offender defense in Ohio

2016“Findings,” for these purposes, means that “‘the [trial] court must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999).

2016“Findings,” for these purposes, means that “‘the [trial] court must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999).

2015Cuyahoga No. 98428, 2013-Ohio-1179, ¶ 11 ; R.C. 2929.41(A). {¶32} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, “and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to defense counsel.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-3177 , 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29 .

2014Cuyahoga No. 98428, 2013-Ohio-1179, ¶ 11 ; R.C. 2929.41(A). {¶32} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, “and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to defense counsel.” State v. Bonnell, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29 .

2015Bonnell requires that the trial court not only make the required findings at the sentencing hearing, so as to “afford[] notice to the offender and to defense counsel,” but also incorporate the findings into the sentencing entry, “because a court speaks through its journal.” Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-3177 , 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29 , citing State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , 863 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 47 .

2015Bonnell requires that the trial court not only make the required findings at the sentencing hearing, so as to “afford[] notice to the offender and to defense counsel,” but also incorporate the findings into the sentencing entry, “because a court speaks through its journal.” Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-3177 , 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29 , citing State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , 863 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 47 .

2013State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 227 N.E.2d 212 , syllabus 1. {¶14} Appellant was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of Pataskala City Ordinance 541.05, which reads: {¶15} "(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following: {¶16} "(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another; {¶17} "(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, the use of which is lawfully restricted to certain persons, purposes, modes, or hours, when the offender knows the offender is in violation of any such restriction or is reckless in that

2013State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 227 N.E.2d 212 , syllabus 1. {¶14} Appellant was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of Pataskala City Ordinance 541.05, which reads: {¶15} "(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following: {¶16} "(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another; {¶17} "(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, the use of which is lawfully restricted to certain persons, purposes, modes, or hours, when the offender knows the offender is in violation of any such restriction or is reckless in that

2000Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co. (1981), 4 Ohio App.3d 164 , 168 , 446 N.E.2d 1122 .

2000Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co. (1981), 4 Ohio App.3d 164 , 168 , 446 N.E.2d 1122 .

2026R.C. 2941.1410(A) and (B). 2 As State v. Gill, 2024-Ohio-2792 (1st Dist.) observed in footnote 2, this appears to be a typo in the statute.

2026And because a court speaks through its journal entries, “the court should also incorporate its statutory findings into the sentencing entry.” Id., citing State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533 , ¶ 47. {¶10} Importantly, the court does not need to state reasons for the findings, the findings alone are sufficient.

2024Muskingum No. CT2018-0012, 2018-Ohio-2877, ¶ 79 .” State v. Brock, 4th Dist.

2024In addition to these two findings, the trial court must also find one of the following: (a) the defendant committed a criminal offense while awaiting trial or sentencing (b) the "harm caused by. . . [the] offenses . . . committed [were] so great or unusual that no single prison term . . . adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct" and (c) the defendant's criminal history makes consecutive sentences "necessary to protect the public . . ." Id. at (C)(4)(a)-(c). {¶ 15} "When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required findings as part of the sentencin

2024So, it does not, by its terms, deprive an offender of ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard * * * at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455 at 459 , 668 N.E.2d 457 .” Id. at ¶ 39. {¶68} Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hacker, which we are bound to follow, we overrule Newcomb’s arguments that the ACT violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, his right to a jury trial, and his right to due process. {¶69} Newcomb additionally argues that the Act violates his right against double jeopardy claiming he is being punished twice for the same offense

2024So, it does not, by its terms, deprive an offender of ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard * * * at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455 at 459 , 668 N.E.2d 457 .” Id. at ¶ 39. {¶68} Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hacker, which we are bound to follow, we overrule Newcomb’s arguments that the ACT violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, his right to a jury trial, and his right to due process. {¶69} Newcomb additionally argues that the Act violates his right against double jeopardy claiming he is being punished twice for the same offense

2023Greene No. 2021-CA-16, 2022-Ohio-490, ¶ 53 .

2022“A court that is ascertaining the meaning of a statute first must ‘consider the “plain meaning of the statutory language.” ’ ” State v. Simmons, 2018-Ohio-2018 , 112 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. D.B., 150 Ohio St.3d 452 , 2017-Ohio-6952 , 82 N.E.3d 1162 , ¶ 10, quoting Portage Cty.

