ante litem notice requirement in Georgia

2012While it is certainly true, as Walker claims, that this Court in Savage noted that the purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is to “ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit,” we went on to explain, in the very next sentence, that the GTCA “requires strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement” and that “substantial compliance is inadequate under the Act.” Savage, 295 Ga. App. at 323 (3) (punctuation omitted); see also Williams, 272 Ga. at 625-26 (noting the need for compliance with the plain meaning o

2012Thus, because Walker failed to strictly comply with the ante-litem-notice provisions of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2), the trial court erred by denying the DOC’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.21 “ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of the lawsuit,” we went on to explain, in the very next sentence, that the GTCA “requires strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement” and that “substantial compliance is inadequate under the Act.” Savage, 295 Ga. App. at 323 (3) (punctuation omitted)

2025In Ragsdale, this Court concluded that “[a]s the ante litem notice requirement of [the Georgia Tort Claims Act,] OCGA § 50-21-26[,] is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.” 308 Ga. at 213.

2025Because we have held in Maxwell, 264 Ga. at 636, that OCGA § 36-33-5 is not a statute of limitations but rather a condition precedent to bringing an action, it follows that OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) does not apply to toll the time in which a minor must provide an ante 11 litem notice to a municipality. 8 See Ragsdale, 308 Ga. at 213 (“As the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.”).

2022Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 845 ( 764 SE2d 543 ) (2014). 6 Id. 7 Cummings v. Ga. Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 282 Ga. 822, 824 ( 653 SE2d 729 ) (2007). 5 (a) No person, firm, or corporation having a tort claim against the state under this article shall bring any action against the state upon such claim without first giving notice of the claim as follows: (1) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered. . . . (2) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing and shall be mailed by certified mail or statutory

2022Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 845 ( 764 SE2d 543 ) (2014). 6 Id. 7 Cummings v. Ga. Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 282 Ga. 822, 824 ( 653 SE2d 729 ) (2007). 5 (a) No person, firm, or corporation having a tort claim against the state under this article shall bring any action against the state upon such claim without first giving notice of the claim as follows: (1) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered. . . . (2) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing and shall be mailed by certified mail or statutory

2019Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 844-845 ( 764 SE2d 543 ) (2014). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 845-846 . 6 Id. 5 Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that a notice that “did not state any amount of loss whatsoever,” even in the face of ongoing medical treatment, “failed entirely to comply” with the GTCA’s ante litem notice requirement.7 In so ruling, the Supreme Court explained that the GTCA does not require that a claimant give notice of the “entire loss,” the “complete loss,” or the “total loss.” Instead, the plain language requires notice of the amount of the loss claimed at that time, withi

2019Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 844-845 ( 764 SE2d 543 ) (2014). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 845-846 . 6 Id. 5 Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that a notice that “did not state any amount of loss whatsoever,” even in the face of ongoing medical treatment, “failed entirely to comply” with the GTCA’s ante litem notice requirement.7 In so ruling, the Supreme Court explained that the GTCA does not require that a claimant give notice of the “entire loss,” the “complete loss,” or the “total loss.” Instead, the plain language requires notice of the amount of the loss claimed at that time, withi

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025Because we have held in Maxwell, 264 Ga. at 636, that OCGA § 36-33-5 is not a statute of limitations but rather a condition precedent to bringing an action, it follows that OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) does not apply to toll the time in which a minor must provide an ante 11 litem notice to a municipality. 8 See Ragsdale, 308 Ga. at 213 (“As the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.”).

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2020Strict compliance does not “take precedence over the plain language or meaning 13 Id. at 638 (1). 14 See Manzanares, 352 Ga. App. at 294, 297 (1). 15 See Pickens, 352 Ga. App. at 38, 44 (1). 16 See OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). 17 See Pickens, 352 Ga. App. at 40 (“[W]e must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 18 See id. (“[T]he purpose of the ante litem notice requirement is to give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”) (citation and punct

2019See also Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. King, 341 Ga. App. 102, 105-106 ( 798 SE2d 492 ) (2017); Silva v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 337 Ga. App. 116, 117 (2) ( 787 SE2d 247 ) (2016) (addressing retroactive application of Myers). 12 See, e.g., Columbus Consolidated Govt. v. Woody, 342 Ga. App. 233, 234 ( 802 SE2d 717 ) (2017) (“Under Georgia law, sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability, and therefore, whether a governmental defendant has waived its sovereign immunity is a threshold issue.”) (punctuation omitted).

2019But the parents cite no law to support this conclusion, and essentially the same argument has been rejected by this Court because absent some statutory waiver, “[t]he state may not waive or be estopped from invoking statutory notice requirements.”16 15 See DeFloria v. Walker, 317 Ga. App. 578, 583 ( 732 SE2d 121 ) (2012) (failure to deliver proper notice to the governmental entity alleged to be at fault demonstrated lack of strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement). 16 Silva, 337 Ga. App. at 119 (4). 9 For these reasons, based on the defective ante litem notice, the trial court

2017Part of the context of the ante litem notice requirement is that “[i]f a claimant does not meet the ante litem notice requirements, then the state does not waive sovereign immunity, and therefore, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Silva v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 337 Ga. App. 116, 117 (2) ( 787 SE2d 247 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation 4 omitted).

