42 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Claremont Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Claremontgreen2 sentences2022(Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638 .) Second, if there is a significant and adverse effect, “we ask whether the significant and adverse effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision.” (Ibid.) If it does not, “the meet-and-confer requirement applies.” (Ibid.) “Third, if both factors are present—if an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees—we apply a balancing test.” (Ibid.) Under that balancing test, an action “ ‘is within th 2014The phrase “merits, necessity or organization of any service or activity” has no counterpart in the NLRA. ( Farrell, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651, 658 .) “This exclusionary language, which was added in 1968, was intended to ‘forestall any expansion of the language of “wages, hours and working conditions” to include more general managerial policy decisions.’ [Citation]; Stats. 1968, ch. 1390, § 4, p. 2727.) ‘Federal and California decisions both recognize the right of employers to make unconstrained decisions when fundamental management or policy choices are involved.’ ([Farrell], supra, 41 Cal.3d at p | 3 | 8 |
Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrellgreen2 sentences2014The phrase “merits, necessity or organization of any service or activity” has no counterpart in the NLRA. ( Farrell, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651, 658 .) “This exclusionary language, which was added in 1968, was intended to ‘forestall any expansion of the language of “wages, hours and working conditions” to include more general managerial policy decisions.’ [Citation]; Stats. 1968, ch. 1390, § 4, p. 2727.) ‘Federal and California decisions both recognize the right of employers to make unconstrained decisions when fundamental management or policy choices are involved.’ ([Farrell], supra, 41 Cal.3d at p 2014The phrase “merits, necessity or organization of any service or activity” has no counterpart in the NLRA. ( Farrell, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651, 658 .) “This exclusionary language, which was added in 1968, was intended to ‘forestall any expansion of the language of “wages, hours and working conditions” to include more general managerial policy decisions.’ [Citation]; Stats. 1968, ch. 1390, § 4, p. 2727.) ‘Federal and California decisions both recognize the right of employers to make unconstrained decisions when fundamental management or policy choices are involved.’ ([Farrell], supra, 41 Cal.3d at p | 2 | 10 |
Boling v. Public Employment Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2021He continued using his powers of office to promote the Initiative after the proponents emerged.” (Id. at pp. 904, 916.) In considering whether the meet and confer requirement applied, the Supreme Court noted that the statute’s “broad formulation encompasses more than formal actions taken by the governing body itself.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 904 .)8 The statute “expressly imposes the duty to meet and confer on ‘[t]he governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing 2021He continued using his powers of office to promote the Initiative after the proponents emerged.” (Id. at pp. 904, 916.) In considering whether the meet and confer requirement applied, the Supreme Court noted that the statute’s “broad formulation encompasses more than formal actions taken by the governing body itself.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 904 .)8 The statute “expressly imposes the duty to meet and confer on ‘[t]he governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing | 2 | 4 |
RIALTO POLICE BENEFIT ASS'N. v. City of Rialtogreen2 sentences2009First, the court considered whether the management action has a "significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 .) If not, there is no duty to meet and confer. ( Id. at pp. 659-660.) Second, the court considered whether the significant and adverse effect arises from implementation of a "fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Id. at p. 660.) If not, a meet and confer requirement applies. ( Ibid. ) Third, if both facts are present, the court applies a balancing test and applies a 2009First, the court considered whether the management action has a "significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 .) If not, there is no duty to meet and confer. ( Id. at pp. 659-660.) Second, the court considered whether the significant and adverse effect arises from implementation of a "fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Id. at p. 660.) If not, a meet and confer requirement applies. ( Ibid. ) Third, if both facts are present, the court applies a balancing test and applies a | 2 | 3 |
International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Public Employment Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2022(Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638 .) Second, if there is a significant and adverse effect, “we ask whether the significant and adverse effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision.” (Ibid.) If it does not, “the meet-and-confer requirement applies.” (Ibid.) “Third, if both factors are present—if an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees—we apply a balancing test.” (Ibid.) Under that balancing test, an action “ ‘is within th 2014To determine whether an employer’s action implementing a fundamental decision is subject to the meet-and-confer requirement (§ 3505), we employ the test found in our decision in Building Material . . . .” Claremont Police Officers Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 636, summarized Building Material, stating, in that case, “the city was required to meet and confer [citation] with the Union because the city’s transfer of duties to a nonbargaining unit had a significant and adverse effect on the bargaining unit’s wages, hours, and working conditions,” and its action was not “exempted as a fundament | 2 | 3 |
Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentiagreen2 sentences2014(Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 27-28 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 126 ].) Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651 , and its progeny guide our review and support the trial court’s conclusion the Department’s reorganization plan was subject to the MMBA’s meet and confer requirement. 2014(Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 27-28 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 126 ].) Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651 , and its progeny guide our review and support the trial court’s conclusion the Department’s reorganization plan was subject to the MMBA’s meet and confer requirement. | 2 | 3 |
Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejogreen2 sentences2010(Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 614, fn. 4 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 ].) “The meet-and-confer requirement is an essential component of the state’s legislative scheme for regulating . . . employment practices.” {Seal Beach, at p. 599.) “The duty to meet and confer in good faith is limited to matters within the ‘scope of representation’ . . .” however. 2010(Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 614, fn. 4 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 ].) “The meet-and-confer requirement is an essential component of the state’s legislative scheme for regulating . . . employment practices.” {Seal Beach, at p. 599.) “The duty to meet and confer in good faith is limited to matters within the ‘scope of representation’ . . .” however. | 2 | 3 |
Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004(Accord, Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63-64 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 588 P.2d 249 ; State Assn. of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 206, 211-213 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 786 .) A policy or regulation may both significantly affect wages, hours, or other working conditions and constitute "a fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 688 , 715 P.2d 648 .) In those circumstances, the meet and confer requirement is inapplicable unless "the employer's need for unencumb 2004(Accord, Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63-64 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 588 P.2d 249 ; State Assn. of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 206, 211-213 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 786 .) A policy or regulation may both significantly affect wages, hours, or other working conditions and constitute "a fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 688 , 715 P.2d 648 .) In those circumstances, the meet and confer requirement is inapplicable unless "the employer's need for unencumb | 2 | 3 |
California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Uplandgreen2 sentences2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement 2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement | 2 | 2 |
Soc. Servs. Local 535 v. Bd. of Supervisors of Santa Barbara Cty.green2 sentences1980Citing Social Services Union v. Board of Supervisors (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 498, 504 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 126 ], the City contends that the rule in question is an “indirect and insubstantial fringe benefit”—since it did not “materially or significantly affect the terms or conditions of employment”—and is therefore not subject to the meet and confer requirement. 1980Citing Social Services Union v. Board of Supervisors (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 498, 504 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 126 ], the City contends that the rule in question is an “indirect and insubstantial fringe benefit”—since it did not “materially or significantly affect the terms or conditions of employment”—and is therefore not subject to the meet and confer requirement. | 1 | 2 |
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultantsgreen1 sentence2023(See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2015) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404 [explaining that unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses when a party fails to serve a timely response is not subject to the meet and confer requirement].) 16 appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob | 1 | 1 |
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern Californiagreen1 sentence2022(See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [“A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it’”].) Lastly, the provisions requiring the parties to “exercise reasonable efforts to initiate a Status Conference call with the Court prior to filing an RFO” impose a procedural condition akin to a meet and confer requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Stationary Engineers, Local 39 v. San Juan Suburban Water Districtgreen1 sentence2013No. 219-E, at p. 11 [waiver of right to meet and negotiate may be shown by either clear and unmistakable language or demonstrable behavior]; see also Stationary Engineers v. San Juan Suburban Water Dist., supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 802 [employer may change policy after employees failed to appear to discuss proposed change despite receiving written notice]; Stockton Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Stockton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 62, 67 [union waived its right to meet and confer where public employer gave notice of proposed change in working conditions and union failed to timely invoke the meet | 1 | 1 |
