remedy for any error in California

2021(Frye, at p. 147; Alvernaz, at pp. 940–941.) The remedy for any such violation “should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered … and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’ ” (Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 170 (Lafler); accord, Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 942 .) When a Sixth Amendment violation causes a defendant to reject the offer of a plea bargain and the defendant is later convicted on more serious charges, “[t]he correct remedy … is to order the [People] to reoffer the plea agreement.”14 (Lafler, at p. 174.) The trial court then must exercise its discretion to

2021(Frye, at p. 147; Alvernaz, at pp. 940–941.) The remedy for any such violation “should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered … and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’ ” (Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 170 (Lafler); accord, Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 942 .) When a Sixth Amendment violation causes a defendant to reject the offer of a plea bargain and the defendant is later convicted on more serious charges, “[t]he correct remedy … is to order the [People] to reoffer the plea agreement.”14 (Lafler, at p. 174.) The trial court then must exercise its discretion to

2021(Frye, at p. 147; Alvernaz, at pp. 940–941.) The remedy for any such violation “should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered … and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’ ” (Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 170 (Lafler); accord, Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 942 .) When a Sixth Amendment violation causes a defendant to reject the offer of a plea bargain and the defendant is later convicted on more serious charges, “[t]he correct remedy … is to order the [People] to reoffer the plea agreement.”14 (Lafler, at p. 174.) The trial court then must exercise its discretion to

2020(See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 916 [“exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates”]; see also Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [“Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse”].) As such, we deny this claim. e. Defendant’s Right to Confrontation On May 11, 2011, with one remaining witness left to testify at the guilt phase, the prosecution informed the trial court that they would not be calling Smith to the stand.

2020(See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 916 [“exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates”]; see also Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [“Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse”].) As such, we deny this claim. e. Defendant’s Right to Confrontation On May 11, 2011, with one remaining witness left to testify at the guilt phase, the prosecution informed the trial court that they would not be calling Smith to the stand.

1989(Lewis v. Grunberg (1928) 205 Cal. 158, 162 [ 270 P. 181 ]; Baker v. Baker (1858) 10 Cal. 527 ; Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 353, 362; Grayson v. Guild et at (1854) 4 Cal. 122, 125 ; Sloan v. Smith (1853) 3 Cal. 406, 407 ; see also In re Riccardi (1926) 80 Cal.App. 66, 72 [ 251 P. 650 ]; and 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 51, p. 365.) This approach by the court was based on the language of section 638, subdivision 1, providing that in the usual case, a referee’s duty is to try the issue “and to report a statement of decision thereon.” Daverkosen v. Kelley, supra,

1989(Lewis v. Grunberg (1928) 205 Cal. 158, 162 [ 270 P. 181 ]; Baker v. Baker (1858) 10 Cal. 527 ; Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 353, 362; Grayson v. Guild et at (1854) 4 Cal. 122, 125 ; Sloan v. Smith (1853) 3 Cal. 406, 407 ; see also In re Riccardi (1926) 80 Cal.App. 66, 72 [ 251 P. 650 ]; and 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 51, p. 365.) This approach by the court was based on the language of section 638, subdivision 1, providing that in the usual case, a referee’s duty is to try the issue “and to report a statement of decision thereon.” Daverkosen v. Kelley, supra,

1989(Lewis v. Grunberg (1928) 205 Cal. 158, 162 [ 270 P. 181 ]; Baker v. Baker (1858) 10 Cal. 527 ; Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 353, 362; Grayson v. Guild et at (1854) 4 Cal. 122, 125 ; Sloan v. Smith (1853) 3 Cal. 406, 407 ; see also In re Riccardi (1926) 80 Cal.App. 66, 72 [ 251 P. 650 ]; and 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 51, p. 365.) This approach by the court was based on the language of section 638, subdivision 1, providing that in the usual case, a referee’s duty is to try the issue “and to report a statement of decision thereon.” Daverkosen v. Kelley, supra,

1989(Lewis v. Grunberg (1928) 205 Cal. 158, 162 [ 270 P. 181 ]; Baker v. Baker (1858) 10 Cal. 527 ; Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 353, 362; Grayson v. Guild et at (1854) 4 Cal. 122, 125 ; Sloan v. Smith (1853) 3 Cal. 406, 407 ; see also In re Riccardi (1926) 80 Cal.App. 66, 72 [ 251 P. 650 ]; and 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 51, p. 365.) This approach by the court was based on the language of section 638, subdivision 1, providing that in the usual case, a referee’s duty is to try the issue “and to report a statement of decision thereon.” Daverkosen v. Kelley, supra,

1989(Lewis v. Grunberg (1928) 205 Cal. 158, 162 [ 270 P. 181 ]; Baker v. Baker (1858) 10 Cal. 527 ; Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 353, 362; Grayson v. Guild et at (1854) 4 Cal. 122, 125 ; Sloan v. Smith (1853) 3 Cal. 406, 407 ; see also In re Riccardi (1926) 80 Cal.App. 66, 72 [ 251 P. 650 ]; and 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 51, p. 365.) This approach by the court was based on the language of section 638, subdivision 1, providing that in the usual case, a referee’s duty is to try the issue “and to report a statement of decision thereon.” Daverkosen v. Kelley, supra,

1965As we said in answer to a similar contention in People v. 2,624 Thirty-Pound Cans of Frozen Eggs (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 427 ]: “The public interest involved cannot be defeated by the inaction of the [public] employees.’’ VI Appellant argues that the Attorney General is without power to institute the present action, contending that the sole remedy for any violation is the action for treble damages given to a victim by section 1812.94 of the Civil Code and the protection against collection implied by the fact that a violative contract is made void by section 1812.92.

1965As we said in answer to a similar contention in People v. 2,624 Thirty-Pound Cans of Frozen Eggs (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 427 ]: “The public interest involved cannot be defeated by the inaction of the [public] employees.’’ VI Appellant argues that the Attorney General is without power to institute the present action, contending that the sole remedy for any violation is the action for treble damages given to a victim by section 1812.94 of the Civil Code and the protection against collection implied by the fact that a violative contract is made void by section 1812.92.