context in which ["parties"] is used." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 583.) Yet section 664.6's statutory context actually supports the broader construction of "parties" I favor, not the majority's construction. *591 The general signature requirement for court papers in California is that "[e]very pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name...." (§ 128.7, subd. (a).) For the purpose of this general requirement, only "if the party is not

1995Instead, the majority purports to examine "the statutory context in which ["parties"] is used." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 583.) Yet section 664.6's statutory context actually supports the broader construction of "parties" I favor, not the majority's construction. *591 The general signature requirement for court papers in California is that "[e]very pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name...." (§ 128.7, subd. (a).) For the purpose of this general requirement, only "if the party is not