compensation exclusivity rule in California

2024Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800 , and other authorities, the trial court determined nearly all of plaintiff’s claims were barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

2020Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 813 (Vacanti).) The workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is based on the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’ ” in which, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability, the employer assumes liability regardless of fault for injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

2016(Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 709.) In California, the rule is more complicated, as the above discussion indicates: The rule bars recovery in a tort action for any injury happening under the stated conditions of compensation unless an exception applies.

2015Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 811 .) However, "the workers' compensation exclusivity rule applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the 'compensation bargain.' " (Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 366 .) "The compensation bargain does not encompass conduct that contravenes a fundamental public policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the 11 employment relationship." (Ibid.) "[W]hen employers step out of their roles as such and commit acts which do not fall within the reasonably anticipated conditions of work, they may not then hide behind the shield of workers' c

2026(Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 ; see also King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 1046- 1047; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1006.) “Because the workers’ compensation system has its theoretical basis in the compensation bargain between employer and employee, a nuanced analysis is required when [(as here)] third parties seek to sue the employer after an employee’s work-related injury.

2010The workers’ compensation exclusivity rule thus does not apply because SunLine’s act of refusing to allow Navarette to return to work on February 15, 2008, fell outside the scope of the workers’ compensation bargain. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 706-707; Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1, 15-16 .) Whether there was good cause for precluding Navarette from returning to work was the issue to be decided by arbitration, and was not encompassed by the WCA.

2015Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 811 .) However, "the workers' compensation exclusivity rule applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the 'compensation bargain.' " (Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 366 .) "The compensation bargain does not encompass conduct that contravenes a fundamental public policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the 11 employment relationship." (Ibid.) "[W]hen employers step out of their roles as such and commit acts which do not fall within the reasonably anticipated conditions of work, they may not then hide behind the shield of workers' c

2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2000Cedars-Sinai expressly disapproved Smith v. Superior Court to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in that case. ( Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) [8] Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675 . 680, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at iss

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2018(Livitsanos, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 754 .) Alternatively stated, that doctrine does not apply where the employer "stepped out of [its] proper role[]." (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 .) In particular, that doctrine does not apply to bar an employee's action for invasion of the constitutional right to privacy or for false imprisonment.

1994(Livitsanos v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th 744, 755 .) But although none of the cases cited above are directly on point, it is nonetheless instructive that virtually all the jurisdictions to consider the matter have concluded that a false imprisonment action was not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. 7 In stating that false imprisonment is outside the scope of the compensation bargain because it constitutes a crime against the person of the employee, we do not mean to suggest that regulatory crimes such as violations of health and safety standards or special orders are

2026(See §§ 3602, subd. (a), 5300; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1005-1006.) As a general rule, workers’ compensation is the sole or exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee “ ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment.’ ” (King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1051 ; see also Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 645 , 654; see Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 662 , 669.) 7 In determining whether the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars a cause of action against an employer, courts initially determine whether th

2026(Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 ; see also King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 1046- 1047; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1006.) “Because the workers’ compensation system has its theoretical basis in the compensation bargain between employer and employee, a nuanced analysis is required when [(as here)] third parties seek to sue the employer after an employee’s work-related injury.

2015(Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1248 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 ].) B In moving for summary judgment, Brady argued Prue’s first cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine under Labor Code sections 132a and 3602 and/or the Labor Code section 132a one-year statute of limitations, and he had not pleaded any public policy that may have been violated by his termination.

2015(Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1248 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 ].) B In moving for summary judgment, Brady argued Prue’s first cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine under Labor Code sections 132a and 3602 and/or the Labor Code section 132a one-year statute of limitations, and he had not pleaded any public policy that may have been violated by his termination.

2007Negligent Supervision and Retention Jones alleged her employer knew or should have known that the male correctional officers engaged in acts of harassment in the past, and it “allowed defendánt McMinn to continue to work in its place of business with no form of discipline or reprimand for his acts of harassment and assault on plaintiff.” Respondents again relied on the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule and countered, “The motion addresses this issue as a matter of law and is [sic] not based upon any undisputed material facts.” Subdivision (c) of Labor Code section 3601 “insulates the empl

2007Negligent Supervision and Retention Jones alleged her employer knew or should have known that the male correctional officers engaged in acts of harassment in the past, and it “allowed defendánt McMinn to continue to work in its place of business with no form of discipline or reprimand for his acts of harassment and assault on plaintiff.” Respondents again relied on the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule and countered, “The motion addresses this issue as a matter of law and is [sic] not based upon any undisputed material facts.” Subdivision (c) of Labor Code section 3601 “insulates the empl

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule

1990(Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 282 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 637 P.2d 266 ].) We reject these contentions and affirm that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from employment dismissal is barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

1990(Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 282 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 637 P.2d 266 ].) We reject these contentions and affirm that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from employment dismissal is barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

2026(See Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 509 [workers’ compensation exclusivity rule barred professor’s tort claims where she suffered injuries as the result of a bicycle accident that occurred on the university’s campus shortly after she left her workstation]; Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128, 1129, 1136-1138 [workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by an employee from a car accident on the employer’s premises (military base) prior to the 14 employee reaching his workstation]; Gutierrez, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 769 [explaining that injuries occurrin

2026(See Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 509 [workers’ compensation exclusivity rule barred professor’s tort claims where she suffered injuries as the result of a bicycle accident that occurred on the university’s campus shortly after she left her workstation]; Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128, 1129, 1136-1138 [workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by an employee from a car accident on the employer’s premises (military base) prior to the 14 employee reaching his workstation]; Gutierrez, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 769 [explaining that injuries occurrin