Daubert-Lanigan hearing in Massachusetts

2024Admission of scientific or technological evidence is governed by what has come to be known as the Daubert-Lanigan standard.16 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 ; Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .

2024Admission of scientific or technological evidence is governed by what has come to be known as the Daubert-Lanigan standard.16 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 ; Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .

2024Admission of scientific or technological evidence is governed by what has come to be known as the Daubert-Lanigan standard.16 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 ; Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .

2024Admission of scientific or technological evidence is governed by what has come to be known as the Daubert-Lanigan standard.16 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 ; Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .

2023Hinds, supra at 222. "[A]pplication of the Daubert- Lanigan standard to soft sciences requires flexibility with special attention being paid to the criteria of reliability that different disciplines develop." Id., citing Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304 , 314 n.5 (2000).

2023Hinds, supra at 222. "[A]pplication of the Daubert- Lanigan standard to soft sciences requires flexibility with special attention being paid to the criteria of reliability that different disciplines develop." Id., citing Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304 , 314 n.5 (2000).

2024Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, "[t]he judge, acting as gatekeeper, is responsible for 'mak[ing] a preliminary assessment whether the theory or methodology underlying the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to reach the trier of fact.'" Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469 , 475 (2017) (Camblin II), quoting Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010).

2024Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, "[t]he judge, acting as gatekeeper, is responsible for 'mak[ing] a preliminary assessment whether the theory or methodology underlying the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to reach the trier of fact.'" Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469 , 475 (2017) (Camblin II), quoting Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010).

2025See Commonwealth v. Woody, 429 Mass. 95, 97 (1999). 8 Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish the reliability of expert testimony constitutes waiver of the issue." Esteraz, petitioner, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016).

2024See Matter of Esteraz, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016) ("The failure to request a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish the reliability of expert testimony constitutes waiver of the issue").

2022The failure to request Page 222 such a hearing "constitutes waiver of the issue." Esteraz, petitioner, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 328 (2015); Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015).

2015See Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015) (failure to request Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish reliability of methodology underlying expert firearms identification testimony constituted waiver of issue).

2023We concluded that the defendants were entitled to seek a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to challenge the reliability of the newest breathalyzer technology, because "breath test evidence, 14 at its core, is scientific evidence," id., and "where 'evidence produced by a scientific theory or process' is at issue, the judge plays an important gatekeeper role to evaluate and decide on its reliability as a threshold matter of admissibility." Id. at 648 , citing Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 . i. First Ananias decision.

2023We concluded that the defendants were entitled to seek a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to challenge the reliability of the newest breathalyzer technology, because "breath test evidence, 14 at its core, is scientific evidence," id., and "where 'evidence produced by a scientific theory or process' is at issue, the judge plays an important gatekeeper role to evaluate and decide on its reliability as a threshold matter of admissibility." Id. at 648 , citing Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 . i. First Ananias decision.

2021See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).

2021See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).

2022The failure to request Page 222 such a hearing "constitutes waiver of the issue." Esteraz, petitioner, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 328 (2015); Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015).

2022The failure to request Page 222 such a hearing "constitutes waiver of the issue." Esteraz, petitioner, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 328 (2015); Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015).

2006The purpose of the Daubert-Lanigan test, therefore, “is to prevent an expert from offering testimony to a fact finder that is not based on reliable methodology.” Id. at 315; see Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 649 (2005) (defining trial judges’ “traditional role as gatekeepers ... [as] protecting juries from evidence that had little chance of being reliable”). “[T]he burden is on the proponent of expert testimony to demonstrate its reliability, not on the opposing party to refute it.” Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100 , 112 n.7 (2006).

2006The purpose of the Daubert-Lanigan test, therefore, “is to prevent an expert from offering testimony to a fact finder that is not based on reliable methodology.” Id. at 315; see Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 649 (2005) (defining trial judges’ “traditional role as gatekeepers ... [as] protecting juries from evidence that had little chance of being reliable”). “[T]he burden is on the proponent of expert testimony to demonstrate its reliability, not on the opposing party to refute it.” Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100 , 112 n.7 (2006).

2021See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).

2021See, e.g., Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. at Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).

2010Rather, we have held that a Daubert-Lanigan hearing may not be necessary where the expert’s methodology has previously been accepted as reliable in the relevant field. 39 See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752 , 763 n.15 (2010); Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 538 (2001).

