5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. DARRYL W.green2 sentences2012See, e.g., State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 367-68 , 33 A.3d 239 (2012). 2012See, e.g., State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 367-68 , 33 A.3d 239 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Terwilliger
green
2 sentences2009If not, were the court’s instructions on this defense inadequate?” State v. Terwilliger, 286 Conn. 902 , 943 A.2d 1103 (2008). 2009If not, were the court’s instructions on this defense inadequate?” State v. Terwilliger, 286 Conn. 902 , 943 A.2d 1103 (2008). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Tinsley
green
2 sentences1999The state argues that “the defendant’s claim is in the nature of an exception or an exemption, and the trial court correctly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” In support of this argument, the state contends that “[i]t is the general rule that where exceptions to a prohibition in a criminal statute are situated separately from the enacting clause, the exceptions are to be proven by the defense.” State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 402 , 435 A.2d 1002 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 , 101 S. Ct. 874 , 66 L. 1999The state argues that “the defendant’s claim is in the nature of an exception or an exemption, and the trial court correctly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” In support of this argument, the state contends that “[i]t is the general rule that where exceptions to a prohibition in a criminal statute are situated separately from the enacting clause, the exceptions are to be proven by the defense.” State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 402 , 435 A.2d 1002 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 , 101 S. Ct. 874 , 66 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Tinsley v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1999The state argues that “the defendant’s claim is in the nature of an exception or an exemption, and the trial court correctly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” In support of this argument, the state contends that “[i]t is the general rule that where exceptions to a prohibition in a criminal statute are situated separately from the enacting clause, the exceptions are to be proven by the defense.” State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 402 , 435 A.2d 1002 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 , 101 S. Ct. 874 , 66 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Walker v. Lockhart
green
1 sentence1999The state argues that “the defendant’s claim is in the nature of an exception or an exemption, and the trial court correctly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” In support of this argument, the state contends that “[i]t is the general rule that where exceptions to a prohibition in a criminal statute are situated separately from the enacting clause, the exceptions are to be proven by the defense.” State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 402 , 435 A.2d 1002 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 , 101 S. Ct. 874 , 66 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wilks v. Israel
green
1 sentence1999The state argues that “the defendant’s claim is in the nature of an exception or an exemption, and the trial court correctly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” In support of this argument, the state contends that “[i]t is the general rule that where exceptions to a prohibition in a criminal statute are situated separately from the enacting clause, the exceptions are to be proven by the defense.” State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 402 , 435 A.2d 1002 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 , 101 S. Ct. 874 , 66 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Cohane
green
2 sentences1990In the present case, “the evidence against the accused is so overwhelming that we can conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by the absence of a [Whelan] instruction”; State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 485 , 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S. Ct. 397 , 83 L. 1990In the present case, “the evidence against the accused is so overwhelming that we can conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by the absence of a [Whelan] instruction”; State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 485 , 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S. Ct. 397 , 83 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
James v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1990In the present case, “the evidence against the accused is so overwhelming that we can conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by the absence of a [Whelan] instruction”; State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 485 , 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S. Ct. 397 , 83 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Shavers v. Walter E. Heller & Co.
green
1 sentence1990In the present case, “the evidence against the accused is so overwhelming that we can conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by the absence of a [Whelan] instruction”; State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 485 , 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S. Ct. 397 , 83 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Thigpen v. Reddix
green
1 sentence1990In the present case, “the evidence against the accused is so overwhelming that we can conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by the absence of a [Whelan] instruction”; State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 485 , 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S. Ct. 397 , 83 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Miles v. United States
green
2 sentences1983Where the defendant’s contention is that the instructions on this standard diluted or impaired the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that contention must be examined “with the greatest care and concern.” United States v. Pine, supra. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court said: “Attempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.” Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 , 26 L. 1983Where the defendant’s contention is that the instructions on this standard diluted or impaired the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that contention must be examined “with the greatest care and concern.” United States v. Pine, supra. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court said: “Attempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.” Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 , 26 L. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Pine, Frank, III
green
1 sentence1983Where the defendant’s contention is that the instructions on this standard diluted or impaired the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that contention must be examined “with the greatest care and concern.” United States v. Pine, supra. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court said: “Attempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.” Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 , 26 L. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.