one final judgment rule in Texas

2026However, as Alcantara points out, “[p]robate and guardianship proceedings present an exception to the one final judgment rule[]” and in such cases, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” Id. at 924–95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)); see also Tex. Est.

2024“Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments, but probate proceedings are an exception to the one final judgment rule.” Est. of Brown, No. 23-0258, 2024 WL 3995734 , at *3 n.7 (Tex. Aug. 30, 2024) (quoting Brittingham– Sada de Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n such cases, ‘multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.’” Mackie, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (quoting Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001)). 4 Gladys does not include any record citations to the March 9 orde

2024See, e.g., Estate of Davidson, No. 05-15-00432-CV, 2016 WL 4254487 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in probate cases, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues”); Hill v. Hill, 460 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (“receivership proceedings are an exception to the one-final-judgment rule”); Franyutti v. Franyutti, No. 04–02–00786–CV, 2003 WL 22656879 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 12, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting argument that trial court erred in signing both a protective order and

2023However, “receivership proceedings are an exception to the one-final-judgment rule.” Hill v. Hill, 460 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied). “[A] trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable.” Huston v. F.D.I.C., 800 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1990).

2026However, as Alcantara points out, “[p]robate and guardianship proceedings present an exception to the one final judgment rule[]” and in such cases, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” Id. at 924–95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)); see also Tex. Est.

2024“Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments, but probate proceedings are an exception to the one final judgment rule.” Est. of Brown, No. 23-0258, 2024 WL 3995734 , at *3 n.7 (Tex. Aug. 30, 2024) (quoting Brittingham– Sada de Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n such cases, ‘multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.’” Mackie, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (quoting Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001)). 4 Gladys does not include any record citations to the March 9 orde

2023However, “receivership proceedings are an exception to the one-final-judgment rule.” Hill v. Hill, 460 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied). “[A] trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable.” Huston v. F.D.I.C., 800 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1990).

2020Corp., 800 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1990)); see also Hill v. Hill, 460 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (“[D]iscrete orders in receivership proceedings are an exception to the one-final-judgment rule.”). 5 Kretzer further argues that, because Roberts failed to appeal the 2013 final judgment and the March 2019 order appointing Kretzer as receiver, Roberts cannot now complain about those orders.

2022Code Ann. § 51.014 . 9Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1 , 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). 4 Courts apply an exception to the one final judgment rule for probate and guardianship cases because multiple final judgments may be rendered on discrete issues in the proceedings that are considered as final for purposes of whether appellate jurisdiction exists over the judgment in the appeal. 10 The exception exists because probate proceedings consist of a continuing series of events and intermediate decisions may harm later phases of the proceedings.11 Thus, an

2018Ctr., L.L.C. v. Estahbanati, 418 S.W.3d 867, 870-71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see also De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (the exception for probate proceedings from the one-final-judgment rule exists, in part, to allow appellate review of controlling, intermediate issues in order to prevent an error from harming later phases of the proceeding). 4 In De Ayala, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed the test announced in Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995), for determining appellate jurisdiction of an “ostensibly interlocutory probate order”: If there is an express

2022Code Ann. § 51.014 . 9Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1 , 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). 4 Courts apply an exception to the one final judgment rule for probate and guardianship cases because multiple final judgments may be rendered on discrete issues in the proceedings that are considered as final for purposes of whether appellate jurisdiction exists over the judgment in the appeal. 10 The exception exists because probate proceedings consist of a continuing series of events and intermediate decisions may harm later phases of the proceedings.11 Thus, an

2009In re Estate of Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (citing Logan v. McDaniel, 21 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)).

2011See, e.g., Art Inst. of Chicago v. Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d 564 , 570–73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (noting an exception to the one final judgment rule for discrete orders in receivership but observing that partial advances against a final fee award during a pending receivership are not subject to appeal under the 2 This court was notified that a suggestion of bankruptcy had been filed in this case on September 16, 2009, and that the trial court had ordered the case abated on February 22, 2010. 2 exception).

2011See, e.g., Art Inst. of Chicago v. Integral Hedging, L.P. , 129 S.W.3d 564 , 570–73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) ( noting an exception to the one final judgment rule for discrete orders in receivership but observing that partial advances against a final fee award during a pending receivership are not subject to appeal under the exception).

2015Id.

2009In re Estate of Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (citing Logan v. McDaniel, 21 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)).

2020See In re Guardianship of Benavides, 403 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (noting that “probate and guardianship proceedings are often exceptions to the ‘one final judgment’ rule” (quoting De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)).

2019In re Guardianship of Benavides, 403 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); see In re Guardianship of Macer, 558 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

2015De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (op. on reh’g); Christensen v. Harkins, 740 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ).

1998Christensen v. Harkins , 740 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. Civ.

