continuous accrual doctrine in California

2026(Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 815 .) However, there are several recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding accrual of a cause of action, among them, the continuous accrual doctrine.

2026(See Dillon v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427 [right to pension]; Carrick v. San Francisco (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 402 [right to reclassification for pension]; County of San Diego v. Myers (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 417 24 [right to Medi-Cal reimbursement]; Mezey v. State of California et al., (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1060 [right to reinstatement of employment]; see also Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823 [distinguishing Dillon and Myers]; Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [distinguishing Dillon, My

2025(See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 812 [monthly collection of tax]; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 141 [monthly welfare payments]; Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343 [periodic royalty payments under contract]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1378 [monthly payments and deliveries under contract].) Absent “a continuing or recurring obligation” the breach of which “provides all the elements of a claim— wrongdoing, harm, and causation”—the continuous accrual doct

2020A cause of action 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 for breach of a written contract is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. (§ 337, subd. (a).) As a general rule, the statute of limitations begins to run “when a controversy is ripe—that is, when all of the elements of a cause of action have occurred and a suit may be maintained.” (Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 (Armstrong Petroleum).) Relying on the continuous accrual doctrine, respondents urge affirmance o

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 , italics added.) The continuous accrual doctrine “is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent brea

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 , italics added.) The continuous accrual doctrine “is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent brea

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 , italics added.) The continuous accrual doctrine “is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent brea

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 , italics added.) The continuous accrual doctrine “is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent brea

2024(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) 31 Plaintiffs cite two cases in which courts applied the continuous accrual doctrine to pension benefit payments: Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 462-464 (Abbott) and Baxter v. State Teachers Ret.

2016Unlike in Dillon , then, plaintiffs’ failure to establish the tax’s invalidity within three years of its enactment does not preclude them from complaining, on grounds of such invalidity, of the tax’s continuing collection.” (Howard Jarvis, at p. 822, fns. omitted; see Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 463 [ 326 P.2d 484 ] [plaintiff was not obligated to seek a timely declaratory judgment as to right to pension before filing a claim for breach of pension obligation].) Armstrong, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 1375 , a case involving periodic royalty payments under an oil and gas lease

2026(Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341 .) Under the continuous accrual doctrine, when an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time the wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 , italics added.) The continuous accrual doctrine “is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent brea

2026(See Dillon v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427 [right to pension]; Carrick v. San Francisco (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 402 [right to reclassification for pension]; County of San Diego v. Myers (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 417 24 [right to Medi-Cal reimbursement]; Mezey v. State of California et al., (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1060 [right to reinstatement of employment]; see also Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823 [distinguishing Dillon and Myers]; Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [distinguishing Dillon, My

2025“Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 .) “The kinds of cases in which the continuous accrual theory have been applied . . . include a variety of instances in which the plaintiff asserted a right to, or challenged the assessment of, periodic payments under contract or under California statutes or regula

2018This court reached the same conclusion in Barratt American, supra , 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 819-820 , 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 ( Barratt American ), holding the continuous accrual doctrine did not *362 apply where the applicable statute of limitations states the limitation period began on the date the assessment is levied.

2018This court reached the same conclusion in Barratt American, supra , 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 819-820 , 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 ( Barratt American ), holding the continuous accrual doctrine did not *362 apply where the applicable statute of limitations states the limitation period began on the date the assessment is levied.

2024Instead, “[t]he time bar starts running when the plaintiff first learns of actionable injury [citation], even if the injury will linger or compound.” (Vaca v. Wachovia (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745 (Vaca) [holding continuing injuries from previous fraud do not restart limitations period]; see also NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237, fn. 10 [holding the continuous accrual doctrine inapplicable to new broadcasts of a reality television series because the broadcast of new episodes was “not a new breach, but rather additional harm” from the original impro

2024(NBCUniversal v. Superior Court, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237, fn. 10 .) 10 in Stone Circle.

2016The statute-of-limitations bar and the continuous accrual doctrine The statute of limitations, a legislatively prescribed time period to bring a cause of action, “exists to promote the diligent assertion of [the] claim[], ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191 ; accord, Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1246 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 ].) For breach of a written contract, that period is four years from the time the claim acc

2016The statute-of-limitations bar and the continuous accrual doctrine The statute of limitations, a legislatively prescribed time period to bring a cause of action, “exists to promote the diligent assertion of [the] claim[], ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191 ; accord, Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1246 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676 ].) For breach of a written contract, that period is four years from the time the claim acc

2016Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may . . . justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, *1342 notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside ... the limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 ; accord, Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-812 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ]; see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1058 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 116 P.3d 1123 ] [applying doctrine to employer’s retaliatory “course of conduct”].)

2016Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may . . . justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, *1342 notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside ... the limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 ; accord, Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-812 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ]; see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1058 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 116 P.3d 1123 ] [applying doctrine to employer’s retaliatory “course of conduct”].)

