application for a special exception in New York

1998Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028, 1029 ; see also, Matter of Orange & Rockland Utils, v Town Bd., 214 AD2d 573 ; cf., Matter of Roginski v. Rose, 97 AD2d 417 , affd 63 NY2d 735 [business district]).

1986Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028 ; Matter of Gernatt Gravel Prods. v Town of Collins, supra).

2026Judicial review of a determination denying an application for a special exception is limited to ascertaining whether the determination was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion ( see CPLR 7803[3]; Matter of Marcus v Planning Bd. of the Vil. of Wesley Hills , 199 AD3d at 1008 ).

2026Here, the ZBA's determination that the petitioner failed to establish compliance with all of the legislatively imposed conditions for the issuance of the requested special exception had an objective factual basis in the record and was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational ( see Code of Town of Southold § 280-13[B][13]; Matter of 790 Holdings Corp. v Board of Appeals of the Town of Hempstead , 237 AD3d 924 ).

2022With no final determination having been rendered on the application for a special exception permit, that issue was not ripe for judicial review, and the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that issue ( see Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 181 AD3d 681, 686 ; Matter of Cornwall Commons, LLC v Town of Cornwall , 163 AD3d 810 , 813-814; Matter of State of New York v Calhoun , 106 AD3d 1470, 1472-1473 ; Matter of Ragusa v Board of Elections in City of N.Y. , 57 AD3d 807, 807 ).

2022We note that ripeness "is a matter pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction which may be raised at any time, including sua sponte" ( Matter of Agoglia v Benepe , 84 AD3d 1072, 1076 ; see 333 Cherry LLC v Northern Resorts, Inc. , 66 AD3d 1176 , 1178 n 3).

2022With no final determination having been rendered on the application for a special exception permit, that issue was not ripe for judicial review, and the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that issue ( see Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 181 AD3d 681, 686 ; Matter of Cornwall Commons, LLC v Town of Cornwall , 163 AD3d 810 , 813-814; Matter of State of New York v Calhoun , 106 AD3d 1470, 1472-1473 ; Matter of Ragusa v Board of Elections in City of N.Y. , 57 AD3d 807, 807 ).

2022With no final determination having been rendered on the application for a special exception permit, that issue was not ripe for judicial review, and the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that issue ( see Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 181 AD3d 681, 686 ; Matter of Cornwall Commons, LLC v Town of Cornwall , 163 AD3d 810 , 813-814; Matter of State of New York v Calhoun , 106 AD3d 1470, 1472-1473 ; Matter of Ragusa v Board of Elections in City of N.Y. , 57 AD3d 807, 807 ).

1998Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028, 1029 ; see also, Matter of Orange & Rockland Utils, v Town Bd., 214 AD2d 573 ; cf., Matter of Roginski v. Rose, 97 AD2d 417 , affd 63 NY2d 735 [business district]).

1998Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028, 1029 ; see also, Matter of Orange & Rockland Utils, v Town Bd., 214 AD2d 573 ; cf., Matter of Roginski v. Rose, 97 AD2d 417 , affd 63 NY2d 735 [business district]).

1986Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028 ; Matter of Gernatt Gravel Prods. v Town of Collins, supra).

1986Moreover, a basic rule of law with respect to an application for a special exception is that the classification of a particular use as a permitted use in a particular district, subject to the granting of a special exception, constitutes a legislative finding that the use is in harmony with the general zoning plan, and will not adversely affect the neighborhood (see, Matter of Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val., 61 NY2d 892 , supra; Matter of Pleasant Val.

1978Four of the reasons for the board’s decision were based on considerations which would be appropriate in a case in which the board was called upon to exercise its discretion on an application for a special exception use (see Matter of Galvin v Murphy, 11 AD2d 900) but this is not such a case.

1967Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Inc. Vil. of East Hills ( 21 Misc 2d 964, 965 ) the Zoning Ordinance required, on an application for a special exception for a gasoline filling station in a Busi ness “ B ” District, that the applicant file the consents of “ 80% in number of the owners and mortgagees of all property within two hundred (200) feet ” of the plot upon which the proposed station was to be erected.

1961(Matter of Syosset Holding Corp. v. Schlimm, 15 Misc 2d 10 .) This being the case, the application of the petitioner must satisfy the standards provided in section 121 of the Village Ordinances.