2022The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.13 [having a weapon under a disability] of the Revised Code unless all of the following apply: (i) The offender previously has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or any felony of the first or second degree. (ii) Less than five years have passed since the offender was released from prison or post-release control, whichever is later, for the prior offense.

2022The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.13 [having a weapon under a disability] of the Revised Code unless all of the following apply: (i) The offender previously has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or any felony of the first or second degree. (ii) Less than five years have passed since the offender was released from prison or post-release control, whichever is later, for the prior offense.

2022“A court that is ascertaining the meaning of a statute first must ‘consider the “plain meaning of the statutory language.” ’ ” State v. Simmons, 2018-Ohio-2018 , 112 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. D.B., 150 Ohio St.3d 452 , 2017-Ohio-6952 , 82 N.E.3d 1162 , ¶ 10, quoting Portage Cty.

2021Cuyahoga Nos. 109754, 109755, and 109857, 2021-Ohio-1586, ¶ 28 , quoting Shaker Hts. v. Hairston, 8th Dist.

2020Summit Nos. 28604 & 28617, 2018-Ohio-574, ¶ 22 . {¶12} The parties herein agreed that, in exchange for his plea, Mr. Ramey would receive a sentence of 21 years in prison with “credit for all time served as required by law.” Yet, the trial court did not calculate Mr. Ramey’s jail-time credit when it issued his sentencing entry.

2019However, as we explained in Bodyke, “ ‘judgments cannot be deprived of their “finality” through statutory conditions not in effect when the judicial branch 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO gave its “last word” in the particular case.’ ” Id. at ¶ 55, quoting People v. King, 27 Cal.4th 29, 35 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 214 , 37 P.3d 398 (2002). {¶ 48} There is a significant difference between a trial court’s having once had jurisdiction to waive the payment of costs at sentencing and its having continuing jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of costs any time after sentencing.

2019However, as we explained in Bodyke, “ ‘judgments cannot be deprived of their “finality” through statutory conditions not in effect when the judicial branch 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO gave its “last word” in the particular case.’ ” Id. at ¶ 55, quoting People v. King, 27 Cal.4th 29, 35 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 214 , 37 P.3d 398 (2002). {¶ 48} There is a significant difference between a trial court’s having once had jurisdiction to waive the payment of costs at sentencing and its having continuing jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of costs any time after sentencing.

2018R.C. 2929.06(B) {¶ 26} Goff asserts that R.C. 2929.06(B) directs the trial court on remand " 'to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing,' " Goff's brief at 5, quoting State v. White , 132 Ohio St.3d 344 , 2012-Ohio-2583 , 972 N.E.2d 534 , ¶ 2, because he was originally tried by a jury and his initial death sentence was vacated. {¶ 27} R.C. 2929.06(B) provides: *224 Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial and if division

2018R.C. 2929.06(B) {¶ 26} Goff asserts that R.C. 2929.06(B) directs the trial court on remand " 'to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing,' " Goff's brief at 5, quoting State v. White , 132 Ohio St.3d 344 , 2012-Ohio-2583 , 972 N.E.2d 534 , ¶ 2, because he was originally tried by a jury and his initial death sentence was vacated. {¶ 27} R.C. 2929.06(B) provides: *224 Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial and if division

2018Cuyahoga No. 83285, 2004-Ohio-2858 , and to State v. Deal, 8th Dist.

2017He further argues that providing a hearing under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) at which the offender could challenge his classification before a judge did not cure the unconstitutionality of the initial classification by the sheriff. {¶7} In State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584 , 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court stated, It is well settled that legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.

2017He further argues that providing a hearing under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) at which the offender could challenge his classification before a judge did not cure the unconstitutionality of the initial classification by the sheriff. {¶7} In State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584 , 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court stated, It is well settled that legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.

2017And the prison term “shall not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) [sic (B)(4)] of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code.” Id. {¶12} Reading together R.C. 2929.01(EE), R.C. 2929.01(DD), R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) and R.C. 2929.15(B), it is clear that the trial court must separately sentence on each offense even when the court determines that a community-control sanction is appropriate for all offenses.

2017“When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required findings as part -9- Case No. 10-17-06 and 10-17-07 of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to defense counsel.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2014-Ohio-2177, ¶ 29 , 16 N.E.3d 659 .