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26 canonical passages across 19 cases, quoted by 5,774 opinions in total. These passages cluster together because the same opinions keep quoting them side by side: they state parts of one doctrine. The anchor passage is from Terry v. Ohio.
| # | Case | Flag | Canonical passage | Citers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Terry v. Ohio Anchor | green | “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” | 1,609 |
| 2 | Terry v. Ohio | green | “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” | 748 |
| 3 | Terry v. Ohio | green | “the officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” | 553 |
| 4 | United States v. Cortez | green | “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” | 417 |
| 5 | Florida v. Royer | green | “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” | 349 |
| 6 | United States v. Sharpe | green | “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” | 344 |
| 7 | United States v. Cortez | green | “the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture.” | 250 |
| 8 | United States v. Cortez | green | “an investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” | 199 |
| 9 | Florida v. Royer | green | “the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.” | 172 |
| 10 | Delaware v. Prouse | green | “even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” | 171 |
| 11 | Adams v. Williams | green | “the purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” | 168 |
| 12 | United States v. Sokolow | green | “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” | 164 |
| 13 | Maryland v. MacOn | green | “whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” | 128 |
| 14 | United States v. Sharpe | green | “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” | 92 |
| 15 | Michigan v. Long | green | “investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” | 78 |
| 16 | Sibron v. New York | green | “must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” | 76 |
| 17 | Arizona v. Johnson | green | “reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.” | 69 |
| 18 | Minnesota v. Dickerson | green | “if the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” | 58 |
| 19 | Brown v. Texas | green | “a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” | 53 |
| 20 | Michigan v. Long | green | “that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” | 43 |
| 21 | United States v. Bernardino Homero Tapia | green | “neither police officers nor courts should sanction as 'reasonably suspicious' a combination of factors that could plausibly describe the behavior of a large portion of the motorists engaged in travel upon our interstate highways.” | 7 |
| 22 | United States v. Brandon Odum, Also Known as Brent Owens, Also Known as Brandon Owens, Also Known as Brian Douglas, Also Known as Bryant Odum | green | “the experience of the law enforcement agent and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect.” | 7 |
| 23 | United States v. Edmonds, Brad | green | “the question of whether reasonable suspicion existed can only be answered by considering the totality of the circumstances as the officer on the scene experienced them” | 6 |
| 24 | United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Richard Nathaniel Mattarolo,order An | green | “had the officer continued to manipulate the object beyond what was necessary to ascertain that it posed no threat, he would have run afoul of the supreme court's holding in minnesota v. dickerson.” | 6 |
| 25 | United States v. Carlos Villegas and Fernando Gonzalez | green | “a reasonable suspicion that the individual is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” | 4 |
| 26 | Crouse v. Pugh | green | “the motor vehicle code of virginia recognizes the right of both the pedestrian and motorist to use the highways for travel.” | 3 |
A red or yellow flag on a member means the underlying case has negative treatment: for those, check the case page before relying on the passage.