2010De Ayala v. Mackie , 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006); see also In re Estate of Willett , 211 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (holding that partial summary judgment in suit brought by will's beneficiaries was interlocutory and unappealable because it did not dispose of all issues raised in beneficiaries' petition).

2010De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006); see also In re Estate of Willett, 211 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, 7 no pet.) (holding that partial summary judgment in suit brought by will’s beneficiaries was interlocutory and unappealable because it did not dispose of all issues raised in beneficiaries’ petition).

2020The court held that “a trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable” and justified its departure from the one-final-judgment rule because “[t]here must be some finality to orders which dispose of discrete issues or controverted questions by which the parties are going to be bound.” Id. at 847–48; see also Bergeron v. Session, 554 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1977) (op. directing clerk to accept appeal) (holding that order allowing fees to receiver was

2003Bobbitt v. Cantu, 992 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). 8 The final possible basis for jurisdiction is the exception to the one final judgment rule for discrete orders in receiver *571 ship proceedings recognized by Huston v. FDIC, 800 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.1990), and Bergeron v. Session, 554 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). 9 In Huston , the Texas Supreme Court held “that a trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable.” 800 S.W.2d

2024Ctr., L.L.C. v. Estahbanati, 418 S.W.3d 867 , 870–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see also De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (the exception for probate proceedings from the one-final- judgment rule exists, in part, to allow appellate review of controlling, intermediate 6 issues in order to prevent an error from harming later phases of the proceeding).

2018Ctr., L.L.C. v. Estahbanati, 418 S.W.3d 867, 870-71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see also De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (the exception for probate proceedings from the one-final-judgment rule exists, in part, to allow appellate review of controlling, intermediate issues in order to prevent an error from harming later phases of the proceeding). 4 In De Ayala, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed the test announced in Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995), for determining appellate jurisdiction of an “ostensibly interlocutory probate order”: If there is an express

2021Estate of Harris, 2019 WL 983772 , at *1; Macer, 558 S.W.3d at 230–31.

2019In re Guardianship of Benavides, 403 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); see In re Guardianship of Macer, 558 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

2023See De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that probate proceedings are the exception to the one final judgment rule and that in such cases multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues); In re Estate of Arizola, 401 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (holding an order appointing an estate administrator ends a phase of the probate proceedings and is a final, appealable judgment); TEX.

2022See De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 579 ; Harris, 2017 WL 4172585 , at *1; see also In re Guardianship of Conis, No. 12-14-00218-CV, 2014 WL 4922643 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 30, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“[A]n order requiring the deposit of funds as security for costs is not a final order under the test applied in De Ayala.”); In re Mitchell, 342 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (“An order requiring the deposit of funds as security for costs is not a final order [in the probate context].”).

2022“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.” Bonsmara, 603 S.W.3d at 390; see Pine v. Deblieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (applying this rule to hold that an interlocutory probate order merged into a final judgment); see also Hill v. Hill, 460 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (holding similarly as to an interlocutory order in a receivership proceeding, which presents another exception to the one-final-judgment rule).

2020The court held that “a trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable” and justified its departure from the one-final-judgment rule because “[t]here must be some finality to orders which dispose of discrete issues or controverted questions by which the parties are going to be bound.” Id. at 847–48; see also Bergeron v. Session, 554 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1977) (op. directing clerk to accept appeal) (holding that order allowing fees to receiver was

2013See Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57 , 92–93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Malekzadeh v. Malekzadeh, Nos. 14-05-00113-CV, 14-06-00341-CV, 2007 WL 1892233 , at *2 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 3, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2003Id. at 139.

2003Bobbitt v. Cantu, 992 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). 8 The final possible basis for jurisdiction is the exception to the one final judgment rule for discrete orders in receiver *571 ship proceedings recognized by Huston v. FDIC, 800 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.1990), and Bergeron v. Session, 554 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). 9 In Huston , the Texas Supreme Court held “that a trial court’s order that resolves a discrete issue in connection with any receivership has the same force and effect as any other final adjudication of a court, and thus, is appealable.” 800 S.W.2d

1994Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank, 795 S.W.2d at 827 ; Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215 , 150 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.Comm'n App.1941, opinion adopted); Aishman v. Taylor, 516 P.2d 244, 245 (Okla.1973).

1994Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank, 795 S.W.2d at 827 ; Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215 , 150 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.Comm’n App.1941, opinion adopted); Aishman v. Taylor, 516 P.2d 244, 245 (Okla.1973).

1994Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank, 795 S.W.2d at 827 ; Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215 , 150 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.Comm'n App.1941, opinion adopted); Aishman v. Taylor, 516 P.2d 244, 245 (Okla.1973).

1994Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank, 795 S.W.2d at 827 ; Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215 , 150 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.Comm'n App.1941, opinion adopted); Aishman v. Taylor, 516 P.2d 244, 245 (Okla.1973).