extent that the defendants claim in Connecticut

2025The defendants quote Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 326 , 885 A.2d 734 (2005), for the proposition that, ‘‘[a]lthough it is well established that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree . . . it is equally well established that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In a single sentence, the defendants assert that, ‘‘[i]f there is a case where the interest rate is unconscionable and against public policy, this is it.’’ Their brief is devoid of any argument or analy

2025The defendants quote Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 326 , 885 A.2d 734 (2005), for the proposition that, ‘‘[a]lthough it is well established that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree . . . it is equally well established that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In a single sentence, the defendants assert that, ‘‘[i]f there is a case where the interest rate is unconscionable and against public policy, this is it.’’ Their brief is devoid of any argument or analy

2025See 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking, 229 Conn. App. 664 , 704–705, 328 A.3d 681 (2024) (‘‘[w]here a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 906 , 330 A.3d 132 (2025); Lafferty v. Jones, 229 Conn. App. 487, 493 , 327 A.3d 941 (2024) (‘‘we deem claims on appeal to be abandoned if they are inadequately briefed’’), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 923 , 333 A.3d 105 (2025), and ce

2012There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule, including “when the [employer] retains control of the premises or supervises the [independent contractor’s] work, when the work is inherently dangerous, or when the [employer] has a nondelegable duty to take safety precautions imposed by statute or regulation.” Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 528 , 825 A.2d 72 (2003).

2012There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule, including “when the [employer] retains control of the premises or supervises the [independent contractor’s] work, when the work is inherently dangerous, or when the [employer] has a nondelegable duty to take safety precautions imposed by statute or regulation.” Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 528 , 825 A.2d 72 (2003).

2012To the extent that the defendants challenge the court’s underlying factual findings that support its legal conclusion of vicarious liability, we consider whether such factual findings are clearly erroneous. “[U]nder the general rule, an employer is not hable for the negligence of its independent contractors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Machado v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 364, 371 , 972 A.2d 724 (2009).

2012To the extent that the defendants challenge the court’s underlying factual findings that support its legal conclusion of vicarious liability, we consider whether such factual findings are clearly erroneous. “[U]nder the general rule, an employer is not hable for the negligence of its independent contractors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Machado v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 364, 371 , 972 A.2d 724 (2009).

2009Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579 , 586 n. 9, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993). [39] To the extent that the defendants claim that the trial court acted improperly by concluding that the clergyman's privilege under ง 52-146b had been waived because the privilege belonged to individuals other than the defendants who had not expressly waived their privilege, we disagree.

2009Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579 , 586 n. 9, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993). [39] To the extent that the defendants claim that the trial court acted improperly by concluding that the clergyman's privilege under ง 52-146b had been waived because the privilege belonged to individuals other than the defendants who had not expressly waived their privilege, we disagree.