Act does not waive immunity in Texas

2026Under the second factor, “any tort claim against the government is brought under [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity.” Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 . 11 Here, Branch expressly sued Quincy in his official capacity.

2026CODE § 101.106(f); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (“[A]ny tort claim against the government is brought under [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity.”) Indeed, Branch’s suit already includes a claim against the City under the TTCA.11 The second element of subsection (f) is thus also satisfied.

2025Zachry, 449 S.W.3d at 110 (“We conclude that the Act does not waive immunity from suit on a claim for damages not recoverable under Section 271.153.”). 2.

2025Zachry, 449 S.W.3d at 109 . 19 The graphic below depicts the proper interrelationship of the statutory immunity waiver in the Act and its other limiting provisions: 20 Because the Act does not waive immunity for consequential damages or equitable relief that is not expressly listed in Section 271.153, the trial court erred when it denied the Fund’s Jurisdictional Plea and granted the College’s MSJ (and implicitly denied the jurisdictional arguments in the Fund’s MSJ).

2013Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex.2008), and “even if the Act does not waive immunity” for the suit.

2009See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 (explaining that claims arising under the Texas 11 Commission on Human Rights Act do not arise under the Tort Claims Act, and therefore section 101.106(e) is inapplicable to those claims); Kelemen v. Elliott, 260 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (relying on Garcia to hold that claims brought under the Texas Whistleblower Act are not claims under the Tort Claims Act, and section 101.106(e) therefore does not apply to such claims).

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide.”); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median’s slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decision

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide."); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median's slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decisio

2019Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 , 621 –9– (Tex. 2011) (declaration of rights); City of Dallas v. Tex. EZPAWN, LP, No. 05-12-01269-CV, 2013 WL 1320513 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (interpretation of ordinance).

2017See id. at 621 (concluding that the Act does not waive immunity when a plaintiff seeks a declaration of their rights); Hank’s Rest.

2017Focusing on the phrase "subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter" in section 271.152, the court explained that " Section 271.152 uses Section 271.153 to further define the extent immunity has been waived" and concluded that "the Act does not waive immunity from suit on a claim for damages not recoverable under Section 271.153." Zachry Constr. , 449 S.W.3d at 109-10 ; see Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325 , 328-29 (Tex. 2006) (observing that "immunity is waived only by clear and unambiguous language" and concluding that City's immunity from suit had not been waived under cha

2015Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth., 2014 Tex. LEXIS 768, *25 , 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1378 (Aug. 29, 2014) ("We conclude that the Act does not waive immunity from suit on a claim for damages not recoverable under Section 271.153."). 59/ Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332-3 (Tex. 2006); see TEX.

2009See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 (explaining that claims arising under the Texas 11 Commission on Human Rights Act do not arise under the Tort Claims Act, and therefore section 101.106(e) is inapplicable to those claims); Kelemen v. Elliott, 260 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (relying on Garcia to hold that claims brought under the Texas Whistleblower Act are not claims under the Tort Claims Act, and section 101.106(e) therefore does not apply to such claims).

2009See Garcia , 253 S.W.3d at 659 (explaining that claims arising under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act do not arise under the Tort Claims Act, and therefore section 101.106(e) is inapplicable to those claims); Kelemen v. Elliott , 260 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (relying on Garcia to hold that claims brought under the Texas Whistleblower Act are not claims under the Tort Claims Act, and section 101.106(e) therefore does not apply to such claims).

2008BHA cites Lamar University, 971 S.W.2d at 196 and City of Fort Worth v. Crockett , 142 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

2008BHA cites Lamar University, 971 S.W.2d at 196 and City of Fort Worth v. Crockett, 142 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

2002State v. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex.1999); State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).

2002State v. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex.1999); State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).

2023Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 472 ; see also Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. 2011) (“[A]ny tort claim against the government is brought ‘under’ the Act for purposes of [S]ection 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity.”).

2023Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 472 ; see also Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. 2011) (“[A]ny tort claim against the government is brought ‘under’ the Act for purposes of [S]ection 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity.”). 7 Standard of Review A governmental employee’s motion to dismiss under Section 101.106(f) is an assertion of immunity and thus a challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

2023See City of Deer Park v. Ibarra, No. 01-10-00490-CV, 2011 WL 3820798 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); City of Houston v. Swinerton Builders, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 4 , 11–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2015Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth., 2014 Tex. LEXIS 768, *25 , 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1378 (Aug. 29, 2014) ("We conclude that the Act does not waive immunity from suit on a claim for damages not recoverable under Section 271.153."); City of Houston v. Swinerton Builders, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 4, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“In reading a statute, we give effect not only to the terms used, but the terms that the legislature chose not to use in construing a statute. [ ] The statute limits the waiver by stating that the entity ‘waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudic

2020See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 ; Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 379–82.

2020See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 ; Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 379–82.

2019See id. at 390 .

2018Robinson v. Scott Page 3 tort); Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2017Grp., L.P., 412 S.W.3d at 112 (explaining 9 that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not waive immunity regarding claims seeking a declaration of a plaintiff’s statutory rights or an interpretation of an ordinance when there is not a claim that the provision is invalid).

2013Estate of Lieberman, 332 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (“[F]or purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought ‘under’ the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions.”).

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide.”); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median’s slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decision

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide."); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median's slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decisio

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide.”); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median’s slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decision

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide."); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median's slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decisio

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide.”); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median’s slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decision

2007For instance, the Act does not waive immunity for decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install, because these decisions involve the exercise of discretion." (citation omitted)); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002) ("But the Act does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such as whether and what type of safety features to provide."); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) ("However, the median's slope and the lack of safety features, such as barriers or guardrails, reflect discretionary decisio