5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1943–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vigilgreen1 sentence2026(Ngo, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 35 .) The suspension did not “create[ ] a presumption of incompetence or deprive[ ] defendant of his right to the ‘fully licensed attorney’ contemplated by article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 35; Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 696–702.) Rather, “the attorney’s resignation from the bar with charges 14 pending resulted in the effective relinquishment of his license to practice law,” and that “relinquishment denied the defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.” (Ngo, at p. 35; Johnson, at p. 702 [“while [defense couns | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Butler Metropolitan Housing Authoritygreen1 sentence2017(See Jones v. Butler Metropolitan Housing Authority (6th Cir. 2002) 40 Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Fiddymentgreen2 sentences1972(Cf. Estate of Fiddyment (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 72, 77 [ 168 P.2d 61 ].) *624 In Estate of Robinson (1924) 65 Cal.App. 588 [ 224 P. 765 ], the daughter of the decedent waived her right to appointment as administratrix and requested the court to appoint one Thomason, a nonrelative, as administrator with the will annexed. 1972(Cf. Estate of Fiddyment (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 72, 77 [ 168 P.2d 61 ].) *624 In Estate of Robinson (1924) 65 Cal.App. 588 [ 224 P. 765 ], the daughter of the decedent waived her right to appointment as administratrix and requested the court to appoint one Thomason, a nonrelative, as administrator with the will annexed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ngo
green
1 sentence2026(Ngo, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 35 .) The suspension did not “create[ ] a presumption of incompetence or deprive[ ] defendant of his right to the ‘fully licensed attorney’ contemplated by article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 35; Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 696–702.) Rather, “the attorney’s resignation from the bar with charges 14 pending resulted in the effective relinquishment of his license to practice law,” and that “relinquishment denied the defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.” (Ngo, at p. 35; Johnson, at p. 702 [“while [defense couns | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024(Id. at p. 615.) The main issue in Schachter was whether the employee’s unvested shares constituted “earned wages” making their forfeiture following the employee’s resignation a violation of Labor Code sections 201 and 202. ( Schachter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 618–619.) As a threshold matter, our Supreme Court stated that incentive compensation including restricted stock constituted wages—which the employer did not dispute. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Estate of Robinson
neutral
2 sentences1972(Cf. Estate of Fiddyment (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 72, 77 [ 168 P.2d 61 ].) *624 In Estate of Robinson (1924) 65 Cal.App. 588 [ 224 P. 765 ], the daughter of the decedent waived her right to appointment as administratrix and requested the court to appoint one Thomason, a nonrelative, as administrator with the will annexed. 1972(Cf. Estate of Fiddyment (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 72, 77 [ 168 P.2d 61 ].) *624 In Estate of Robinson (1924) 65 Cal.App. 588 [ 224 P. 765 ], the daughter of the decedent waived her right to appointment as administratrix and requested the court to appoint one Thomason, a nonrelative, as administrator with the will annexed. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Aggeler v. Dominguez
green
2 sentences1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former 1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Goldsmith v. Board of Education of Sacramento City High School District
green
2 sentences1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former 1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Spier v. Peck
green
2 sentences1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former 1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Reuter v. Bd. of Supervisors of San Mateo
green
2 sentences1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former 1943Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words "if he be removed", whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, "or in case of," indicating an intention to separate the two ideas. [3] Moreover it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.