5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–1990 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Keeler v. Superior Courtred2 sentences1990However, there are no common law crimes in California. (§ 6.) “This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.” (Keeler v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 631 .) It would be a manifest exercise of the forbidden power for the judiciary to expand the Penal Code by creating a novel meaning which extends the statute to cases outside the ambit of the applications fixed by its 1988“Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that ‘No act or omission’ accomplished after the code has taken effect ‘is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . .’ This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is v | 3 | 4 |
People v. Hessgreen2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 2 | 2 |
People v. Knowlesgreen2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 2 | 2 |
Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co.green2 sentences1983(People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 217 P.2d 1 ]; Harbor Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co. (1891) 88 Cal. 491, 493 [ 26 P. 375 ]; People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 685 [ 234 P.2d 65 ]; In re Finley (1905) 1 Cal.App. 198, 201 [ 81 P. 1041 ].)” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 , 470 P.2d 617 , 40 A.L.R.3d 420 ].) Section 459 explicitly provides that the mental state necessary to commit the crime of burglary is the specific intent “to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (See People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 477, 481 [ 147 Cal.Rp 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 2 | 2 |
In Re Finleygreen2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 2 | 2 |
People v. Apodacagreen2 sentences1988“Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that ‘No act or omission’ accomplished after the code has taken effect ‘is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . .’ This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is v 1988“Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that ‘No act or omission’ accomplished after the code has taken effect ‘is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . .’ This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is v | 1 | 1 |
People v. Markusgreen2 sentences1983(People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 217 P.2d 1 ]; Harbor Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co. (1891) 88 Cal. 491, 493 [ 26 P. 375 ]; People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 685 [ 234 P.2d 65 ]; In re Finley (1905) 1 Cal.App. 198, 201 [ 81 P. 1041 ].)” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 , 470 P.2d 617 , 40 A.L.R.3d 420 ].) Section 459 explicitly provides that the mental state necessary to commit the crime of burglary is the specific intent “to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (See People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 477, 481 [ 147 Cal.Rp 1983(People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 217 P.2d 1 ]; Harbor Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co. (1891) 88 Cal. 491, 493 [ 26 P. 375 ]; People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 685 [ 234 P.2d 65 ]; In re Finley (1905) 1 Cal.App. 198, 201 [ 81 P. 1041 ].)” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 , 470 P.2d 617 , 40 A.L.R.3d 420 ].) Section 459 explicitly provides that the mental state necessary to commit the crime of burglary is the specific intent “to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (See People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 477, 481 [ 147 Cal.Rp | 1 | 1 |
Trop v. Dullesgreen2 sentences1981Stewart, J.) It is the Legislature which has the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime. ( People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [ 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 , 493 P.2d 880 ].) Admittedly, the sole function of the judiciary is to examine legislative acts *163 in light of constitutional limitations to assure that the punishment imposed is exercised within the limits of civilized standards ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 , 78 S.Ct. 590 ]) for to do otherwise would allow the Legislature to be the sole judge of the perm 1981Stewart, J.) It is the Legislature which has the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime. ( People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [ 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 , 493 P.2d 880 ].) Admittedly, the sole function of the judiciary is to examine legislative acts *163 in light of constitutional limitations to assure that the punishment imposed is exercised within the limits of civilized standards ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 , 78 S.Ct. 590 ]) for to do otherwise would allow the Legislature to be the sole judge of the perm | 1 | 1 |
Rummel v. Estellegreen2 sentences1981Penal Code section 6 provides in part: “No act or omission [occurring after the code has taken effect] is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation .... ” “This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively 1981Penal Code section 6 provides in part: “No act or omission [occurring after the code has taken effect] is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation .... ” “This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Horton v. Gallardo
neutral
2 sentences1983(People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 217 P.2d 1 ]; Harbor Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co. (1891) 88 Cal. 491, 493 [ 26 P. 375 ]; People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 685 [ 234 P.2d 65 ]; In re Finley (1905) 1 Cal.App. 198, 201 [ 81 P. 1041 ].)” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 , 470 P.2d 617 , 40 A.L.R.3d 420 ].) Section 459 explicitly provides that the mental state necessary to commit the crime of burglary is the specific intent “to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (See People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 477, 481 [ 147 Cal.Rp 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 2 | 1970–1983 |
People v. Anderson
red
2 sentences1981Stewart, J.) It is the Legislature which has the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime. ( People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [ 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 , 493 P.2d 880 ].) Admittedly, the sole function of the judiciary is to examine legislative acts *163 in light of constitutional limitations to assure that the punishment imposed is exercised within the limits of civilized standards ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 , 78 S.Ct. 590 ]) for to do otherwise would allow the Legislature to be the sole judge of the perm 1981Stewart, J.) It is the Legislature which has the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime. ( People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [ 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 , 493 P.2d 880 ].) Admittedly, the sole function of the judiciary is to examine legislative acts *163 in light of constitutional limitations to assure that the punishment imposed is exercised within the limits of civilized standards ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 , 78 S.Ct. 590 ]) for to do otherwise would allow the Legislature to be the sole judge of the perm | 1 | 1981–1981 |
DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists
green
2 sentences1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o 1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Baker
green
2 sentences1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o 1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Harder v. Lucot
green
2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Redmond
green
2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ex parte McNulty
green
2 sentences1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o 1970Code, § 4), it is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings. ( People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44 , 50 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 595 , 442 P.2d 675 ].) Penal statutes will not be made to reach beyond their plain intent; they include only those offenses coming clearly within the import of their language. ( De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139 , 156 [ 187 P.2d 769 , 175 A.L.R. 382 ].) Indeed, "Constructive crimes — crimes built up by courts with the aid o | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Whipple
green
2 sentences1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i 1970Penal Code section 6 declares in relevant part that "No act or omission" accomplished after the code has taken effect "is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation. . . ." (9) This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.