2017Our recent decision in West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743 ( 797 SE2d 809 ) (2017), however, construed the ante litem notice requirement in OCGA § 36-33-5 as limited to negligence cases brought against municipalities and specifically overruled Brown low v. City of Calhoun, 198 Ga.App. 710 (402 SE2d788) (1991), in which the Court of Appeals held that ante litem notice was required for a claim of inverse condemnation.

2017Our recent decision in West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743 ( 797 SE2d 809 ) (2017), however, construed the ante litem notice requirement in OCGA § 36-33-5 as limited to negligence cases brought against municipalities and specifically overruled Brown low v. City of Calhoun, 198 Ga.App. 710 (402 SE2d788) (1991), in which the Court of Appeals held that ante litem notice was required for a claim of inverse condemnation.

2012While it is certainly true, as Walker claims, that this Court in Savage noted that the purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is to “ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit,” we went on to explain, in the very next sentence, that the GTCA “requires strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement” and that “substantial compliance is inadequate under the Act.” Savage, 295 Ga. App. at 323 (3) (punctuation omitted); see also Williams, 272 Ga. at 625-26 (noting the need for compliance with the plain meaning o

2012Thus, because Walker failed to strictly comply with the ante-litem-notice provisions of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2), the trial court erred by denying the DOC’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.21 “ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of the lawsuit,” we went on to explain, in the very next sentence, that the GTCA “requires strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement” and that “substantial compliance is inadequate under the Act.” Savage, 295 Ga. App. at 323 (3) (punctuation omitted)

2005“Substantial compliance with the ante litem notice requirement is inadequate under the Act. [Cits.]” Grant v. Faircloth, 252 Ga. App. 795 ( 556 SE2d 928 ) (2001); accord Williams v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 624 ( 532 SE2d 401 ) (2000); Clark v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 250 Ga. App. 448 ( 552 SE2d 445 ) (2001); McGee v. State of Ga., 227 Ga. App. 107, 108-109 (1) ( 487 SE2d 671 ) (1997).

2005“Substantial compliance with the ante litem notice requirement is inadequate under the Act. [Cits.]” Grant v. Faircloth, 252 Ga. App. 795 ( 556 SE2d 928 ) (2001); accord Williams v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 624 ( 532 SE2d 401 ) (2000); Clark v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 250 Ga. App. 448 ( 552 SE2d 445 ) (2001); McGee v. State of Ga., 227 Ga. App. 107, 108-109 (1) ( 487 SE2d 671 ) (1997).

2005“Strict compliance with OCGA§ 50-21-26 (a) is required. [Cits.]” Aim, supra, 235 Ga. App. at 481 (2).

2002“Strict compliance with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) is required. [Cits.]” Kim, supra, 235 Ga. App. at 481 (2).

2019Black in holding that "the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-33-5 is not applicable to suits for breach of contract" and reversing grant of summary judgment to city based on plaintiff's failure to provide ante litem notice); Benator , 310 Ga. App. at 601 , 714 S.E.2d 109 (quoting Neely 's holding that "the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-33-5 is not applicable to suits for breach of contract" and affirming denial of city's motion to dismiss for failure to provide ante litem notice). 7 Moreover, it does not appear that English common law treated the definition of "property"

2019Black in holding that "the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-33-5 is not applicable to suits for breach of contract" and reversing grant of summary judgment to city based on plaintiff's failure to provide ante litem notice); Benator , 310 Ga. App. at 601 , 714 S.E.2d 109 (quoting Neely 's holding that "the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-33-5 is not applicable to suits for breach of contract" and affirming denial of city's motion to dismiss for failure to provide ante litem notice). 7 Moreover, it does not appear that English common law treated the definition of "property"

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 868 (2) ( 789 SE2d 236 ) (2016); see Equity Trust Co. v. Jones, 339 Ga. App. 11, 14 ( 792 SE2d 458 ) (2016) (explaining that matters in abatement under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) such as a defense claim of improper venue must be determined by the trial court and not a jury).

2025Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 868 (2) ( 789 SE2d 236 ) (2016); see Equity Trust Co. v. Jones, 339 Ga. App. 11, 14 ( 792 SE2d 458 ) (2016) (explaining that matters in abatement under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) such as a defense claim of improper venue must be determined by the trial court and not a jury).

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 )

2025Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 868 (2) ( 789 SE2d 236 ) (2016); see Equity Trust Co. v. Jones, 339 Ga. App. 11, 14 ( 792 SE2d 458 ) (2016) (explaining that matters in abatement under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) such as a defense claim of improper venue must be determined by the trial court and not a jury).

2025Safety, 337 Ga. App. 864, 868 (2) ( 789 SE2d 236 ) (2016); see Equity Trust Co. v. Jones, 339 Ga. App. 11, 14 ( 792 SE2d 458 ) (2016) (explaining that matters in abatement under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) such as a defense claim of improper venue must be determined by the trial court and not a jury).