2016(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 [“ ‘[w]hen an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period’ ”]; see ibid. [“[b]ecause each new breach of such an obligation provides all the elements of a claim — wrongdoing, harm, and causation [citation] — each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery”]; Howard Jarvis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 809 [same]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d

2016(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 [“ ‘[w]hen an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period’ ”]; see ibid. [“[b]ecause each new breach of such an obligation provides all the elements of a claim — wrongdoing, harm, and causation [citation] — each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery”]; Howard Jarvis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 809 [same]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d

2016(See Aryeh , at p. 1202; cf. Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 [statute of limitations did not bar rescission claim where contract created a continuing obligation, severable each time, to pay royalties: “[t]here is no fixed amount to be paid out over time under the Kingsmen’s contract, but rather a continuing obligation to pay a portion of the profits and royalties on ‘Louie, Louie’ as the recording gets used over time”].) *1347 Finally, the Gilkyson heirs urge us to apply the continuous accrual analysis to their claims for breach of the implied covenant of g

2016(See Aryeh, at p. 1202; cf. Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 [statute of limitations did not bar rescission claim where contract created a continuing obligation, severable each time, to pay royalties: “[t]here is no fixed amount to be paid out over time under the Kingsmen’s contract, but rather a continuing obligation to pay a portion of the profits and royalties on ‘Louie, Louie” as the recording gets used over time”].) Finally, the Gilkyson heirs urge us to apply the continuous accrual analysis to their claims for breach of the implied covenant of good fai

2016Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may . . . justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, *1342 notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside ... the limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 ; accord, Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-812 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ]; see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1058 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 116 P.3d 1123 ] [applying doctrine to employer’s retaliatory “course of conduct”].)

2016Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may . . . justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, *1342 notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside ... the limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 ; accord, Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-812 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ]; see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1058 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 116 P.3d 1123 ] [applying doctrine to employer’s retaliatory “course of conduct”].)

2002(See, Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1195 , 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 , 36 P.3d 2 .) This is not a proper case for application of the continuous accrual rule.

2002(See, Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1195 , 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 , 36 P.3d 2 .) This is not a proper case for application of the continuous accrual rule.

2024(Abbott, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 445 ; Baxter, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 349-350; see also Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Development Commission (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1296 [applying the continuous accrual theory to annual transfers of tax receipts].) As a consequence, these cases involved obligations that were repeatedly breached by the failure to pay such as Plaintiffs’ impairment claim.

2023Moreover, although the continuous accrual doctrine has been applied to cases involving “an obligation to make periodic payments under California statutes or regulations” (Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Development Commission (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1295 ), no authority holds that the doctrine is limited to such cases.

2024Instead, “[t]he time bar starts running when the plaintiff first learns of actionable injury [citation], even if the injury will linger or compound.” (Vaca v. Wachovia (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745 (Vaca) [holding continuing injuries from previous fraud do not restart limitations period]; see also NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237, fn. 10 [holding the continuous accrual doctrine inapplicable to new broadcasts of a reality television series because the broadcast of new episodes was “not a new breach, but rather additional harm” from the original impro

2024Instead, “[t]he time bar starts running when the plaintiff first learns of actionable injury [citation], even if the injury will linger or compound.” (Vaca v. Wachovia (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745 (Vaca) [holding continuing injuries from previous fraud do not restart limitations period]; see also NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237, fn. 10 [holding the continuous accrual doctrine inapplicable to new broadcasts of a reality television series because the broadcast of new episodes was “not a new breach, but rather additional harm” from the original impro

2023(Vera v. REL-BC, LLC, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 69.) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. [Citations.] Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox), quotation marks omitted.) Under this test, “we look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongd

2013However, “ ‘[I]t is error for a . . . court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory.’ ” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 810 .) On its face, the operative complaint, like the two preceding it, alleges that the recurring imposition of excess charges was.not only fraudulent but also unfair.

2026(See Dillon v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427 [right to pension]; Carrick v. San Francisco (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 402 [right to reclassification for pension]; County of San Diego v. Myers (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 417 24 [right to Medi-Cal reimbursement]; Mezey v. State of California et al., (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1060 [right to reinstatement of employment]; see also Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823 [distinguishing Dillon and Myers]; Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [distinguishing Dillon, My

2025(See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 812 [monthly collection of tax]; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 141 [monthly welfare payments]; Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343 [periodic royalty payments under contract]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1378 [monthly payments and deliveries under contract].) Absent “a continuing or recurring obligation” the breach of which “provides all the elements of a claim— wrongdoing, harm, and causation”—the continuous accrual doct

2025(See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 812 [monthly collection of tax]; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 141 [monthly welfare payments]; Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343 [periodic royalty payments under contract]; Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1378 [monthly payments and deliveries under contract].) Absent “a continuing or recurring obligation” the breach of which “provides all the elements of a claim— wrongdoing, harm, and causation”—the continuous accrual doct

2024Instead, “[t]he time bar starts running when the plaintiff first learns of actionable injury [citation], even if the injury will linger or compound.” (Vaca v. Wachovia (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745 (Vaca) [holding continuing injuries from previous fraud do not restart limitations period]; see also NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237, fn. 10 [holding the continuous accrual doctrine inapplicable to new broadcasts of a reality television series because the broadcast of new episodes was “not a new breach, but rather additional harm” from the original impro