application for a special exception in Maryland

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

1981But, if there is no probative evidence at all of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal. [Montgomery Co. v.] Merlands [Club, 202 Md. 279 , 96 A.2d 261 (1953)]. [Id. at 191.] A more recent case in which we reversed the denial of a special exception by a local board and an affirmance of that denial by the circuit court is Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41 , 310 A.2d 543 (1973).

1981But, if there is no probative evidence at all of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal. [Montgomery Co. v.] Merlands [Club, 202 Md. 279 , 96 A.2d 261 (1953)]. [Id. at 191.] A more recent case in which we reversed the denial of a special exception by a local board and an affirmance of that denial by the circuit court is Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41 , 310 A.2d 543 (1973).

2008In Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md.App. 612, 617 , 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974), Judge Rita Davidson (seven years later to become the author of Schultz ), then writing for the Court of Special Appeals, examined an order of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals denying an application for a special exception to operate a funeral home within a residential zone.

2008In Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md.App. 612, 617 , 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974), Judge Rita Davidson (seven years later to become the author of Schultz ), then writing for the Court of Special Appeals, examined an order of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals denying an application for a special exception to operate a funeral home within a residential zone.

1996Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., supra, 983 F.2d at 1292 (revocation of a use permit, but the court nevertheless held that the landowner had not shown that an assumed property interest in the permit had yet been denied because "the Township has rendered no final decision regarding the revocation of the permit"); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, supra, 961 F.2d at 1214 (plaintiff's application for rezoning of his property was denied); Nasierowski Bros.

1996Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., supra, 983 F.2d at 1292 (revocation of a use permit, but the court nevertheless held that the landowner had not shown that an assumed property interest in the permit had yet been denied because “the Township has rendered no final decision regarding the revocation of the permit”); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, supra, 961 F.2d at 1214 (plaintiff’s application for rezoning of his property was denied); Nasierowski Bros.

1996Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., supra, 983 F.2d at 1292 (revocation of a use permit, but the court nevertheless held that the landowner had not shown that an assumed property interest in the permit had yet been denied because "the Township has rendered no final decision regarding the revocation of the permit"); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, supra, 961 F.2d at 1214 (plaintiff's application for rezoning of his property was denied); Nasierowski Bros.

1996Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., supra, 983 F.2d at 1292 (revocation of a use permit, but the court nevertheless held that the landowner had not shown that an assumed property interest in the permit had yet been denied because “the Township has rendered no final decision regarding the revocation of the permit”); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, supra, 961 F.2d at 1214 (plaintiff’s application for rezoning of his property was denied); Nasierowski Bros.

1996See, e.g., Biser v. Town of Bel Air, supra, 991 F.2d at 102 (denial of an application for a special exception); Taylor Inv.

1996See, e.g., Biser v. Town of Bel Air, supra, 991 F.2d at 102 (denial of an application for a special exception); Taylor Inv.

2008“Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a benefit to the community____But if there is no probative evidence of ... factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d at 1325 .

2008“Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a benefit to the community____But if there is no probative evidence of ... factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d at 1325 .

1971But, if there is no probative evidence at all of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal.” ( 257 Md. at 191 , 262 A. 2d at 504 .) We cited Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. with approval in the recent case of Cason v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 261 Md. 699, 707 , 276 A. 2d 661, 665 (1971). *162 See also Montgomery County Council v. Scrimgeour, 211 Md. 306 , 127 A. 2d 528 (1956); Montgo

1971But, if there is no probative evidence at all of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal.” ( 257 Md. at 191 , 262 A. 2d at 504 .) We cited Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. with approval in the recent case of Cason v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 261 Md. 699, 707 , 276 A. 2d 661, 665 (1971). *162 See also Montgomery County Council v. Scrimgeour, 211 Md. 306 , 127 A. 2d 528 (1956); Montgo

2020App. 694, 698 (1996); see also Gingell, 249 Md. at 375 (noting that one reason for “requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to the courts [is] [] that it is within the expertise of the administrative agency involved to hear and consider the evidence brought before it and make findings as to the propriety of the action requested”); Poe, 241 Md. 307–08 (explaining that “[i]t is particularly within the expertise of an administrative body such as the Board to marshal and sift the evidence presented in a hearing upon an application for a special exception and to make an

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

2008The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal." (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91 , 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not ac

2008As relevant to the case at bar, we quoted the above emphasized language from Schultz as the special exception standard as late as our case of Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 113 , 775 A.2d 1234, 1244 (2001).

2008As relevant to the case at bar, we quoted the above emphasized language from Schultz as the special exception standard as late as our case of Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 113 , 775 A.2d 1234, 1244 (2001).

2002Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d 1319 (citations omitted; emphasis in original); see also Eastern Outdoor II, 307-09, 807 A.2d 49 .

1989See Huff, 214 Md. at 61-62, 133 A.2d 83 . 8 In Rockville , a case which involved an application for a special exception and not a reclassification to a floating zone, the Board of Zoning Appeals rejected the application because, the Board concluded, the proposed use was not in accord with the general welfare.

1989See Huff, 214 Md. at 61-62, 133 A.2d 83 . 8 In Rockville , a case which involved an application for a special exception and not a reclassification to a floating zone, the Board of Zoning Appeals rejected the application because, the Board concluded, the proposed use was not in accord with the general welfare.

1971We had expressly given approval to this practice in Tyrie v. Baltimore County, 215 Md. 135,140-141 , 137 A. 2d 156,158-159 (1957) in which Judge Hammond (now Chief Judge), for the Court, aptly stated: “It is obvious then that as to a particular tract of land the right to the same uses may be obtained, in many instances, either by a reclassification or the granting of a Special Exception.

1971We had expressly given approval to this practice in Tyrie v. Baltimore County, 215 Md. 135,140-141 , 137 A. 2d 156,158-159 (1957) in which Judge Hammond (now Chief Judge), for the Court, aptly stated: “It is obvious then that as to a particular tract of land the right to the same uses may be obtained, in many instances, either by a reclassification or the granting of a Special Exception.