2025See State v. Wierson, 321 Ga. 597, 600 (2) (a) (___ SE2d ___) (2025) (considering the insanity-defense statutes’ relevant contexts and noting that the General Assembly chose to include explicit exceptions in other adjacent Code sections but did not do so for the insanity-defense statutes).

2024See also Langford v. Dept. of Community Health, 363 Ga. App. 121 , 125 (2) ( 871 SE2d 26 ) (2022) (no compliance with GTCA when plaintiff submitted the notice of claim to DOAS but completely omitted any state agency despite DOAS’s settlement discussions with plaintiff); Callaham v. Ga. Ports Auth., 337 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 786 SE2d 505 ) (2016) (failure to send copy of ante litem notice to the state agency within 12 months despite the agency’s knowledge of the claim was fatal).

2024See also Langford v. Dept. of Community Health, 363 Ga. App. 121 , 125 (2) ( 871 SE2d 26 ) (2022) (no compliance with GTCA when plaintiff submitted the notice of claim to DOAS but completely omitted any state agency despite DOAS’s settlement discussions with plaintiff); Callaham v. Ga. Ports Auth., 337 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 786 SE2d 505 ) (2016) (failure to send copy of ante litem notice to the state agency within 12 months despite the agency’s knowledge of the claim was fatal).

2023See, e.g., Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 336 (2) ( 695 SE2d 576 ) (2010) (holding that, in order to reset the five-year period during an appeal, “an appellate court order must be both signed by the trial court and entered on the trial court’s records”). 11 See Lewis v. Gwinnett County, 367 Ga. App. 241 , 245 & n. 1 ( 885 SE2d 320 ) (2023) (declining to determine whether the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 was a statute of limitation because, under the facts of that case, the filing of the ante litem notice was a deadline in a civil case within the meaning of the emer

2023See, e.g., Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 336 (2) ( 695 SE2d 576 ) (2010) (holding that, in order to reset the five-year period during an appeal, “an appellate court order must be both signed by the trial court and entered on the trial court’s records”). 11 See Lewis v. Gwinnett County, 367 Ga. App. 241 , 245 & n. 1 ( 885 SE2d 320 ) (2023) (declining to determine whether the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 was a statute of limitation because, under the facts of that case, the filing of the ante litem notice was a deadline in a civil case within the meaning of the emer

2023To support this argument, HCWA cites our decision in City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 596-597 (4) ( 552 SE2d 536 ) (2001), which addressed whether the ante litem notice provision for a municipality (requiring notice within six months of the claim) or a county (requiring notice within 2 Although OCGA § 36-92-2 (b) provides that sovereign immunity “is waived only to the extent and in the manner provided in this chapter,” the ante litem notice requirement appears in a separate chapter of Title 36. 5 twelve months of the claim) applied to the plaintiffs’ nuisance action.

2023To support this argument, HCWA cites our decision in City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 596-597 (4) ( 552 SE2d 536 ) (2001), which addressed whether the ante litem notice provision for a municipality (requiring notice within six months of the claim) or a county (requiring notice within 2 Although OCGA § 36-92-2 (b) provides that sovereign immunity “is waived only to the extent and in the manner provided in this chapter,” the ante litem notice requirement appears in a separate chapter of Title 36. 5 twelve months of the claim) applied to the plaintiffs’ nuisance action.

2021See Evans v. City of Covington, 240 Ga. App. 373, 374-375 (2) ( 523 SE2d 594 ) (1999); see also City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 819 (152 8 SE2d 752 ) (1966) (finding that a city council “had no right to waive the requirements of [OCGA § 36-33-5]”). 2.

2021See Evans v. City of Covington, 240 Ga. App. 373, 374-375 (2) ( 523 SE2d 594 ) (1999); see also City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 819 (152 8 SE2d 752 ) (1966) (finding that a city council “had no right to waive the requirements of [OCGA § 36-33-5]”). 2.

2021See Evans v. City of Covington, 240 Ga. App. 373, 374-375 (2) ( 523 SE2d 594 ) (1999); see also City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 819 (152 8 SE2d 752 ) (1966) (finding that a city council “had no right to waive the requirements of [OCGA § 36-33-5]”). 2.

2020See City of Forsyth v. Bell, 258 Ga. App. 331, 332 ( 574 SE2d 331 ) (2002); Nicholas v. Van, 252 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 556 SE2d 497 ) (2001); Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544, 548 (2) ( 533 SE2d 109 ) (2000); Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403, 406 (3) (b) ( 525 SE2d 433 ) (1999). 10 actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code,” within the Code section setting forth its two-year statute of limitation, OCGA § 50-21-27, but not in its ante litem notice provision, OCGA § 50-21-26.

2020See City of Forsyth v. Bell, 258 Ga. App. 331, 332 ( 574 SE2d 331 ) (2002); Nicholas v. Van, 252 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 556 SE2d 497 ) (2001); Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544, 548 (2) ( 533 SE2d 109 ) (2000); Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403, 406 (3) (b) ( 525 SE2d 433 ) (1999). 10 actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code,” within the Code section setting forth its two-year statute of limitation, OCGA § 50-21-27, but not in its ante litem notice provision, OCGA § 50-21-26.