| San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Stockton Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Stocktongreen1 sentence2013No. 219-E, at p. 11 [waiver of right to meet and negotiate may be shown by either clear and unmistakable language or demonstrable behavior]; see also Stationary Engineers v. San Juan Suburban Water Dist., supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 802 [employer may change policy after employees failed to appear to discuss proposed change despite receiving written notice]; Stockton Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Stockton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 62, 67 [union waived its right to meet and confer where public employer gave notice of proposed change in working conditions and union failed to timely invoke the meet | 1 | 1 |
| International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Union v. City of Pleasantongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solano County Employees' Ass'n v. County of Solanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Social Services Union v. Alameda County Training & Employment Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McElhaney v. Cessna Aircraft Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Firefighters Local 1014 v. City of Monroviagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huntington Beach Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silver Burdett Co. v. State Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach
green
2 sentences2024Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591 (Seal Beach), the California Supreme Court held that the meet and confer requirement of section 3505 applies to charter cities, despite the charter amendment provisions contained in article XI, section 3 of the California Constitution. 2018The meet-and-confer requirement of section 3505 is an important feature of state public employee labor relations law, and one that places a relatively "minimal" burden on a local agency's governing functions. ( Seal Beach , supra , 36 Cal.3d at p. 599 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 685 P.2d 1145 .) Further, the MMBA aims to foster full communication between public employers and employees and improve employer-employee relations. | 3 | 2010–2024 |
Townsend v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2024(See Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435 .) But this is precisely why it would be counterproductive to make such voluntary conduct subject to monetary sanctions.8 For these reasons, we conclude that after a motion to compel discovery has been filed, further expenses incurred in meeting and conferring on the discovery dispute, whether it be through private mediation or normal channels of communication, are not compensable as discovery sanctions. 2024(See Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435 .) But this is precisely why it would be counterproductive to make such voluntary conduct subject to monetary sanctions.8 For these reasons, we conclude that after a motion to compel discovery has been filed, further expenses incurred in meeting and conferring on the discovery dispute, whether it be through private mediation or normal channels of communication, are not compensable as discovery sanctions. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Cornett
green
2 sentences2024This appears to be an issue of first impression that requires us to interpret the Civil 24 Discovery Act’s provisions on monetary sanctions, misuse of the discovery process, and the meet and confer requirement. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s 2024This appears to be an issue of first impression that requires us to interpret the Civil 24 Discovery Act’s provisions on monetary sanctions, misuse of the discovery process, and the meet and confer requirement. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State Ass'n of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences2004(Accord, Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63-64 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 588 P.2d 249 ; State Assn. of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 206, 211-213 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 786 .) A policy or regulation may both significantly affect wages, hours, or other working conditions and constitute "a fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 688 , 715 P.2d 648 .) In those circumstances, the meet and confer requirement is inapplicable unless "the employer's need for unencumb 2004(Accord, Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63-64 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 588 P.2d 249 ; State Assn. of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 206, 211-213 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 786 .) A policy or regulation may both significantly affect wages, hours, or other working conditions and constitute "a fundamental managerial or policy decision." ( Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 688 , 715 P.2d 648 .) In those circumstances, the meet and confer requirement is inapplicable unless "the employer's need for unencumb | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale
green
2 sentences1987Appellants cite Government Code section 3505.1, which provides: “If agreement is reached by the representatives of the public agency and a recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations, they shall jointly prepare a written memorandum of such understanding, which shall not be binding, and present it to the governing body or its statutory representative for determination.” In Glendale City Employees’ Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 540 P.2d 609 ], the Supreme Court interpreted this provision as implying that an agreement must be 1987Appellants cite Government Code section 3505.1, which provides: “If agreement is reached by the representatives of the public agency and a recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations, they shall jointly prepare a written memorandum of such understanding, which shall not be binding, and present it to the governing body or its statutory representative for determination.” In Glendale City Employees’ Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 540 P.2d 609 ], the Supreme Court interpreted this provision as implying that an agreement must be | 2 | 1987–1987 |
City of Palo Alto v. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd.
