error constitutes a blatant violation in Indiana

2025The Court explained: The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).

2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1653 | December 20, 2024 Page 26 of 54 [56] The fundamental error exception to waiver is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).

2021Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Smith claims that the error was fundamental because it brought attention to his absence and violated “his right against self-incrimination without any adverse comment at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. [12] The fundamental error exception is exceedingly narrow and applies only where “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 84

2020“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies defendant fundamental due process.’” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)), reh’g denied.

2025The error claimed must either “make[ ] a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009).

2017Rather, Hutchison argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to order a competency evaluation before finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. 2 “The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). *311 The error claimed must, either “make a fair trial., impossible” , or constitute “clearly blatant viol

2024“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024 Page 23 of 33 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)).

2019Etter argues that admission of this hearsay statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. 2 Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Etter claims that admission of this statement amounted to fundamental error. [17] The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is “extremely narrow” and applies only in egregious circumstances “when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due proce

2025Fundamental error is an “extremely narrow” exception that “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. [22] Rule 404(b) “serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants” and “prevents the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’ that a criminal defendant’s ‘prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.’” Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568 (quoting Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024 , Court of Appeals of I

2020“We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could 5 The “fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

2017This exception is available only in “egregious circumstances.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003).

2016The exception is “available only in egregious circumstances.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003).

2020“The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1312| December 16, 2020 Page 3 of 6 Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002)).

2013The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the “fundamental error” rule is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.2002), reh’g denied.

2017The fundamental error exception “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 . “‘For error to be ‘fundamental,’ prejudice to the defendant is required.’” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003)). [16] Childress contends that the admission of the challenged hearsay evidence constituted fundamental error because the evidence was not substantially trustworthy under Reyes and was “the only evide

2017The fundamental error exception “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 . “‘For error to be ‘fundamental,’ prejudice to the defendant is required.’” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003)). [16] Childress contends that the admission of the challenged hearsay evidence constituted fundamental error because the evidence was not substantially trustworthy under Reyes and was “the only evide

2026Fundamental error is “error so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial is rendered impossible.” The fundamental error rule is extremely narrow, and applies only when “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied).

2018Given this record, we do not find that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [16] Furthermore, even if, as Lugo claims, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, Lugo has failed to establish that the comments placed him “in a position of grave peril to which [he] would not have been subjected otherwise,” nor did the comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which applies “only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendan

2024The appellant “faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [their] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

2013Benson, 762 N.E.2d at 755 . "[This] exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Mathews, 849 N.E.2d at 587 .

2015See Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.”).

2012“The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ).

2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ).

2019The fundamental error doctrine “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Covey v. State, 929 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2018The fundamental error doctrine “applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Covey v. State, 929 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). ‘A finding of fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred ... by not acting when he or she should have....’ Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide

2024The appellant “faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [their] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

2018Given this record, we do not find that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [16] Furthermore, even if, as Lugo claims, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, Lugo has failed to establish that the comments placed him “in a position of grave peril to which [he] would not have been subjected otherwise,” nor did the comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which applies “only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendan

2020Benefield v. State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [10] We conclude that the error was not so fundamental that it rendered a fair trial impossible.

2019Benefield v. State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [26] At the post-conviction hearing, appellate counsel testified that he scrutinized the jury instructions, considered raising the issue of a missing definition, but deemed the issue waived.

2019See R.W. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process”) (citations omitted), trans. denied. [21] We, therefore, reverse and remand to the juvenile court to generate a clear record, specifically with regard to its acceptance or denial of the agreement related to the probation modification.

2018“The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” R.W. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (examining the concept of fundamental error in a delinquency proceeding) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

2017Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 490 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).

2016Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 490 (Ind.2015), cert. denied (2016).

2023“The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id.

2012Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

2023“The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (cleaned up), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2018“The Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-349 | July 16, 2018 Page 14 of 21 fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

2019Fundamental Error [22] Gaines next contends that the State improperly presented, through other witnesses, the drumbeat repetition of GA.G.’s statements prior to her testifying and being subject to cross examination. 2 Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Gaines claims that admission of this evidence amounted to fundamental error. [23] The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is “extremely narrow” and applies only in egregious circumstances “when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is subst

2019Etter argues that admission of this hearsay statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. 2 Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Etter claims that admission of this statement amounted to fundamental error. [17] The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is “extremely narrow” and applies only in egregious circumstances “when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due proce

2018The doctrine applies when “an error was so egregious and abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the error for appeal.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012). [28] Nevertheless, we do not need to decide Parents’ fundamental error allegation.

2017Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). “[A]t bottom, the fundamental-error doctrine asks whether the error was so egregious and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 50A03-1702-CR-363 | October 3, 2017 Page 7 of 16 abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the error for appeal.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012). [15] Dodson maintains that the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides, in r

2020“Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; rather harm is found when error is so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1239 .

2014This exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citation omitted). 10 Conclusion Concluding the search of Mosley’s residence did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment and that any error in the admission of the other evidence challenged by Mosley is harmless, we affirm.

2018Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 992 .

2017Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; rather harm is found when error is so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible. 38 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ind. 2015) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2016“The ‘fundamental error’ rule is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id.

2016In other words, the fundamental error rule requires a defendant “show greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error because no objection has been made.” Id.

2018Thus, he may now obtain relief only by demonstrating fundamental error, see Pattison v. State , 54 N.E.3d 361 , 365 (Ind. 2016), which occurs "when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process," Lewis v. State , 34 N.E.3d 240 , 246 (Ind. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). *433 [17] Patterson briefly argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by using the phrase "not responsible by reason of insanity" in the jury instructions.

2015Lewis v. State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 246 (Ind. 2015). [7] In Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1991), our supreme court held: that an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.

2017(Childress’ Br. at 10) (quoting Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). [17] Here, however, we need not determine if the challenged evidence was substantially trustworthy under Reyes.

2013Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

2015Lewis v. State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 246 (Ind. 2015). [7] In Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1991), our supreme court held: that an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.

2011James’s claim that the jury should have been instructed on specific intent is based on our supreme court’s decision in Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.1991).