2010Rather, we have held that a Daubert-Lanigan hearing may not be necessary where the expert’s methodology has previously been accepted as reliable in the relevant field. 39 See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752 , 763 n.15 (2010); Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 538 (2001).

2024Finally, we consider whether the trial judge abused his discretion in his discussion of the other Daubert-Lanigan factors: whether FLH data evidence "(3) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (4) has an unacceptably high known or potential rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards." Davis, 487 Mass. at 454, quoting Powell, 450 Mass. at 238 .

2024Finally, we consider whether the trial judge abused his discretion in his discussion of the other Daubert-Lanigan factors: whether FLH data evidence "(3) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (4) has an unacceptably high known or potential rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards." Davis, 487 Mass. at 454, quoting Powell, 450 Mass. at 238 .

2018In any event, a Daubert-Lanigan hearing generally is not required where, as here, courts have "previously admitted expert testimony of the same type, where the testimony is offered for the same purpose, and where there is no factual issue as to whether the expert is qualified, whether the appropriate methodology has been followed, or whether the quality of the evidence is sufficient to permit an opinion." Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang , 458 Mass. 827 , 845 (2011).

2018In any event, a Daubert-Lanigan hearing generally is not required where, as here, courts have "previously admitted expert testimony of the same type, where the testimony is offered for the same purpose, and where there is no factual issue as to whether the expert is qualified, whether the appropriate methodology has been followed, or whether the quality of the evidence is sufficient to permit an opinion." Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang , 458 Mass. 827 , 845 (2011).

2013Id., quoting Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986).

2013Id., quoting Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986).

2025See Commonwealth v. Woody, 429 Mass. 95, 97 (1999). 8 Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish the reliability of expert testimony constitutes waiver of the issue." Esteraz, petitioner, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016).

2025It is not necessary for a judge to expressly qualify an EMT as an expert, "[a] judge may implicitly qualify an experienced, certified EMT as an expert." Bouley, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 714 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 834 (2004).3 "The crucial 3 Likewise, to the extent the defendant suggests that the judge was required to conduct a Daubert-Lanigan hearing on the reliability of Reddy's methodology (personal observations), because the defendant did not request a Daubert-Lanigan hearing prior to trial, the issue is waived.

2025It is not necessary for a judge to expressly qualify an EMT as an expert, "[a] judge may implicitly qualify an experienced, certified EMT as an expert." Bouley, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 714 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 834 (2004).3 "The crucial 3 Likewise, to the extent the defendant suggests that the judge was required to conduct a Daubert-Lanigan hearing on the reliability of Reddy's methodology (personal observations), because the defendant did not request a Daubert-Lanigan hearing prior to trial, the issue is waived.

2025"Nonetheless, regardless of whether such a hearing is held, a trial judge has an important responsibility as the gatekeeper of the evidence; before a witness may testify as an expert, the judge must make 'the threshold determination that the expert opinion is sufficiently reliable to go before the jury.'" Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159 , 172–173 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 417 (2014).

2024See Molly A. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 267 , 284 n.24 (2007). "[A]t the junction where Daubert intersects with summary judgment practice, Daubert is accessible, but courts must be cautious -- except when defects are obvious on the face 11 of a proffer -- not to exclude debatable scientific evidence without according the proponent of the evidence adequate opportunity to defend its admissibility." Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).

2024See Molly A. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 267 , 284 n.24 (2007). "[A]t the junction where Daubert intersects with summary judgment practice, Daubert is accessible, but courts must be cautious -- except when defects are obvious on the face 11 of a proffer -- not to exclude debatable scientific evidence without according the proponent of the evidence adequate opportunity to defend its admissibility." Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).

2024See Davis, 487 Mass. at 454 ("reliability can still be established by general acceptance alone, without regard to the other Daubert-Lanigan factors"); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2024See Davis, 487 Mass. at 454 ("reliability can still be established by general acceptance alone, without regard to the other Daubert-Lanigan factors"); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2021Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, "the touchstone of admissibility is reliability." DiCicco, 470 Mass. at 729 , quoting Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796 (1997).

2021Under the Daubert-Lanigan standard, "the touchstone of admissibility is reliability." DiCicco, 470 Mass. at 729 , quoting Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796 (1997).

2021See Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 32 (2012).

2021See Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 32 (2012).

2017Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 458 (2001), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 , and Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .

2017Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 458 (2001), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-595 , and Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26 .