offender plea in Georgia

2014See also Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 346 (5) ( 698 SE2d 301 ) (2010) (co-indictee should have been allowed to question informant regarding the basis for his First Offender plea to show potential bias).

2014See also Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 346 (5) ( 698 SE2d 301 ) (2010) (co-indictee should have been allowed to question informant regarding the basis for his First Offender plea to show potential bias).

2013See, e.g., In the Matter of Caroway, 279 Ga. 381 ( 613 SE2d 610 ) (2005) (24-month suspension with conditions upon reinstatement following guilty plea to possession of drugs); In the Matter of Lewis, 282 Ga. 649 ( 651 SE2d 729 ) (2007) (24-month suspension following guilty plea to possession of cocaine); In the Matter of Waldrop, 283 Ga. 80 ( 656 SE2d 529 ) (2008) (24-month suspension following First Offender plea for possession of a controlled substance).

2013See, e.g., In the Matter of Caroway, 279 Ga. 381 ( 613 SE2d 610 ) (2005) (24-month suspension with conditions upon reinstatement following guilty plea to possession of drugs); In the Matter of Lewis, 282 Ga. 649 ( 651 SE2d 729 ) (2007) (24-month suspension following guilty plea to possession of cocaine); In the Matter of Waldrop, 283 Ga. 80 ( 656 SE2d 529 ) (2008) (24-month suspension following First Offender plea for possession of a controlled substance).

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p

2010See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 ( 513 SE2d 212 ) (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace,’ ” which “in no way lengthen[s] the sentence itself” (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 278 Ga. App. 42, 45 ( 628 SE2d 128 ) (2006) (holding that defendants need not be advised of the potential effect of a guilty plea on rights such as “the right to bear arms, obtain a p