green
1 sentence2024By contrast, the burden on the city’s democratic functions is minimal.” (Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 599 .) The MMBA’s meet and confer provisions do not dictate the substance of a municipality’s labor provisions, but they do mandate that municipalities follow a process 4 Although the city in this case violated section 3507, rather than section 3505, in City of Palo this court agreed with PERB’s analysis that “the ‘consultation in good faith’ mandated by section 3507 is very much like the ‘meet and confer’ process mandated under section 3505.” (City of Palo Alto, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2023(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 .) “[A]lthough we are required to decide ‘ “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect [in the complaint] can be cured by amendment[,] . . . [t]he burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff” ’ [citation] by ‘show[ing] in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.’ ” (LeBrun v. CBS Television Studios, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 199 , 212.) “The plaintiff must clearly and specifically set forth the 13 The trial court denied | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cooksey v. ALEXAKIS
green
1 sentence2023The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” (§ 437c, subd. (h).) A party seeking a continuance to oppose summary judgment “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained [through additional discovery] are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts.” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633 .) “[L]ack of diligence may be a ground for denyi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Frazee v. Seely
green
1 sentence2023The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” (§ 437c, subd. (h).) A party seeking a continuance to oppose summary judgment “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained [through additional discovery] are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts.” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633 .) “[L]ack of diligence may be a ground for denyi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Thomas v. Stenberg
green
1 sentence2023A. Negligence “To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662 .) “The limitations period for a cause of action for ordinary negligence is two years.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 662 .) The complaint does not allege a duty that the defendants had to Saffore that was breached within the statute of limitations for negligence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin
green
1 sentence2023A. Negligence “To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662 .) “The limitations period for a cause of action for ordinary negligence is two years.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 662 .) The complaint does not allege a duty that the defendants had to Saffore that was breached within the statute of limitations for negligence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. County of El Dorado
green
1 sentence2022(Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638 .) Second, if there is a significant and adverse effect, “we ask whether the significant and adverse effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision.” (Ibid.) If it does not, “the meet-and-confer requirement applies.” (Ibid.) “Third, if both factors are present—if an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees—we apply a balancing test.” (Ibid.) Under that balancing test, an action “ ‘is within th | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2018By contrast, the burden on the city's democratic functions is minimal." ( Ibid . ) We further reasoned that " 'general law prevails over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard to matters which would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the subject matter of the general law is of statewide concern.' [Citation, fn. omitted.] Fair labor practices, uniform throughout the state, are a matter 'of the same statewide concern as workmen's compensation, liability of municipalities for tort, perfecting and filing of claims, and the requirement to subscribe to loyalty 2018By contrast, the burden on the city's democratic functions is minimal." ( Ibid . ) We further reasoned that " 'general law prevails over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard to matters which would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the subject matter of the general law is of statewide concern.' [Citation, fn. omitted.] Fair labor practices, uniform throughout the state, are a matter 'of the same statewide concern as workmen's compensation, liability of municipalities for tort, perfecting and filing of claims, and the requirement to subscribe to loyalty | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Garcia v. McCutchen
green
1 sentence2018(Stats. 2017, ch. 273, § 1.) Similarly, section 439, which imposes a meet and confer 7 As a general rule of statutory construction, repeal by implication is disfavored, and an implied repeal will be found “ ‘only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes [citations], and the statutes are “irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.” ’ ” (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469 , 476–477.) 11 process prior to filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, provides at subdivision (d)(3) tha | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ass'n of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence2016The action “is within the scope of representation only if the employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.” [Citation.] In balancing the interests to determine whether parties must meet and confer over a certain matter [citation], a court may also consider whether the “transactional cost of the bargaining process outweighs its value.”’” (Orange County, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 40 .) 3. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Morton v. Wagner
green
1 sentence2014In this appeal, appellant argues at length about this court’s decision in Morton 156 Cal.App.4th 963 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1264 v. Municipality of Anchorage neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. The Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, Subordinate to Ip& Gcu green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| CAL. SCH. EMP. ASSN. v. Travis Unified Sch. Dist. neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| San Jose Peace Officer's Assn. v. City of San Jose green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.